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ABSTRACT 
 
AN ETHICAL MODEL FOR MANDATORY REPORTING TO AVOID PREVENTABLE 
ADVERSE HARM IN HEALTH CARE 
 
 
 
By 
Kate A. Molchan, JD, MA 
December 2018 
 
Dissertation supervised by Professor Gerard Magill 
The goal of the dissertation is to undertake an analysis in healthcare ethics that focuses 
upon organizational ethics to resolve problems related to medical error in the U.S. The ethical 
argument focuses upon justifying a model of mandatory reporting nationally. 
While countless others have argued in favor of the implementation of a mandatory 
reporting system, this dissertation presents its model through the lens of organizational theory; 
arguing first that healthcare organizations are ethically required to invest in patient safety.  This 
premise frames the foundation for this dissertation's central argument; namely, that U.S. 
healthcare organizations have an ethical imperative to protect the public from undue harm.  Only 
after having established this normative foundation does this dissertation address the primary 
obstacle to improving patient safety (the current culture of medicine) and offer suggestions for 
how to begin to build a business case to incentivize decisive action to develop a culture of safety.   
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 This dissertation explores the ethical justification for developing a centralized, 
mandatory, non-punitive reporting system that can collect and disseminate adverse event 
information to a national audience.  The analysis relates two foundational concepts to advance 
this argument: namely, the system-based approach to patient safety and institutional moral 
agency.  The discussion of the systems-based approach to patient safety informs the stance that 
healthcare organizations are uniquely situated to intervene to reduce medical error.  This 
approach emphasizes the role of system defenses, barriers, and safeguards in preventing errors; 
recognizing that, because humans are fallible and cannot be made perfect, reform efforts need to 
focus on system design to prevent harm.  The second concept provides a normative framework to 
hold healthcare organizations morally accountable for failures in system design. Without moral 
agency, organizations cannot be held accountable for their institutional practices or use of 
systems.  Together, these concepts provide an ethical framework to advocate for greater 
transparency and the nationwide implementation of a mandatory reporting system for 
preventable adverse harm. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The phrase “adverse harm” in the dissertation title may appear somewhat strange but it 
has become widely used in healthcare to combine two concepts related to medical error: adverse 
events and harm.  The goal of the dissertation is to undertake an analysis in healthcare ethics that 
focuses upon organizational ethics to resolve problems related to medical error in the U.S. The 
ethical argument focuses upon justifying a model of mandatory reporting nationally.  The ethical 
justification for the codification of a mandatory reporting system is explained by discussing these 
issues: the history of the current patient harm epidemic (Ch.2); the ethical imperative to improve 
patient safety (Ch.3); the theory of organizational moral agency (Ch.4); the relevant law and the 
history of the debate over error reporting in the United States (Ch.5); the application of the 
foundational concepts to present a model for error reporting (Ch.6). 
Error within the healthcare system is a major social policy problem.  In recent decades, 
iatrogenic (or inadvertent) harm has emerged as one of the nation’s most pressing healthcare 
challenges.1  Nearly two decades have passed since the landmark Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
report, To Err is Human, Building a Safer Health System first made the general public aware of 
the severity and pervasiveness of medical harm.2  The IOM Report, in 1999, galvanized attention 
on the problem of medical error.  The IOM Report is famous for its alarming claim that as many 
as 98,000 people in U.S. hospitals were dying every year from medical error.  Even more 
notorious was its jumbo jet analogy; the IOM report was credited with the analogy that the 
number of deaths in the U.S. from medical error is equivalent to one Boeing 747 crashing every 
day.  These estimates did not even include serious, but non-fatal injuries—only deaths. 
The IOM report, modeled after highly successful efforts in the aviation industry, 
recommended implementing a two-tiered system of reporting to tackle the error epidemic: 
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voluntary reporting of minor or harmless errors, and mandatory reporting of all serious errors.3  
To date, however, the United States still lacks any centralized, national reporting structure to 
investigate and reduce the occurrence of medical errors.  This dissertation explores the ethical 
justification for developing a centralized, mandatory, non-punitive reporting system that can 
collect and disseminate adverse event information to a national audience.   
The analysis relates two foundational concepts to advance this argument: namely, the 
system-based approach to patient safety and institutional moral agency.  The discussion of the 
systems-based approach to patient safety informs the stance that healthcare organizations are 
uniquely situated to intervene to reduce medical error.  This approach emphasizes the role of 
system defenses, barriers, and safeguards in preventing errors; recognizing that, because humans 
are fallible and cannot be made perfect, reform efforts need to focus on system design to prevent 
harm.  The second concept provides a normative framework to hold healthcare organizations 
morally accountable for failures in system design. Without moral agency, organizations cannot 
be held accountable for their institutional practices or use of systems.  Together, these concepts 
provide an ethical framework to advocate for greater transparency and the nationwide 
implementation of a mandatory reporting system for preventable adverse harm. 
Though the United States has not followed the IOM recommendations, the report did 
motivate the passage of the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (Patient Safety 
Act).4  Progress has been slow.  The Patient Safety Act—which became effective in 2009— 
contemplates the creation of a voluntary reporting system for health care providers to share 
safety event reports on a privileged and confidential basis.  The success of the Patient Safety Act 
depends on the establishment of independent Patient Safety Organizations (PSOs) to collect and 
analyze safety event information from health care providers.5  Curiously, however, the Patient 
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Safety Act fails to offer substantial guidance or funding for PSOs to carry out this work.6  As of 
2009, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) had certified 65 PSOs, although 
few had begun collecting data.7  In fact, many of the PSOs did not even have any contracts in 
place to collect information from providers.  Officially, in 2010, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) concluded that it could not comment on the effectiveness of the Patient Safety Act 
because the law is still in the process of being implemented.8   
To purportedly support PSOs, the Patient Safety Act also mandated the development of a 
Network of Patient Safety Databases (NPSD)9 to collect and aggregate non-identifiable patient 
safety data from PSOs.10  However, nearly ten years later, and there is still no word on when the 
NPSD will begin collecting information.11  AHRQ entered into a three-year contract with 
Westat, effective September 2007, to establish the NPSD.  In 2010, AHRQ and Westat officials 
reported to the GAO that they expected that the NPSD could begin receiving data by February 
2011, however, they also noted that this depends on both the development of common formats 
and on the development of a method of de-identifying patient safety data.12  According to a 
Federal Register notice, as of January 2014, AHRQ is still soliciting feedback and meeting with 
software developers to finalize development of the Common Formats.13  Still without a method 
to de-identify patient safety data in September 2012, AHRQ awarded a new five-year contract to 
ActioNet.  At the conclusion of that contract, ActioNet later submitted the only bid on a recent 
four-year contract (awarded August 2017) to further maintain the Patient Safety Organization 
Privacy Protection Center (PSOPPC) and NPSD.  While the plan was to utilize the PSOPPC to 
de-identify PSO data in order to meet the confidentiality requirements for submission to the 
NPSD, the full solicitation for contract HHSA290201700002C clearly confessed that “AHRQ 
has not yet built or implemented the NPSD environment nor received any data in the NPSD 
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environment.”14  Moreover, the GAO also recognized that, even if the AHRQ develops effective 
strategies and a working NPSD, the Patient Safety Act also relies on the voluntary participation 
of providers and PSOS.15  Not surprisingly, it is unclear whether the Patient Safety Act 
framework will be successful given the lack of incentives, federal funding, and legal precedent. 
Thus, while the IOM report generated widespread awareness and stimulated collective 
outrage, the public outcry has not been loud enough to break the cycle of inaction.  The United 
States healthcare system is still failing to reduce the occurrence of medical error.  Shockingly, at 
the same time, the death toll actually seems to be rising.  Recent studies have suggested that 
medical harm occurs in as many 1 in 3 admissions—most of which are preventable.  To this 
point, a 2013 study concluded that the current number of premature deaths associated with 
preventable harm is estimated at more than 400,000 per year16—more than four-fold the original 
IOM estimate.  To borrow the notorious jumbo jet analogy from the IOM report, this is 
comparable to, not one, but, three Boeing 747 aircrafts falling from the skies every day.   
It is clear that current efforts, including voluntary reporting systems, are failing to 
motivate healthcare providers to report or reduce errors.  Though the IOM report initially 
provoked patient anxiety, there has been all too little change in the healthcare industry.  It is 
understandable why—even if a patient's family does learn that their loved one’s death was 
preventable (a disclosure that happens infrequently) the problem of preventable deaths occur one 
patient at a time, in one hospital at a time.  If these figures had to be reported nationally, the 
public would be shocked and healthcare would be forced to make the necessary changes to avoid 
so many preventable errors and deaths. To truly tackle the problem of medical error, the U.S. 
healthcare system must be held accountable for this epidemic harm.  It is time to take decisive 
action to prioritize patient safety.   
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The purpose of this analysis is to approach the problem of medical error from the 
perspective of organizational ethics in healthcare.  Since the IOM report, experts have concluded 
that individual providers are not responsible for most errors.  Of course, there will always be 
some individuals whose incompetence or negligence justifies a malpractice lawsuit; but studies 
have convincingly concluded that poorly designed organizational systems (e.g., long work hours, 
insufficient safeguards, understaffing) are the root cause of medical harm.  Starting from this 
widely accepted understanding of error management, which focuses on changing the conditions 
within the system to anticipate and prevent errors, this dissertation adopts a similar approach in 
organizational ethics to argue for a nationally mandated reporting system that will significantly 
reduce the occurrence of medical error. 
The analysis adopts a systems approach in organizational ethics to explain the need for 
and contribution of a nationally mandated reporting system. While countless others have argued 
in favor of the implementation of a mandatory reporting system, this dissertation will be the first 
bioethics analysis to present an argument from the perspective of organizational ethics in 
healthcare.  This dissertation presents its model through the lens of organizational theory; 
arguing first that healthcare organizations are ethically required to invest in patient safety.  This 
premise frames the foundation for this dissertation's central argument; namely, that U.S. 
healthcare organizations have an ethical imperative to protect the public from undue harm.  Only 
after having established this normative foundation does this dissertation address the primary 
obstacle to improving patient safety (the current culture of medicine) and offer suggestions for 
how to begin to build a business case to incentivize decisive action to develop a culture of safety.   
The argument begins with a comprehensive summary of the extent of patient harm in the 
United States.  Chapter two provides a critical analysis of the problem of medical error, through 
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which this research has concluded that healthcare organizations have an ethical obligation to 
implement solutions in a more genuine effort to protect the public interest.  To fully appreciate 
the severity of the ethical issue, chapter two further examines the frequency and taxonomy of 
medical errors, noting the complex intersection of multiple factors.  Not surprisingly, safety 
improvement efforts have failed to prevent thousands of tragic deaths due to medical error.  To 
an extent, this shortcoming can be attributed to the intricacy of human error.  Chapter two aims 
to provide a comprehensive overview of these complexities, paying attention to the 
identification, frequency, and causation of errors.   
This picture of error and its causes provides a contextual basis to approach systems 
thinking within healthcare systems.  As medical education began improving and providers were 
able to employ more interventions and procedures, the healthcare system began attaining greater 
influence and ability to cause harm.  As early as the mid-1950s researchers were warning about 
problems with patient safety.17  Many of the early patient safety reforms resulted from public 
outrage in response to high profile, horrific errors.  In the 1980s, the death of Libby Zion led to 
public scandal about poor supervision and sleep-deprivation among medical residents. 18  After a 
massive overdose of chemotherapy in the early nineties, prominent health reporter Betsy Lehman 
died at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute in Boston—one of the country's most renowned cancer 
institutions. Then, in 1995, it was the Willie King case; where a surgeon at University 
Community Hospital in Tampa amputated the wrong leg.  In that same year, a New York woman 
died when her doctor used her catheter as a feeding tube; a surgeon in Grand Rapids, Michigan 
performed a mastectomy on the wrong breast; and a therapist in Tampa erroneously disconnected 
a 73-year-old's ventilator.19  Although these cases have had a profound impact on the practice of 
medicine, this type of specific headline exposure tended to suggest that medical errors—while 
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appalling—were rare, infrequent accidents.  The publication of the IOM report, however, 
signaled a new approach to error—it was the rise of the patient safety movement.  
Accordingly, the third chapter explores the history and evolution of the patient safety 
movement, with a focus on contemporary terminology and methods.  Armed with a basic 
understanding of the modern approach, this chapter also examines the contention that a 
prevailing culture of blame is primarily responsible for the high rate of medical error.  Informed 
by systems theory, proponents of this contemporary approach contend that healthcare 
organizations must abandon the practices of blaming individuals in order to improve safety.  This 
chapter helps to frame the foundation for this dissertation's argument that preventing unintended 
injury requires a systems-based approach; one that can identify and eliminate the latent defects 
within the current health care system that permit obvious, but often irreversible, human error.   
To successfully implement such an approach, it is essential to develop a solution that 
simultaneously fosters organizational accountability.  This dissertation argues that the failure to 
address this element is one of the leading reasons as to why the patient safety movement has 
made so little progress in reducing the occurrence of medical error.  To support this argument, 
the fourth chapter critically examines the application of organizational moral agency as a 
mechanism to develop normative methods to improve the quality and safety of healthcare.  This 
analysis further reveals that, safety improvement efforts are not only failing, but also that future 
efforts are unlikely to succeed given the lack of financial incentives for healthcare organizations 
to take the issue more seriously.   
Before addressing how to better incentivize the development of robust patient safety 
systems, the fourth chapter tackles the question of whether healthcare organizations are ethically 
required to invest in patient safety.  Through establishing the necessity for a systems-based 
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approach to prevent unintended injury, this chapter provides a foundation for the argument that 
healthcare organizations must get involved—indeed, if the public could individually curtail the 
incidence of harm, medical malpractice should have already been wildly successful.  Though 
there are many, the major failing of medical malpractice is that it only tackles the problem of 
preventable harm one patient at a time, in one hospital at a time.  Even when the family and 
public learn of harm (something that hospitals and other facilities can easily cover up in most 
cases), because the incident is presented as a single occurrence, it does not convey the severity of 
the harm epidemic.  In this way, the notion of accountability is critical to safety reform.  If 
healthcare organizations were required to report incident rates nationally, the public would be 
shocked.   The entire healthcare system would be forced to make the necessary organizational 
changes to avoid such rampant preventable harm.  A single incident, however appalling, will 
never be able to match the demand for a national level of systemic intervention—it simply does 
not seem necessary.  Societal expectations and judgments regarding health care are formed, in 
part, in relation to an understanding of accountability.  Accordingly, section B explains the 
emergence of organizational ethics within health care and clarifies how organizational moral 
agency can offer a framework to guide societal expectations.  
Having established that organizations must take patient safety more seriously, chapters 
five and six consider how to develop a solution to identify and eliminate defects within the 
healthcare system while simultaneously fostering organizational accountability.   
Within this context, the fifth chapter critically examines the ethical and legal debate on 
the centralized reporting of medical errors.  Opponents advance a number of arguments, but most 
center on the ineffectiveness of current mandatory systems; contending that mandatory reporting 
systems actually worsen participation in error management.  This chapter explores those 
 9 
arguments, making clear that the true problem is that the existing systems (both mandatory and 
voluntary) were designed to force compliance and impose punitive measures.  To truly realize 
positive change towards improving patient safety, error reporting systems must be designed to 
achieve those goals—these systems must be primarily concerned with collecting information to 
improve patient safety.  Instead, empirical evidence tends to show that the current mandatory 
reporting systems in place are underfunded and poorly executed.  Not surprisingly, these systems 
are unable to foster buy-in and help stimulate meaningful change.  While critics have helped to 
pinpoint many weaknesses in the current systems, these are not problems that cannot be 
overcome with a well-designed reporting system.  Far from an argument against mandatory 
reporting, this ongoing problem, instead, highlights the importance of garnering greater 
administrative support.   
To that end, the sixth chapter recommends a series of reforms that introduce mandatory 
reporting and encourage accountability through public awareness and the implementation of 
incentive programs.  However, change does not always come easy—particularly when the 
majority of healthcare organizations continue to ignore both the safety behavior and management 
dimensions of safety culture.  To achieve safe health care, this chapter provides a mechanism to 
cultivate a sense of responsibility for safety.   Given the fact that patient safety initiatives must 
compete for resources with other priorities, it is critical that any reform effort offers a compelling 
business case for patient safety.  Fully engaging the public, transparent accountability for harm, 
and systemically correcting the root causes of harm will be necessary to curtail this epidemic of 
harm.  To that end, this chapter articulates important mechanisms that must be incorporated into 
the centralized, mandatory reporting system: (1) incentivize safety efforts, (2) protect providers 
and institutions from unfair punitive measures, (3) integrate the reporting mechanism within 
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existing systems to streamline reporting, (4) ensure reporting mandates are clear and easy to 
interpret, and (5) provide meaningful feedback to encourage continued reporting.  Congress 
should pay particular attention to the importance of embedding the recommended incentives.  It 
is time to break the cycle of inaction and create a safer health system. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  PATIENT HARM: AN EPIDEMIC  
The United States loses more American lives to patient safety incidents every six months 
than it did in the entire Vietnam War.1 
 
—HealthGrades, “Patient Safety in American Hospitals”  
 
 
A. The Beginnings 
 Prior to the scientific progresses of the industrial revolution, society often regarded the 
medical practitioners of the 19th century with caution.  Given the lack of training and basic 
understanding of anatomy that marked the medicine of that era, it is not surprising that there was 
great suspicion surrounding the field—a field that was more often considered quackery.2  Yet, 
towards the end of the century, medical education was improving.3  By the early 20th century, the 
profession self-organized and significantly repaired its public image.  These new-century doctors 
embraced a code of ethics and abided by licensing requirements.  In the public mind, the 
American physician—adorned with an air of moral probity—was held in high esteem.4  Possibly 
the most revered of all was the small-town doctor; the lone physician that cared for entire rural 
towns with a single, characteristic black bag.  This image embodied the ‘Country Doctor:’ an 
“empathetic portrait of an American folk hero.”5   
 When making judgments about appropriate professional conduct, these new-century 
physicians consulted a single source: the Hippocratic code.6  Although it is commonly called the 
‘Hippocratic Oath,’ the Hippocratic ethic is a verbalized codification of a set of moral precepts—
more than an oath, it is a code.  As a code, it describes the expectations of ethical behavior and 
professional decorum for physicians.7  In solemnly swearing to abide by the Hippocratic ethic, 
the code and oath coincide, but the ethic does not lose its identity as a code.  In its entirety, the 
code represented the Hippocratic tradition, which was the standard of medical ethics.8   
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Establishing an ethical system within a code is not a traditional methodology, but instead 
follows from the rhetorical method of the argument from authority.9  In this way, the Hippocratic 
tradition exist as self-evident and self-justifying moral precepts.10  In classical logic, an argument 
from authority was accepted out of deference for the presumed expertise or prestige of the person 
or institution.  As such, the strength of such a claim varies based on the validity of the authority 
at issue.  
In this instance, the tradition gained moral authority as theories of common morality that 
were generally accepted and recognized as universal truths within the medical profession of that 
era.  Theories of common morality focus on a set of moral norms that are widely accepted within 
the social system.  A norm is a rule or pattern, which is usually related to expected social 
behavior, that is typical within a population.  While also describing expected social behavior, 
unlike a social norm, a moral norm includes a normative expectation that persons are morally 
obligated to abide.  All common-morality accounts share several philosophical underpinnings.  
First, each account begins with shared norms—these are typically established empirically.  This 
empirical investigation is non-normative, descriptive ethics because its objective is to uncover 
what factually occurs rather than establish what should ethically happen.11  Second, systems of 
common morality assume that the set of accepted rules or principles are universal and implicit.  
Principles are slightly more abstract than rules, but both order, classify, and group moral 
norms.12  Finally, these theories are pluralistic, as the proponents offer at least two (though, 
usually more) principles or rules as the basis for the ethical framework.13   
 A weakness in this approach is its reliance upon the sustained common morality.  Many 
philosophers accept W.D. Ross’s contention and agree that a system of morality can be founded 
on a common set of widely accepted moral principles, yet the endurance of any such moral 
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framework is dependent upon an undisturbed sense of common moral ideals.  Because a 
common morality builds from a set of moral norms, as a society becomes more pluralistic, the 
approbation of the common morality could deconstruct.14  Faced with the erosion of 
commonalities, a moral guideline based on common morality must develop a new basis of 
normative authority or be relegated to exist as a social construct without any moral force.15   
 While medical technology advanced, the common morality deteriorated as physicians 
faced increasingly complex ethical dilemmas.  The Hippocratic tradition did not provide any 
insight into matters of medical futility or, as healthcare costs skyrocketed, the distribution of 
care.  After World War II prompted huge advances in medical knowledge and techniques, 
however, medical commentators began expressing concerns about unintended problems.16  
Similarly, the public trust faltered; the introduction of technology had transformed the doctor-
patient relationship in ways that portrayed doctors as uncaring, greedy, and self-interested.17   
 In the mid 1950s things worsened, as researchers began publishing studies warning of 
problems with patient safety.18  Despite repeated revelations about patient deaths and injuries, 
they elicited almost no effect on the actual practice of medicine.19  The medical paradigm 
successfully combatted change using two rather effective safeguards.20  First, relying on public 
perception of doctors as well-intentioned and caring, it asserted that some level of inadvertent 
patient harm was simply unavoidable given the advanced level of technology.  As these injuries 
were unavoidable, there was no impetus to take any corrective action.  Secondly, in the unusual 
instance when it was too difficult to suggest that an injury was unavoidable, the practitioner was 
cast as the problem.  The medical paradigm was safely entrenched.   
 As Thomas Kuhn described, even without these safeguards, altering a paradigm is a 
revolutionary process; “each [new revolution] necessitated the community's rejection of one 
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time-honored scientific theory in favor of another incompatible with it.”21  To be accepted as a 
paradigm, a theory does not need to be complete or explain all counter-instances.  It takes a true 
crisis to shake up the stereotypes and pave the way for a fundamental paradigm shift.22  It will 
only occur when a profession can no longer evade anomalies—these are the tradition-shattering 
turning points.  In the case of the medical tradition, it will take significant pressure to penetrate 
the self-protective shell of rationalizations.  One expert, Michael Millenson, argues that the news 
media has successfully subverted the old paradigm and ushered in a new era of patient safety.23  
1. High-Profile Errors 
  Indeed, with the medical tradition ignoring the studies, the major push for reform came 
from the general public (after being informed by the media).  With high profile cases gaining 
intense coverage, the outcry was deafening.  
White Coat Criminals: The Libby Zion Case 
 In the 1980s, the death of Libby Zion—daughter of well-known investigative journalist 
and former attorney, Sydney Zion—led to public scandal about poor supervision and sleep-
deprivation among medical residents.24  The case, itself, is both confusing and contested, and 
almost every witness in the eventual court trial presented a differing account of the facts. 25  At 
least four different narratives, occasionally overlapping, emerged to explain the event: (1) The 
doctors and hospital, to varying degrees, are responsible for Libby Zion's death, which resulted 
solely from medical malpractice. (2) Libby Zion died because a broken hospital system allowed 
inexperienced and overworked trainee doctors to manage her care. (3) Libby died as a result of 
her own failure to provide a full medical history, specifically, by concealing her illicit cocaine 
use. (4) Libby Zion died an unpreventable death from an unidentifiable cause.26  That said, there 
are some undisputed facts.  
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 Late Sunday night, March 4, 1984, Libby Zion, an 18-year-old college student at 
Bennington College, presented to New York Hospital with a fever, agitation, and odd jerking 
movements.27  She had been ill at home for several days with a low-grade fever and an earache—
possibly related to a recent tooth extraction on Thursday, March 1—and had already been taking 
erythromycin, an antibiotic. Her condition worsened.  Libby began to act strangely, writhing her 
body and periodically seeming disoriented. Sidney contacted his doctor, Raymond Sherman, an 
attending at New York Hospital, who suggested that they bring her to the emergency room.28   
 The Zions arrived at the New York Hospital emergency room shortly before midnight—
the time on the emergency pavilion record was 11:43 p.m. During an initial assessment an 
emergency-room nurse, Anne Gallagher, logged a temperature of 102.9° F.  Nurse Gallagher 
recalled that Libby was unable to sit still.  She noticed that Libby was shaking and appeared very 
uncomfortable.  At some point during the two-hour examination, Sidney thought he overheard a 
nurse say the fever had risen to 103.5° F.  Not being able to find a clear diagnosis, the emergency 
room physicians admitted Libby at 2 a.m. for further observation.29  Though it was never 
charted, Myrna Blade, a nurse assigned to Libby's care after she was admitted, noted that she was 
throwing herself around the bed and swearing incomprehensibly, as though she was a little 
delirious.30  It made it difficult to communicate with her.   
 On that evening, the only staff member on call was Dr. Luise Weinstein, a first-year 
intern with eight months of experience.31  During the week, a house-staff usually comprised of 
three interns and one resident; but it was routine to be understaffed on Sundays.  The emergency 
room Dr. called ahead to advise her of the new admission and briefly discuss her case.32  Dr. 
Weinstein told her immediate supervisor, Gregg Stone—a second-year resident—and they 
decided to meet and examine Libby together.  Weinstein, who routinely worked between 95 and 
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110 hours every week, was already covering nearly forty patients, and both residents had been 
working for roughly eighteen hours when they began examining Libby.33  Stone arrived first, and 
had completed his assessment before Weinstein arrived, although he remained elsewhere on the 
floor to write up his notes.  Sidney and Elsa said that Dr. Weinstein and nurse Blade were 
already at Libby's bedside when they finally reached her room, after getting slightly lost.  Dr. 
Weinstein complained that Libby was a poor historian, hardly surprising.  At one point, Libby 
was so disoriented that she told Dr. Weinstein that she only had one brother.  Libby did disclose 
that she was taking Nardil, an anti-depressant, but repeatedly denied using any illegal drugs 
(except for marijuana).    
 Shortly before 2:45 a.m., Drs. Stone and Weinstein settled on a “plan of conservative 
care” (as Dr. Stone later put it).34  The plan, which the attending physician approved by phone, 
was to administer intravenous fluids and Tylenol for her fever while observing her and awaiting 
results from other tests.35  At the time, the preferred diagnosis was “a viral syndrome with 
hysterical symptoms.”36  Though this was still a preliminary assessment, neither resident was 
particularly alarmed—ordering routine vitals (temperature, pulse, and blood pressure) to be taken 
every four hours. Feeling assured that their daughter was all right, Sidney and Elsa Zion went 
home at around 3 a.m. Much of what transpired in the following three and a half hours are 
contested, but the charts reveal a general timeline.  
 Per Dr. Weinstein's orders, nurse Blade administered a sub-therapeutic dose of Demerol, 
an opiate, around 3:30 a.m. to help control Zion's shaking movement.37  Blade, a registered nurse 
for over seventeen years, was the only provider involved in Libby's care who knew that Demerol 
was contraindicated with Nardil; unfortunately, she reportedly had not reviewed the emergency-
room sheet to realize that Libby was taking Nardil at that time.38  Weinstein stated that she 
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looked up Nardil in a physician's reference book, but overlooked any contraindication for 
Demerol.  Around 4:15 a.m., shortly after Weinstein left the floor to see other patients, Libby 
was increasingly agitated, swearing, and trying to climb out of bed.  Nurse Blade asked Jerylyn 
Grismer, a 1983 graduate from nursing school, to call Weinstein to ask her to return and evaluate 
Libby because she was worsening.39  After observing Libby pull off her covers, try to remove her 
hospital gown, and attempting to scale the bed's side rails, Nurse Grismer called Weinstein to 
suggest that Libby should be retrained.  Evidently believing the agitation and shivering to be 
consistent with the prior symptoms she observed, Weinstein orally ordered restraints.  The nurses 
first utilized a Posey restraint that secured Zion's waist and chest to the bed.  When the Posey 
failed to contain Zion, the nurses also tied her wrists and ankles (supposedly, they failed to 
communicate this decision to Dr. Weinstein, who later said it was not appropriate).   
Not satisfied, Grismer called Weinstein again and asked her to come evaluate Libby 
personally. Weinstein refused, explaining that she had just seen Libby and was with another sick 
patient.  Weinstein reportedly felt comfortable with nurse Grismer's assessment that, despite the 
persistent agitation, there were no changes to Libby's appearance and respiration, and orally 
ordered 1 mg of Haldol—an antipsychotic tranquilizer.40  Sometime shortly after the nurses 
administered the Haldol, Zion finally calmed and fell asleep.  Myrna Blade, the senior nurse, 
stated that she woke Zion at 6 a.m. to take two Tylenol tablets.  Blade recalled that Libby was 
flushed, and she could tell that she was feverish, though she did not believe it was “that high.”41  
Just one half hour later, during the routine morning temperature checks, Zion's temperature was 
between 105.8° and 107.8° F.  The nurse's aide reportedly had a difficult time obtaining a 
temperature, as Libby kept thrashing and would not open her mouth.  The aide eventually 
obtained a temperature from Libby's armpit.  However, because an axillary (i.e., armpit) reading 
 19 
is one degree(s) lower than an oral reading and two degrees lower than a rectal reading, Libby's 
internal temperature was as high as 110° F.  Nurse Grismer immediately called Dr. Weinstein, 
who ordered cold compresses and a cooling blanket.  Ten minutes later, at 6:40 a.m. Libby was 
in cardiac arrest.  Despite extensive resuscitative efforts, Zion passed away.42  
 Even after her death, however, everyone remained puzzled.43  Eventually, the hospital 
would attempt to shift the blame to Libby.  Drs. Leonard (the emergency room doctor), Stone, 
and Weinstein only knew about the Nardil, erythromycin, and Libby's occasional marijuana use.  
In truth, Libby was taking far more drugs: her dentist prescribed 20 tablets of Percodan (only 5 
were left), her psychologist prescribed 30 Valium and 30 Dalmane, her pediatrician prescribed 
Chlor-Trimeton (an antihistamine), and she purportedly used cocaine (at least according to one 
toxicology report).  After conducting his investigation, Dr. Joseph Ruggiero, the chief resident, 
concluded that Libby's condition stemmed from a drug interaction between Nardil and one of the 
drugs that she ingested prior to admission—likely cocaine.44  Sidney was irate.45  
 Sidney Zion wanted the doctors to be charged for criminally negligent homicide.  Libby's 
cocaine usage—or lack thereof—was widely contested.  A supplemental report attached to the 
initial toxicology report, stated that the blood samples were retested and found to be negative for 
cocaine.  Sidney maintained that Libby died from a deadly interaction of the hospital-
administered Demerol with Nardil: 
I learned that they gave her Demerol, which the physicans handbook says you do not give 
against Nardil, that when she began writhing around, trying to break loose or whatever, 
trying to get out of that bed, Luise Weinstein refused to come down and see her and 
ordered a bed thing put around her, a restraint put on her, without examining her; that 
when Libby broke that restrain Luise Weinstein coldly ordered another one, another 
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restraint… Luise Weinstein still refused to come down and see the kid, ordered her hands 
and feet tied to the bedpost and then had her hit with a drug called Haldol, and Luise 
Weinstein never saw her again until they put in the code. …It is my definition of 
murder.46  
Sidney raged. With his media connections, he had immense influence over the news coverage, 
and he positioned the doctors involved as murderers in every interview.47   
 Though it is difficult to learn of this case and believe that Libby's death was 
unpreventable, it was not until later that experts could explain why—Libby died from a form of 
drug poisoning called serotonin syndrome.48  Despite its relative obscurity, this deadly 
interaction was first described in 1959 in a patient with tuberculosis who was treated with 
meperidine (Demerol)—the interaction was not named serotonin syndrome until 1982. The 
combination of Nardil and Demerol (or possibly another drug) may have likely raised the level 
of circulating serotonin to dangerous levels.  As she became agitated, exhibiting classic early 
symptoms, she was restrained.  The resulting muscular tension is believed to have sent her fever 
soaring to lethal heights.  Though the condition was discovered, until the Zion case, the 
overwhelming majority of physicians in the United States had not heard of the interaction.  At 
that time, there were only 20 reported cases since the 1950s.  In fact, according to their 
testimonies, none of Libby's doctors were aware of the interaction.  Dr. Weinstein reportedly 
consulted the Physician's Desk Reference, but had not noticed the warning that “death can result” 
from that drug combination.49  
 Interestingly, despite this, Sidney Zion was consumed by anger and would not stop until 
New York Hospital admitted it killed his daughter.  Though his crusade helped to spur reforms, 
especially in limiting the hours residents can work per day,50 Sidney arguably failed to push the 
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system to change in any meaningful way to prevent a similar error in the future.  Indeed, these 
interactions continue to kill patients today—even with hours restrictions.  What the system needs 
is a dramatic restructuring of how we provide care; from the improved utilization of technology 
to monitor and warn of potentially uncommon interactions to a new mindset for how young 
doctors are mentored and supervised.  To realize meaningful gains the commitment to patient 
safety must be systemic and engrained.  The fervor to again reform safety re-emerged after a 
similar high-profile tragedy a decade later.  
Betsy Lehman: Not the Only Victim 
 
[M]ay I appeal to you to pause for a moment, if you will, in your important task. For in 
the wings outside your busy meeting rooms may be heard the murmurings of patients 
gone now due to fatal medical error, or harmed by a medical system they trusted. They 
are the ones absent…. Among them is my young, brilliant daughter suddenly lost….  
Patient safety must be utmost and constant, both ingrained into the system you seek to 
strengthen, and into caring hearts.51  
 
—Mildred Lehman 
 
 On March 23, 1995, the Boston Globe published a chilling front page article warning that 
“Doctor's orders killed cancer patient.”  In the exposé, veteran reporter Richard Knox wrote: 
When 39-year-old Betsy A. Lehman died suddenly last Dec. 3 at Boston's Dana-Farber 
Cancer Institute, near the end of a grueling three-month treatment for breast cancer, it 
seemed a tragic reminder of the risks and limits of high-stakes cancer care.  In fact, it was 
something very different. The death of Lehman, a Boston Globe health columnist, was 
due to a horrendous mistake: a massive overdose of a powerful anti-cancer drug that 
ravaged her heart, causing it to fail suddenly just as she was preparing to go home to her 
husband and two young daughters. The error was discovered only last month by Dana-
Farber clerks, not clinicians. Lehman was not the only victim.52 
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The media frenzied, with 28 front-page headlines devoted to the heartbreaking error.53  After a 
massive overdose of chemotherapy, prominent health reporter Betsy Lehman died at the Dana-
Farber Cancer Institute in Boston—one of the country's most renowned cancer institutions.  The 
circumstances leading to her death are undisputed.  
 Lehman sought out an aggressive (and experimental) four-day chemotherapy protocol at 
Dana-Farber for metastatic breast cancer.54  She was to receive an almost lethal dose of 
chemotherapy, which she believed would give her a 20 percent chance of surviving for another 5 
years.  Unfortunately, the protocol summary failed to clarify whether the specified dose of 
cyclophosphamide (6,520 milligrams) was intended to be administered as the daily dose or the 
cumulative dose over the course of the 4-day treatment.  Because the prescription was on a note 
used for daily doses, Betsy was given 16 days' worth of treatment in four days.  Less than three 
weeks later, she died as a result of cardiac toxicity from the overdose.  
 Unlike in the Zion case, the error killing Betsy occurred multiple times over the course of 
multiple days, under the supervision of at least a dozen experienced physicians, nurses, and 
pharmacists.  It was her third round of chemotherapy and Betsy was alarmed at the severity of 
the side effects.  It was far worse than she had experienced in the prior rounds; she was vomiting 
sheets of tissue lining from her gut.  Despite her complaints, doctors overlooked the signs of the 
overdose, interpreting the severe side effects as normal reactions to the intentionally aggressive 
treatment.  
  Shortly before she was to be discharged, Betsy called Hester Hill, a friend who was also a 
social worker at the nearby Beth Israel Hospital.  When Hester failed to answer, Lehman left a 
message explaining that she was calling because she was feeling very frightened: "I don't know 
what is wrong, but something's wrong."55  Less than an hour later she was found dead.  
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 Worse still, just days before Lehman's first dosage, another woman was given the same 
four-fold overdose.  Maureen Bateman, a fifty-two-year-old patient, suffered irreversible heart 
damage, yet recovered and survived for another three years.  The news of these errors was a 
strong wake-up call:56 the Dana-Faber Cancer Institute was not just any institution, it was a 
world-class facility.  Given the institute's prominence within the community, news of the nearly 
simultaneous and deadly errors was met with profound shock.   
As Knox recalled, the errors were "so irrevocably bald" that the Boston medical 
community made no attempt to defend itself.57  Millenson argues that, as a result, the Lehman 
incident became the unavoidable anomaly that subverted the existing paradigm.  To his point, 
within six months, the Massachusetts Hospital Association ("MHA") launched a medication 
safety project.  A year later, the MHA started forming a Coalition for Prevention of Medical 
Errors.  This was around the same time that the AMA was finalizing its plans for a new safety 
foundation.  Millenson contends that the support of influential groups such as the MHA and 
AMA bolstered the patient safety movement, making it easier to publish accounts illustrating the 
old paradigm's failure to protect patients.  
 Though Millenson's contention is compelling, the fact remains that these errors continue 
to persist without any genuine evidence of a paradigm shift.  Looking just at medication 
overdoses (similar to that causing Besty Lehman's death), it is plain that little has improved over 
the years.  
 More than a decade after Lehman's tragic passing, on November 9, 2006, 21-day-old 
Alyssa Shinn died after being prescribed a lethal dosage of zinc.58  Alyssa was born 14 weeks 
premature.  In order to boost her metabolism, the hospital intravenously administered total 
parenteral nutrition (TPN).  TPN is a necessary way to provide nutrition for infants, particularly 
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pre-term, whose bodies cannot absorb sufficient (or sometimes, any) nutrition through their 
stomach or intestine.  TPN allows fluids to enter the body intravenously, bypassing the GI tract.  
The dosage includes a combination of protein, carbohydrates, fats, vitamins, minerals, and 
electrolytes.  Late on the evening of November 8, the lead pharmacist, Pam Goff began mixing 
an order for 330 micrograms of zinc.  However, when she entered the order in the machine that 
mixes the compound, she accidentally selected milligrams (instead of micrograms) from the 
drop-down menu.  This lead to a 1,000-fold increase beyond the prescribed dosage.  That 
evening, nurses started Alyssa on this new dose.  By 6:30 a.m. the next morning, the pharmacist 
sent a memo warning of a possible medication error, "send new TPN stat."  Sadly, due (in part) 
to staffing shortages, the team failed to change her IV until 1 p.m.  Nurses immediately began 
flushing Alyssa's small body with an antidote, but it was too late—Alyssa died.  Upon being 
summoned to see her supervisor, Pam said: "I just broke down into tears and started to shake… I 
just sobbed uncontrollably. I went back to my desk and started to vomit and cry and shake."  An 
investigation later revealed that a safety stop on the mixing machine had not been set, two other 
pharmacists failed to check Goff's calculation, and the technician neglected to raise any alarms at 
needing to replenish the machine 11 times for it to complete filling the infant's TPN bag with 48 
vials of zinc.  The nursing staff also did not seem to notice that the bag was significantly larger 
than usual.  These cases are not rare.  
 In 2006, an Indianapolis hospital accidentally dosed 6 infants with 1000 times the 
prescribed dose of heparin—three died.59  Just a year later, in November 2007, Dennis Quaid and 
his wife, Kimberly, almost lost their twins, Thomas Boone and Zoe Grace, to a similar overdose.  
Heparin, which functions as an anticoagulant, is routinely used in neonatal intensive care units to 
prevent the formation and extension of blood clots.60  The arterial lines, which are commonly 
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used to monitor neonates, are associated with clinically significant risks of catheter occlusion 
(i.e., the plastic tubing is obstructed) and thrombosis (i.e., blood clots within blood vessels).  
Often the catheter occlusion is secondary to thrombosis.  To reduce these complications, most 
neonatal intensive care units prescribe some form of heparin infusion to maintain the patency or 
openness of the catheter.  In many cases involving heparin overdoses, technicians are mistaking 
10,000 unit per millimeter vials for the prescribed 10 unit per millimeter heparin vials.  Though 
horrifying, the frequency of these errors clearly demonstrates that these errors are due to a larger 
system error.  In this particular case, the manufacturer packaging for the doses look very similar: 
both packaged in similar size vials with shades of blue as the main background color on the 
label.61  
 That same year, another nurse, Julie Thao, was arrested and charged with felony 
manslaughter after a medication error lead to the death of a young mother.62  Julie was a veteran 
nurse with 15 years of service in a high volume obstetrics unit at St. Mary's Hospital.  During a 
busy holiday season, Julie offered to work extra shifts to help cover a coworker's family medical 
leave.  At the time of the error, she had just finished a 16.75-hour double shift less than six hours 
before starting her third shift at 7 a.m.  During the second half of her third shift, Jasmine Grant 
was admitted to give birth.  Following a formalized workaround, Julie began preparing an 
epidural before the anesthesiologist arrived.  This to-do list was implemented to minimize the 
amount of time that the anesthesiologist needed to be in the unit.  The nurses were to obtain the 
necessary medications, insert and prime the tubing, and place the medications on the infusion 
pump before the anesthesiologist arrived and actually wrote the necessary order.  At the same 
time, Julie was supposed to administer IV penicillin to treat a streptococcal infection.  Confusing 
the two infusion bags, Julie mistakenly delivered the epidural medication through the IV meant 
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for the antibiotic.  Tragically, Jasmine suffered a cardiac arrest and died.  As a result, Nurse Thao 
was terminated from her position without severance and charged with felony criminal neglect.   
Facing jail time and unable to pay legal fees for a stronger defense, Thao pled no contest 
to two misdemeanors.  Though this allowed her to avoid a jail sentence, the Board of Nursing 
suspended her license for 9 months, and her convictions barred her from practicing in any 
federally funded health care organization for five years.63  Interestingly, a further condition of the 
Nursing Board's sanctions, prohibited Thao from working for more than 12 hours per day.64  This 
sanction tends to suggest that the Board believed that Thao was uniquely unable to work fatigued 
without an elevated risk of error, yet somehow other nurses are similarly unaffected.    
 In the specific case of St. Mary's Hospital, a root cause analysis report revealing systemic 
defects allowing for the error partially vindicated Thao.  Most notably, the report clarified that 
nurses prepared epidurals early (a violation of hospital policy) in response to pressure from 
anesthesiologists.65  In response to those defects, St. Mary's now requires signed orders for 
epidurals, has greatly increased the use of technology to limit error, and requires nurses working 
longer than 16 hours to take 12 hours off before returning to work.  Any one of these protections 
would have prevented Jasmine Grant's tragic passing.  
 Although these highly publicized cases have had a profound impact on the practice of 
medicine (particularly on an institutional or case-specific level), this type of exceptional headline 
exposure also tends to suggest that medical errors—while appalling—are rare, infrequent 
accidents.  The public and community are initially appalled, but quickly pacified at the first sign 
of corrective action.  After all, the stories appear to be newsworthy because they are unique in 
some way, lending to the belief that the tragedies are horrific, but isolated incidents.66  However, 
a turning point for the error prevention movement came in late November, 1999.   
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2. The IOM Report, To Err is Human 
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published a comprehensive 223-page report on 
medical errors that astonished the nation.  Its goal was to break the unacceptable cycle of 
inaction.  According to the report’s most famous and disturbing claim, as many as 98,000 people 
were dying in U.S. hospitals each year from medical error.67  These estimates did not even 
include serious but non-fatal injuries—just deaths.68  As it put it, "to err is human, but errors can 
be prevented."69   To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System was the first publication to 
offer broad transparency into the shockingly high rate of medical error—not just by way of a 
singular, isolated tragedy, but with comprehensive numbers.70  Because of this, some experts 
even went so far as to suggest that To Err is Human represents the ‘discovery’ of the epidemic of 
medical mistakes.71   
Interestingly, even though To Err is Human merely republished decade-old results from 
other studies, it was the first document that vaulted patient safety into the mainstream media.72  
Specifically, To Err is Human relied on two prior studies: a then unpublished study of adverse 
events in Colorado and Utah, and the well-known Harvard Medical Practice Study of iatrogenic 
injury in New York hospitals.  The Harvard Medical Practice Study was a retrospective review 
of 30,121 medical records from patients discharged from acute care hospitals throughout New 
York in 1984.73  The Utah-Colorado Medical Practice Study similarly reviewed discharge 
records from twenty-eight hospitals in Utah and Colorado in 1992.  When the results of these 
studies were extrapolated to the 33.6 million hospital admissions in the U.S. in 1997, the Utah 
and Colorado study suggested that as many as 44,000 patients were dying yearly as a result of 
hospital error.  The New York Study had a higher death toll, suggesting that the number might be 
as high as 98,000.  Press coverage quickly dropped the lower figure, reporting instead the high-
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end estimate.  Further, few journalists conveyed the subtleties of the report; neglecting to 
mention that the numbers came from data that was already more than fifteen years old.   
Many experts also credit the IOM with an even more notorious jumbo jet analogy.  As it 
goes, To Err is Human provided a tangible icon for the magnitude of the problem (one that, some 
argue, managed to shake the nation out of its collective inattention), pointing out that the number 
of deaths in the U.S. from medical error is equivalent to one Boeing 747 crashing every day.74  In 
fact, Lucian Leape first published this analogy in a 1994 JAMA article.  Writing about the 1991 
Harvard Medical Practice Study (the same study that the IOM report cited), Leape wrote: 
Also in 1991, the Harvard Medical Practice Study reported the results of a population-
based study of iatrogenic injury in patients hospitalized in New York State in 1984.  
Nearly 4% of patients suffered an injury that prolonged their hospital stay or resulted in 
measurable disability. For New York State, this equaled 98,609 patients in 1984.  Nearly 
14% of these injuries were fatal. If these rates are typical of the United States, then 
180,000 people die each year partly as a result of iatrogenic injury, the equivalent of 
three jumbo-jet crashes every two days (emphasis added).75  
Even more curious, the mainstream media did accurately report on Leape's article in 1994, 
however, it failed to garner the same attention that the IOM report would later stimulate.  By 
March of 1995, Newsweek altered the quote, simplifying the formulation to just one jet crashing 
every day.76  Nearly 6 years later, Leape (a co-author on the IOM report) was continuing to 
emphasize his jumbo jet analogy during interviews.  Reporters, having not read the IOM report, 
mistakenly credited Leape's 1994 jumbo jet analogy to the IOM report (as opposed to the earlier 
article).  This makes it even more interesting that the IOM report had such a significant impact—
not only was the data decades old, but even the sensationalized sound-bites were recycled from 
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prior articles.  Nevertheless, for some reason, the IOM report was able to initiate action in a way 
that prior reports could not.  
  
FIGURE 2.1. History of the Patient Safety Movement. 
 
Before the IOM report, the entire profession (including governments and academic 
constituents) seemed committed to downplaying the frequency of error within health care.77  
Whether it was deliberate neglect or simple ignorance, providers, healthcare organizations, and 
policy makers were not taking seriously the need to improve safety.  Though the jumbo jet 
analogy had been reported in the news nearly five years before the IOM report, a major 
difference that could account for the significantly different reaction to the IOM report is that, 
though the prior studies and articles received some mention, the IOM report was splayed across 
front-page covers and was given significant airtime during mainstream nightly news features.  As 
expected, this exposé caused a media frenzy that seized the public’s attention.  Though this did 
not start the patient safety reform moment (see figure 2.1), it did propel it to the forefront of the 
nation's focus.   
PATIENT SAFETY MOVEMENT – HIGHLIGHTS  
1959: Moser's book Diseases of Medical Progress. 
1978: Cooper: Preventable Anesthesia Mishaps published.  
1982: 20/20 "The Deep Sleep" airs.  
1984: Libby Zion dies. 
1985: Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation formed. 
1991: Harvard Medical practice studies published in the New England Journal of 
Medicine. 
1994: JAMA publishes Leape's seminal article, "Error in Medicine"   
1995: Boston Globe columnist Besty Lehman dies.  
1996: First Annenberg Patient Safety Conference held.  
1997: National Patient Safety Foundation formed.  
1999: Institute of Medicine published To Err is Human. 
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Not surprisingly, the IOM report provoked patient anxiety on a much larger scale than the 
individually reported errors could muster in the past.  The public demanded swift action.  Safety 
instantly became a central focus, making the IOM report perhaps the single-most instrumental 
publication in igniting the patient safety movement.78  Aside from drawing attention to the 
epidemic, the IOM report offered a comprehensive strategy to improve patient safety.  Utilizing a 
four-tiered approach, the IOM report issued the following recommendations: 
•   Establishing a national focus to create leadership, research, tools and protocols to 
enhance the knowledge base about safety; 
•   Identifying and learning from errors through immediate and strong mandatory 
reporting efforts, as well as the encouragement of voluntary efforts, both with the 
aim of making sure the system continues to be made safer for patients; 
•   Raising standards and expectations for improvements in safety through the actions 
of oversight organizations, group purchasers, and professional groups; and  
•   Creating safety systems inside health care organizations through the 
implementation of safe practices at the delivery level. This level is the ultimate 
target of all of the recommendations.79 
Specifically, in order to develop a national focus, the report tasked Congress with establishing a 
Center for Patient Safety within the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality ("AHRQ").  
This new center, it explained, should be responsible for developing knowledge and 
understanding of errors within healthcare, and setting nationwide goals to prevent errors and 
improve patient safety.  It should monitor progress in meeting those goals and issue an annual 
report to the President and Congress.  The IOM report also emphasized the importance of 
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adequately funding the Center, especially as it also directed that the Center should oversee the 
allocation of research dollars to test and evaluate best practices for preventing errors.  
 To aid the Center for Patient Safety in meeting its goals, the IOM report urged Congress 
to establish reporting systems.80  Without these systems to collect data, the Center would struggle 
to evaluate progress toward national goals.  The report envisioned that two systems would work 
conjointly: a nationwide mandatory reporting system that collects a limited set of standardized 
information about serious adverse harm, and a network of voluntary reporting systems that 
collect more detailed data about broader causes of harm.  To encourage reporting, the IOM 
report also recommended that Congress pass legislation extending the peer review privilege to 
protect data related to patient safety.81   
 Simultaneously, the IOM report recognized that health care organizations will need 
multi-faceted external pressures to devote more attention to patient safety.82  To this end, the 
report urged regulators, accreditors, and payers to hold organizations more accountable.  It 
advised regulators and accreditors to require organizations to develop patient safety programs.  
The report also pointed out ways that purchasers could influence health care organizations; most 
notably, it suggested they require a commitment to safety standards as a term in contracting 
decisions.  Finally, the IOM report called on licensing bodies and the Food and Drug 
Administration to heighten their scrutiny.  
 Lastly, the report recognized that, in order to truly make a meaningful impact, health care 
organizations themselves must make a genuine commitment to becoming safer.  The 
organizations and the leadership overseeing them must be independently driven to establish 
patient safety programs.  The establishment of these programs should be motivated by a sincere 
desire to improve patient safety, not merely as way to meet the bare minimum requirements.   
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While past reform efforts were disjointed and isolated, after news of the IOM report, 
Congress promptly appropriated $50 million annually for patient safety research, established a 
Center for Quality Improvement and Safety, and (eventually) signed into law the Patient Safety 
and Quality Improvement Act of 2005.83  Additionally, within a year, over twenty states had 
passed some variation of reporting laws.  The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations committed to developing safety standards and enforces those initiatives through 
comprehensive inspections.84  A number of other accreditors became involved as well, including 
the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) and the American Board 
of Medical Specialties (ABMS).85   
By all accounts, the IOM managed to make a major impact on the industry in a very short 
timeframe—with many of its recommendations being implemented.  Unfortunately, in spite of 
these efforts, progress has remained frustratingly slow.86  Explaining why is a complicated task.  
As the report itself acknowledged, healthcare organizations are increasingly complex institutions 
and improving safety requires a multidimensional approach.87  Even so, the fundamental problem 
(from a broad perspective) is remarkably simple: there is just not enough pressure on the industry 
to change.  Repeated publications in medical journals had virtually no effect on the overall 
practice of medicine at all.  Not because providers are wildly unethical, but rather that even 
ethical people tend to tolerate unethical behavior when they feel powerless to effect any 
meaningful change.88  As the IOM Report explained, to prevent errors, the entire systems need to 
change.   
The systems need to be re-designed to make it difficult to make mistakes or do the wrong 
thing, and easy to do the right thing.  For instance, take the issue of alertness: when faced with an 
impossible choice between working too many consecutive hours or being fired, most providers 
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feel forced to tolerate the conditions, fueled with the confidence that, because they are committed 
to providing quality care, they can prevent any performance errors.  Providers are not 
independently choosing to put patients at risk, but that can be an end-result.  Given these 
constraints, almost all of the advancements within patient safety resulted because of sustained 
public outrage because that level of pressure mobilized high-level action.89  However, the 
motivating pressure quickly dissipates.  As much as it is difficult to admit, these organizations 
will continue causing harm without a massive restructuring to address deeply systemic flaws.  In 
this light, while there are a growing number of professionals dedicated to improving safety and 
quality, it is not simply not enough.  
At each significant anniversary of To Err is Human, commentaries have also looked back 
and analyzed our progress; mostly exploring our failure to live up to the original call to action.  
In his five-year review, Robert Wachter gave the patient safety efforts an optimistic C+.  He 
noted that, while institutions are finally starting to invest in safety, there is still a long way to go.  
Wachter specifically bemoaned the lack of federal funding, noting that the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality only received $60 million in contrast to the $27 billion 
allocated for the National Institutes of Health.90  In other words, he criticized the government for 
only invested $1 towards safety for every $500 it spent on advancing diagnoses and treatments.  
Most troubling is the fact that, despite being grossly underfunded for the task, funding the Center 
for Patient Safety is the federal government's single largest investment in patient safety.91   
Leape and Berwick, however, took a more positive approach.92  Noting setbacks, they 
still pressed a belief that the industry would begin to dramatically increase its pace.  Further, they 
applauded three important accomplishments of the IOM report in the first five years: framing 
error prevention, enlisting stakeholder support, and changing practices.  Most importantly, they 
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first credited the IOM report with fundamentally changing the way that providers view and 
discuss medical errors.  While acknowledging that there are skill plenty of skeptics, Leape and 
Berwick were encouraged by how many health care leaders were beginning to adopt the 
understanding that bad systems (not bad people) lead to the majority of errors.  The second 
important outcome was the broad array of stakeholders that emerged: the federal government, the 
Veteran's Health Administration, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, the American College of Physicians, the National Patient Safety Foundation, the 
American Medical Association, the Accreditation Council on Graduate Medical Education, the 
American Board of Medical Specialties, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement, regional 
collations, the Leapfrog Group, and the thousands of devoted providers.  Lastly, Leape and 
Berwick credited the IOM report with accelerating changes in best practices. 
At ten years, Dr. Carolyn Clancy (director of the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality) lamented the slow progress.93  Clancy suggests that, while there are many factors, one 
of the most important reasons for the underwhelming improvement in patient safety is the 
fragmented nature of the industry: improvement efforts are largely hospital-based, leaving it up 
to individual organizations to invest—or not—in the undertaking.  That said, there had been 
many accomplishments throughout those five years.  As Wachter notes, from 2004-2009 the U.S. 
created the first federal initiative to computerize health care (through the Office of the National 
Coordinator for Health IT), the World Health Organization formed the World Alliance for 
Patient Safety, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement launched its first national campaign (the 
100,000 Lives Campaign), Congress authorized the creation of Patient Safety Organizations 
(PSOs) to promote error reporting and shared learning, the Michigan ICU study was published 
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noting remarkable reductions in catheter-related line infections using a safety checklist, and 
Medicare announced a "no pay for errors" initiative.  These modest improvements led Wachter to 
raise his overall grade from a C+ to a B- (his full assessment is reproduced below in table 2.1). 
TABLE 2.1. Assessment of progress in ten patient-safety domains, 1999-2004 and 2004-2009 
Safety Category 
2004 
grade 
2009 
grade Comments 
Regulation / Accreditation A- B+ An important early driver, but much of the low-hanging fruit has now been picked 
Reporting Systems C B+ 
Key intervention was the adoption of the NQF list to support error 
reporting; some improvement in analytical abilities at provider 
organization and state/national levels 
Health information technology B- C+ 
Surprisingly low uptake over past 5 years; increasing evidence of 
health IT-related safety hazards and implementation challenges; 
new infusion of federal dollars should promote health IT adoption 
Malpractice system and 
accountability D+ C+ 
Increased pressure for accountability has led to more emphasis 
on "Just Culture"; more accountability at leadership level as well; 
practical approaches for balancing "no blame" and accountability 
still lagging 
Workforce and training issues B B- 
Limited but increased engagement by providers; evidence 
regarding impact of residency duty-hour limits mixed; nurse 
shortage eased but primary care shortage worse; few 
organizations adopting robust teamwork, culture change, or 
simulation programs 
Research - B- 
Stronger methods are emerging; moderate, but insufficient, 
increase in funding; still limited data on what works; field still 
debating fundamental questions regarding evidence standards for 
safety studies 
Patient engagement and 
involvement - C+ 
Patient advocacy movements small; impact of "how can patients 
protect themselves?" efforts uncertain; significant progress on 
disclosure policies and practices 
Provider organization 
leadership engagement - B 
Stronger focus on safety by boards, "C-suite," as business case 
becomes more robust; uptake of strong leadership interventions 
(root-cause analysis, Executive Walk Rounds) improved but spotty 
National and international 
organizational interventions - A- 
Much stronger engagement by AHRQ, NQF, Joint Commission, 
ACGME, WHO, IHI, and others; better dissemination of tools, 
training, and requirements; some wide-scale change efforts (IHI 
campaigns, Michigan and WHO checklist studies) have illustrated 
capacity for broad engagement and measurable progress 
Payment system interventions - C+ Impact of P4P in quality uncertain; P4P not yet applied to safety 
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Overall grade for progress in 
patient safety C+ B- 
Most striking improvements in reporting and leadership; gaps in 
IT and accountability are most concerning, but both areas 
should see significant progress driven by new funding (IT) and 
emerging consensus (accountability) 
Source: Adapted from Robert Wachter, "Patient Safety at Ten: Unmistakable Progress, Troubling 
Gaps," Health Affairs 29, no. 1 (2010): 166. 
 
Though Wachter has not published an updated grade since his ten-year review, in an interview 
with Healthcare IT News in April 2018, his comments echoed a similar sentiment: patients are 
safer than they were, but there is still significant work to accomplish.94  
At fifteen years, researchers from Johns Hopkins and Australian National University 
interviewed 11 leading international authorities (three of whom directly contributed to the IOM 
Report) on patient safety to assess the IOM Report's impact on current practices.95  All of the 
experts echoed a similar initial reaction: the IOM Report, To Err is Human, generated 
widespread eagerness, which instilled a genuine hope that the publication would bring about 
safer patient care.  While the interviewees had great insights and suggestions for areas for 
improvement, many still expressed disappointment about the lack of meaningful progress 
towards safer patient care.  All agreed that for patient safety to improve healthcare organizations 
must do more to learn from adverse events.  Collectively, the interviews revealed five key 
challenges for why incident reporting systems have failed to facilitate the type of learning that 
organizations need: (1) inadequate processing, (2) inadequate engagement of clinicians, 
particularly physicians, (3) insufficient action in response to reports, (4) inadequate funding and 
institutional support, and (5) inadequate utilization of health information technology 
developments.  
because of measurement challenges; Medicare's "no pay for 
errors" is a provocative initiative; no evidence yet about impact 
and concerns regarding unintended consequences 
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As a result, even though the IOM report generated widespread awareness that medical 
errors continue to occur throughout health care, it failed to "break [the] cycle of inaction."96  The 
widespread public attention was met with two forms of resistance.97  The first questioned the 
validity of the patient safety movement as a unique endeavor; after all, the quality improvement 
(QI) movement had already taken hold.  Beginning in the late 1980s, the QI movement had 
already attained legitimacy.  Rather than focus on harm, however, the quality movement sought 
to uncover best practices to improve access and decrease costs.   
The second, and more detrimental, resistance was the argument that the IOM report 
grossly exaggerated the occurrence of harm.  Motivated by denial, these critics attacked the loose 
language of errors, challenging both the vague definitions and the pseudoscience philosophy of 
the safety sciences.  To make matters worse, the initial shock dissipated.  Paired with the strong 
Congressional response, promising reform and a safer health system, the public was left to 
assume that no news, is good news.  Indeed, just three years after To Err is Human provoked 
overwhelming and widespread anxiety, a study found that the majority of physicians and the 
general public believed that fewer than 5,000 deaths occurred in hospitals each year due to 
error.98  In reality, this could not be further from the truth.   
B. The Current Crisis 
 As if 98,000 annuals deaths were not chilling enough, contemporary studies continue to 
find that the incidence of harm is far greater than previously measured.  More recent studies have 
suggested that medical harm occurs in as many 1 in 3 admissions—half of which may be 
preventable.99  In fact, contributing to more than 400,000 deaths, medical error is rivaling 
tobacco use as the primary cause of preventable mortality in the United States.100  Positioning 
medical harm as the third leading cause of death in the United States,101 this amounts to 7,692  
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deaths per week or more than 1,095 deaths per day (Table 2.2).  Worldwide, iatrogenic harm 
(avoidable harm caused by healthcare, rather than an injury or illness) in acute-care settings 
(10,000) accounts for more deaths per day than HIV/AIDS (8,000), road traffic accidents 
(3,000), natural disasters (100), and terrorism (20).102  This alone is unacceptable, and these 
numbers do not even take into consideration the tens of thousands of patients who suffer serious, 
but non-fatal complications.  
TABLE 2.2. Leading Causes of Death in the United States in 2016 
Cause of Death No. of Deaths Percent of Total Deaths 
1. Heart Disease 635,260 23.1 
2. Cancer  598,038 21.8 
3. Medical harm  400,000 14.6 
Source: Adapted from Kenneth Kochanek, Sherry Murphy, and 
Jiaquan, Elizabeth Arias, Mortality in the United States, 2016, NCHS 
Data Brief, no. 293, (Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health 
Statistics, 2017); for 400,000 statistic, John T. James, "A New, 
Evidence-Based Estimate of Patient Harms Associated with Hospital 
Care," Journal of Patient Safety 9, no. 3 (Sept. 2013): 122-128. 
  
Admittedly, there are some reviewers who challenge the validity of these studies.  As 
they point out, many of the contemporary estimates of deaths due to medical error (and even the 
IOM report itself) reference source studies that did not offer any methodology for estimating 
mortality based on medical error.103  Instead these source studies, as the critics argue, only 
sought to measure the prevalence of harm caused by health care.  As such, skeptics argue that the 
data is too limited to be able to estimate the causal relationship between a preventable adverse 
event and subsequent death.  Some recent studies, however, did set out with the primary purpose 
of measuring the prevalence of death due to medical error (namely, estimates from 
HealthGrades104 and Leapfrog105).  These studies, commentators contend, are epidemiologically 
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flawed.  Confounding makes it incredibility difficult to parse out the harm caused by poor 
medical management versus that caused by the patient's underlying illness, especially when 
considering the fact that patients at the highest risk for being exposed to hospital-acquired 
conditions (such as central line infections) are also at a higher risk of dying because of their 
underlying condition.  In this light, there is a real necessity to develop a reliable means of 
quantifying and classifying adverse harm and preventable death.  Without this basis, not only 
will it be impossible to measure any meaningful level of progress, it will be nearly impossible to 
identify key problems in order to appropriately intervene to improve patient safety.   
1. Understanding ‘Error’ in Medicine: Definitions, Classifications and Methods 
 
Human error is a very large subject, quite as extensive as that covered by the term 
human performance.106  
 
—James Reason, Human Error 
 
Definitions 
Not surprisingly, disagreement over how to measure medical error complicates efforts to 
improve safety.107  Indeed, defining error—or simply identifying it—is a difficult task.108  The 
term error has become part of the common vernacular within health care (especially when 
referring to human error), yet it lacks a common definition.  To complicate matters, neither 
laypersons nor professionals can even agree on what terminology to use, using the terms 
accident, mistake, failure, error, negligence, adverse event, and malpractice interchangeably.109  
Without a standard nomenclature, it is difficult (if not impossible) to interpret or report findings. 
From an etymological perspective, error is derived from the root err.  Dating to circa 
1300 from the Old French word errur from the Latin errare, the root concept of error is to 
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wander or stray.  The Oxford English Dictionary First Edition (1891) offers the following: 
1. The action of roaming or wandering; hence a devious or winding course, a 
roving, winding. Now only poet. 2. Chagrin, fury, vexation; a wandering of the 
feelings; extravagance of passion. Obs. 3. The condition of erring in opinion; the 
holding of mistaken notions or beliefs; an instance of this, a mistaken notion or 
belief; false beliefs collectively. 4. Something incorrectly done through ignorance 
or inadvertence; a mistake, e.g., in calculation, judgment, speech, writing, action, 
etc. 5. A departure from moral rectitude; a transgression, wrong-doing.110  
Merriam-Webster defines error as "an act involving an unintentional deviation."111  In a sense, 
this contemporary definition still reflects the root notion of straying—such that there is a 
departure from the actor's intended course.  This understanding of error tends to view an act 
based on its outcome.    
Historically, this is how researchers first approached harm within medicine.  Early 
investigators embraced an outcome-dependent definition of medical error, studying adverse 
patient outcomes rather than medical error itself, regardless of outcome.112  Thus, human error(s) 
that did not result in a deviation from the intended outcome were excluded from consideration.  
Some speculate that this tendency stems from the influence of the Hippocratic oath charging 
physicians to "do no harm."113  In this light, investigators may not have been concerned with acts 
that did not violate this principle.  Paradoxically, however, the earliest studies concerning this 
topic actually dismissed medical errors as the price society must pay for medical progress.114   
In 1964, Elihu Schimmel first acknowledged the unavoidable dangers within modern 
medicine, while still calling for greater care in a pioneering study of the incidence of error, 
"Hazards of Hospitalization."115  Though he did not attempt to identify which errors were 
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preventable, the Schimmel study was the first prospective assessment of the risks accompanying 
modern healthcare.  Schimmel uncovered that, during an 8-month period, medical treatment was 
causing complications in one out of every five patients.  Not wanting to imply that this level of 
harm was necessarily preventable, Schimmel used the term episodes to refer to all "untoward 
events, complications, and mishaps."  Importantly, the study only included episodes that "arose 
from acceptable diagnostic or therapeutic measures," and excluded any complications arising 
from inadvertent errors.  Though the discovery was startling, it did not have a strong impact on 
the practice of medicine.  
Several decades later, three publications gave prominence to the use of the term adverse 
event to describe the harmful outcomes from medical error.  Still some of the most extensive 
investigations concerning iatrogenic injury, the Harvard Medical Practice Study, the Quality in 
Australian Health Study, and the Utah and Colorado Medical Practice Study, helped to 
proliferate the term adverse error.  Both the Harvard Medical Practice Study (1991) and the Utah 
and Colorado Medical Practice Study (1999) defined adverse events as unintended injury, which 
was caused by medical management (as opposed to an underlying illness), and resulted in 
measurable disability116 (the Utah and Colorado Study clarified to this to include either a 
prolonged hospital stay or disability at discharge).117  The Harvard Medical Study additionally 
evaluated and ranked each instance of adverse error based on the occurrence and severity of any 
negligence, which it defined as a failure to meet the standard of care for a reasonable physician.   
The Quality in Australian Health Study (QAHCS) rejected this criterion, instead 
measuring preventability in place of negligence.118  In explaining this modification, the QAHCS 
study noted that few adverse patient outcomes result from negligence.  In this light, and with the 
stated goal of improving quality, QAHCS focused instead on preventability.  The study suggests 
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that this approach will also cast its results in a more positive and constructive light, as opposed to 
a potentially antagonistic one.  The Australian study assessed preventability (with respect to an 
adverse event) as an error that resulted from a failure to follow accepted medical practice—either 
at an individual (judged by the expected performance for the average practitioner) or system 
level.  While this definition of preventability essentially renames the Harvard Medical Practice 
Study's definition of negligence (with both definitions focusing on the adherence to the accepted 
standard of care), the underlying suggestion is warranted.  Taken together, these seminal studies 
offer a critical combination with respect to defining adverse error.  Regardless of the terminology 
used, a definition of medical error should combine the key elements from each of these studies: 
that is, the definition must still measure harm and consider outcomes, but not to the exclusion of 
understanding the process that contributed to the end result.  The definition must aim to reduce 
all deviations (even when harm is only minimal or avoided entirely) without specifically 
focusing on whether providers adhered to accepted practices.  This approach offers important 
insights into the total cost and magnitude of the harm, while still providing the necessary 
knowledge to meaningfully intervene to reduce the overall harm.   
To exemplify this point, consider the following prospective study.  Khan and Arsanious 
collected data over a 10-week period with the aim of determining whether UK medical students, 
junior doctors, and consultants had divergent perceptions of the severity of a clinical error.119  
The participants were asked to rank eight different hypothetical scenarios using a numerical scale 
(1-10) based on the severity of error.  A response of 1 indicates that there is no error, whereas 10 
denotes the most severe possible error.  Interestingly, nearly all of the responses suggested that 
the respondents highly factored the outcome into determining whether an incident qualified as an 
error.  However, the there was a clear line between those who considered an incident as easily 
 43 
made (resulting in a low ranking) versus viewing that incident instead as being easily preventable 
(contributing to a higher ranking).  For instance, in one such scenario two patients presented with 
similar names.  At the end of the ward round, a junior doctor accidentally switched the patients' 
drug charts.  Later that day, the nurse begins dispensing their drugs according to the charts' 
instructions, only to be stopped because one of the patients questioned why her tablets were a 
different color.  The nurse apologized and administers the correct medication to both patients.  In 
this case, though the patient prevented any potential harm, the potential severity of the harm is 
great.  Participants who viewed this as being an easily made mistake (e.g., "drugs charts can 
easily get moved around") rated this very low (2) given the potential for harm.  Conversely, 
respondents who noted that this breach was easily avoidable rated the error very severely (9).  
This example alone makes clear that it is not enough to only consider error based on whether a 
patient suffered measurable harm.  While, in this particular instance, the patient prevented any 
occurrence of harm, not labeling this as an error significantly hinders any genuine attempt at 
reducing the overall rate of error.  Left ignored, this gap in care will almost surely result in 
eventual harm at some point.  Additionally, it is not prudent to excuse and tolerate certain harms 
because of a low-perceived degree of evidence for preventability.  
As explained, it is important that our definition for medical error includes both acts that 
actually result in harm, as well as those that have the potential to cause harm (but failed because 
of some intervention).  Some use separate terms to refer to these outcome-based categories of 
medical errors: referring to error that results in harm as an adverse event, while referring to an 
event that could have resulted in an adverse patient outcome but did not ultimately result in 
injury as near misses, close calls, potential adverse events, or warning events.120   
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This leads to the following definition for medical error: an act or omission during 
planning or execution that contributes (or could contribute) to an unintentional deviation.121  This 
incorporates the essential elements discussed above, and is in keeping with prevalent definitions: 
Leape: "Error may be defined as an unintended act (either of omission or commission) or 
one that does not achieve its intended outcome."122 
Joint Commission: "Error: An unintended act, either of omission or commission, or an act 
that does not achieve its intended outcome."123  
Dana Farber Cancer Institute: "Error is an event of act of commission or omission with 
unintended, potentially negative consequences for the patient."124 
Institute of Medicine and The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality: "An error is 
defined as the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended (i.e., error of 
execution) or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (i.e., error of planning).125   
Note the specific inclusion of intentionality in the definitions adopted by the Dana Farber Cancer 
Center, Institute of Medicine, and Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.  As these 
definitions suggest, determining whether an action constitutes an error cannot be judged based on 
outcome alone.  Simply because there is a bad outcome, does not automatically mean there was 
an error.  In this light, an error only occurs when a person, attempting to do the right thing, does 
the wrong thing.  The key element is that the person was intending to do the right thing, but there 
was a deviation that was not deliberate.  A deliberate or intentional injury would be a very 
different form of abuse.  In this way, the notions of intention and error are intimately linked.126  
One useful way of qualifying intentional behavior, from a psychological perspective, is to apply 
a simple, three-question algorithm: 
1. Were the actions directed by some prior intention? 
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2. Did the actions go as planned? 
3. Did the actions achieve their desired consequences? 
Unlike trying to discern someone's basic motivation, these questions can all be easily answered.  
Because error can only be used to describe intentional actions, human error can only be corrected 
on the basis of the answers to the second and third questions.  Actions that do not go as planned 
(question 2) can be separated into two subsets: those that nevertheless achieved their outcome, 
and those that failed. Though it is possible for the actions-not-as-planned to still meet their 
desired goal, it is highly improbable.  For instance, consider the famous case of Thabo Meli v. 
The Queen (1954). In Thabo Meli, a gang of four men plotted to kill another man and cover it up 
by making it look like a drunken accident.  The men invited the poor victim to a hut, got him 
heavily drunk, and hit him on the head with the intent of killing him.  As it turns out, the victim 
was only knocked unconscious.  Believing they had killed him, the men threw the victim's body 
over a nearby cliff and arranged items to make it appear as though he had inadvertently walked 
off the side of the cliff.  He also survived the fall! Though, the victim did later die from 
exposure.  Though none of the actions went as planned, inexplicably, the man did later die as a 
consequence of the gang's actions. These unusual cases are possible, though very unlikely.  Even 
actions that do go as planned, however, do not always achieve their desired consequences 
(question 3).   In these cases, the problem is not with the lack of intention, but with the plan 
itself.   
 However, as Dr. John Banja points out in Medical Errors and Medical Narcissism, this 
singular focus on intentionality can also be problematic.  Banja offers the following example: 
Dr. Jones, who is considered the finest surgeon at Ajax Hospital, is about to repair Mr. 
Green's abdominal aortic aneurysm.  Because Mr. Green has undergone numerous 
 46 
abdominal operations, Dr. Jones realizes that this surgery might be extremely complex 
because of scarring and anatomical reconfiguration in the surgical site.  Although Dr. 
Jones exercises enormous patience and skill during the operation, he nevertheless 
lacerates Mr. Green's bowel, which necessitates additional surgery.127  
 Banja rightfully points out that most health professionals would not categorize this as an error, 
as this is more appropriately labeled a surgical complication.  Nevertheless, the limitation of 
most definitions for error is that they include these types of negative outcome within their 
definition.  Indeed, only using intentionality to limit the scope of incidents that fall within the 
realm of medical error will inadvertently include known or even likely complications that (may 
have even been disclosed to the patient during the informed consent process) simply because the 
health provider did not intend them.  Consequently, this dissertation defines medical error as an 
act or omission during planning or execution that contributes (or could contribute) to an 
unintentional and unreasonable deviation.   
Classifications of Error 
Armed with a definition for medical error, it is important to be able to understand and 
identify errors as they happen.  Sorting errors into classifications allows observers to identify, 
quantify, and possibly prevent broad categories of error.  Due to the complexity of healthcare 
errors, there have been a number of innovated approaches to classifying error.128  There is no 
single taxonomy, with different classifications serving different needs.129  Despite this, all 
existing taxonomies correspond to three basic levels of classification: contextual, modal, or 
psychological.130   
Contextual classification is an approach that focuses on specific contextual information 
(e.g., time, place, people, procedures).  This taxonomic form describes errors based upon the 
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particular actions and environment.131  Because of this singular focus on a particular scenario, a 
contextual taxonomy cannot offer a predictive account of error in general.  This kind of 
taxonomy instead offers a completely context-dependent descriptive account, which may offer 
insights in the risks of error for a specific set of tasks in a particular environment.  Lucian Leape 
offered a contextual taxonomy for understanding medical error by categorizing errors in terms of 
which types of errors occur in which environments.132  According to this classification scheme, 
there are three main categories of medical error: diagnostic errors, treatment errors, preventative  
errors, and other complications (see table 2.3). 
TABLE 2.3. Types of Medical Error  
Types of Error by Category   
Diagnostic Error     
 Error or delay in diagnosis 
 Failure to perform indicated tests (no tests or inappropriate tests) 
 Failure to act on test or monitoring results 
Treatment Error  
 Error in the performance of an operation, procedure, or test 
 Error in the administration of a treatment 
 Error in medication use, dose, or method 
 Avoidable delays in responding to abnormal test or providing treatment 
 Inappropriate (not indicated) care  
Preventative Error    
 Failure to provide prophylactic treatment 
 Inadequate monitoring or follow-up treatment 
Other Error    
 Communication failure 
 Equipment failure 
 Other system failure 
Sources: Adapted from Lucian Leape et al., "Preventing Medical Injury," Qual. Rev. Bull. 19, 
no. 5 (1993): 144-149. 
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Modal classification examines the ways that error occurs on a behavioral level (e.g., did 
the error occur through an act or omission), seeking to understand the manner in which the act 
was performed.  This context-free classification is sometimes called the "mode" of an error.133  
Rather than focus on the describing the specifics involved, this taxonomy would instead sort an 
error based on the it's mode (e.g., omission, substitution, insertion, repetition).  This approach 
offers insight into which modes of error are more common and makes it possible to calculate 
error probabilities; however, it cannot meaningfully improve error prevention because it does not 
provide any information about how the categories of error manifest.  One particular modal 
classification scheme, the Predictive Human Error Analysis (PHEA), integrates errors of 
omission, errors of commission, and extraneous errors (resulting from an unnecessary act).134  
While it can be useful for researchers to group errors according to outcome, examining errors 
from a psychological perspective can yield better insight for developing effective prevention 
strategies (a major shortcoming of modal classifications).135   
The third level does just that: looking beyond the observable characteristics of the error 
or its context, instead employing psychological principles to understand the nature of the error. 
Most experts prefer this approach, as it helps to explain events rather than merely describe 
them.136  In this form, the investigator attempts to discern where throughout the chain of events 
an error occurred, and then understand why.137  This attempt to make inferences about the 
underlying mechanisms that allow for certain errors, positions psychological taxonomies to offer 
generalizable and predictive insights.    
In this respect, James Reason notes that psychologists make a distinction between error 
types and error forms.138  According to Reason, error type relates to the presumed origin of an 
error within a corresponding cognitive stage at which it occurred during the action sequence.  
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Reason identifies three main cognitive stages: planning, storage, and execution.  Error forms, 
conversely, are not tied to any one specific underlying cognitive stage.  Instead, error forms 
represent the recurrent varieties of fallibility that surface during all types of cognitive activity 
regardless of the specific error type. 
TABLE 2.4. Error Types According to Cognitive Stage 
Cognitive Stage Primary Error Type 
Planning Mistakes 
Storage Lapses 
Execution Slips 
Source: Adapted from James Reason, Human Error (Cambridge University Press, 1990) 12-14. 
 
 Of the three main error types, planning refers to the cognitive processes involved in 
identifying a goal and then determining the appropriate means to achieve it.  Most often, people 
do not immediately act upon their plans.  Because of this, there is a likely storage phase that 
occurs between formulating a plan and executing the plan.  Finally, the last stage concerns the 
processes involved in actually executing the stored plan.  
As Reason explains, a mistake (a planning failure) is distinctly different from a slip, or 
lapse (an execution failure).139  Essentially, this means that there are two basic ways a failure can 
occur: (1) the plan is adequate, but the actions deviate from the intention, or (2) the actions go 
entirely as planned, but the plan was faulty.  This distinction hinges on the difference between 
conscious (intended) and automatic (unintended) behavior.  A slip is an error of action, which 
results from some degree of inattentiveness during the performance of a routine and largely 
automatic task.  Similarly, a lapse often occurs during a routine task, but it relates to an internal 
failure of memory.  For both, a person intended a certain action that does not go according to 
plan.  These execution failures are regularly associated with some level of distraction or 
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preoccupation.  Given their distinctions, it is possible to externally observe a slip (e.g., slip of the 
tongue, slip of the pen).  By contrast, because lapses largely relate to memory failures, these 
error forms are more covert.  Lapses may only be readily apparent to the actor involved.  
Conversely, a mistake is a conscious error of knowledge or planning.  Here, the action 
itself goes exactly as planned but fails to achieve the intended outcome; the error occurred when 
planning the action.  Reason defines mistakes as: 
deficiencies or failures in the judgmental and/or interferential processes involved in the 
selection of an objective or in the specification of the means to achieve it, irrespective of 
whether or not the actions directed by this decision-scheme run according to plan.140  
Given this definition, mistakes are even more likely to be less understood than slips—being 
subtler and more complex.  Because of their nature, mistakes will also be harder to detect.  
Human consciousness is quite well trained to notice departures from intention, however, the 
quality of a plan is a matter of debate.  As such, mistakes present a far greater danger.   
 Nevertheless, the primary distinction between mistakes and slips (or lapses) is quite 
simple: "if the intention is not appropriate, this is a mistake. If the action is not what was 
intended, this is a slip (or lapse)."141  Mistakes can be further categorized into (a) failures of 
expertise, where some pre-established rule or standard is applied inappropriately (i.e., rule-based 
mistakes), and (b) a lack of experience, where the individual lacks relevant knowledge (i.e., 
knowledge-based mistakes. These errors are often compounded by the heavy emphasis on 
memorization within health care practice.    
Failures of expertise and lack of experience correspond closely to Rasmussen's skill-rule-
knowledge behavior classification for describing human cognitive control.  Reason derives his 
conceptual framework from Rasmussen's work, yielding the parallels depicted in table 2.5. 
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TABLE 2.5. Performance Levels and Error Types 
Rasmussen's Classification Primary Error Type 
Skill-based Slips (and lapses) 
Rule-based Mistakes 
Knowledge-based Mistakes 
Source: Adapted from James Reason, Human Error (Cambridge University Press, 1990) 53-
56. 
 
Rule-based mistakes occur in relation to familiar problems—problems that providers train to 
handle.  A large part of medical practice is built on this system of corresponding rules or 
heuristics: if x (patient presents with high fever and sharp pain in the lower right abdomen), then 
it is probably y (appendicitis).  When used appropriately, a simple heuristic approach performs 
surprisingly well, out-performing both predictive instruments and physicians.142  However, this 
process can go awry in a number of ways: providers can apply a bad rule, fail to apply a suitable 
rule, or misapply a useful rule by failing to consider the contraindications.  These errors are 
compounded by the heavy emphasis on memorization within health care practice 
For instance, consider the case of Blanche Begaye (a pseudonym).143  Blanche, a Navajo 
woman in her sixties, presented to the emergency room in respiratory distress.  She reported that 
she had been feeling ill for a few days.  Though she originally attributed it to a bad head cold, 
she came to the emergency room because her systems continued to worsen after drinking tea and 
taking a few aspirin.  On exam, Begaye had a fever of 100.2° F and she was breathing rapidly.  
Her lungs were clear and white-blood-cell count was normal, but a blood test showed slight 
acidity.  At the same time, however, a chest X-ray showed no indication of viral pneumonia.  
Nevertheless, the emergency room physician diagnosed Begaya with subclinical pneumonia.  He 
determined that she must be in the early stages of the infection, which he used to disregard the 
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data that contradicted his diagnosis (namely, the absence of rhonchi and white streaks on the 
chest X-ray and normal white-blood-cell count).   
Knowledge-based mistakes occur when a provider encounters a novel situation, outside 
of the realm of his or her problem-solving heuristics.  In this instance, the practitioner is forced 
to reason through the problem without any specific preparation.  This is a slow, effortful, and 
extremely error-prone process.  Not only do these situations require providers to make decisions 
without any mental model to guide them, they are attempting to solve a problem with incomplete 
or incorrect knowledge (making knowledge-based mistakes the most complex error type).  For 
instance, a surgeon may be forced to guess at the source of the bleeding during a high pressure 
operation.144  Cognitive psychologists have found that health professionals frequently commit 
knowledge-based mistakes due to stress or immense time constraints.145  Some common types of 
knowledge-based mistakes include: the availability heuristic, using the first information that 
comes to mind; confirmation bias, seeking only evidence that supports an opinion to the 
exclusion of any contradictory information;  and overconfidence tendency, which is believing the 
validity of a determination without any justification or evidence to support it.146   
These three basic error types (mistakes, slips, and lapses) are also distinct from 
violations.  Violations are deviations (mostly deliberate, though they can also be erroneous) from 
the safe and accepted operating standards.147  Whereas errors primarily result from limitations in 
thinking and remembering, violations arise because of attitudes about motivation or how to 
behave in a work environment.  Because violations do not result from human limitations, it is 
only possible to understand them in relation to the social context in which humans behave.148  In 
the case of violations, the actions (though not the possible bad outcomes) were intended; the act 
did not result from a mistake or accident.  Accordingly, James Reason defines violations as 
 53 
deliberate deviations from an organization's proscribed safety practices and regulations.149  While 
deliberate, violations do not necessarily reflect a malicious intent.  Instead, violations are 
byproducts of the ways individuals cut corners in everyday tasks to accomplish a competing 
objective—usually to save time.  There are three main groups: routine, optimizing, and 
situational (or necessary) violations.   
Routine violations are largely habitual and can include virtually subconscious acts.  Two 
factors tend to influence the occurrence of habitual violations: (a) the human tendency to take the 
quickest and most convenient path, and (b) an apparently trivial procedure (especially within an 
organization that is relatively indifferent to violations).  Optimizing violations are undertaken for 
personal gain rather than task-related goals (e.g., to get home early or alleviate boredom).  A 
necessary or situational violation occurs when someone disregards a rule because it is seemingly 
impossible to follow under those circumstances.  For instance, a nurse may administer a drug 
without first using the hospital's medication scanner to check for errors because the technology is 
not working properly at the time.  While the nurse is choosing to knowingly violate the 
procedure in the patient's best interest, these violations can be disastrous should something else 
go wrong (e.g., the infusion bag is for the incorrect dosage).  
Because all violations increase risk, they also increase the likelihood of error and the 
propensity of harm.  As such, the boundaries between errors and violations are not fixed.  For 
instance, it is difficult to discern how a subconscious violation is different than a slip.  Although 
the margins will always be blurred, one possibility is to simplify the distinction based on 
intent.150  While skill-based slips (errors) are almost always isolated events, routine violations 
tend to re-occur daily.  Even though routine violations could eventually become subconscious, at 
 54 
one point in time the actor still made a conscious choice to engage in that behavior.  Choice is 
the key element.   
Further, given the ways that violations differ from errors, each require different 
interventions. 151  Whereas errors primarily arise as informational problems, violations are 
commonly associated with motivational problems (e.g., low morale, poor leadership, perceived 
lack of concern).  Thus, while errors can be reduced by improving the quality and delivery of 
information within the healthcare system, violations necessitate motivational and organizational 
changes.  
Finally, there is a third distinction that influences the way that people contribute to 
accidents: the difference between latent and active failures.  James Reason credits the distinction 
between these types of failures to Mr. Justice Sheen's observations regarding the capsize of the 
Herald of Free Enterprise.  Mr. Sheen was investigating the capsize of the roll-on-roll-off ferry, 
which sank in shallow water off the coast of Zeebruge, Belgium in March of 1987, killing 189 
passengers and crew.  Sheen wrote: 
At first sight the faults which led to this disaster were the… errors of omission on the part 
of the Master, the Chief Officer and the assistant bosun … But a full investigation into 
the circumstances of the disaster leads inexorably to the conclusion that the underlying or 
cardinal faults lay higher up in the Company … From top to bottom the body corporate 
was infected with the disease of sloppiness.  
Reason uses this excerpt to clearly exemplify the difference between active and latent failures.  
The active failures (the various errors on the part of the ship's crew) were immediately clear.  
But, as the inquiry ultimately uncovered, the Herald was a "diseased" ship long before it sailed 
on that fateful day.  In this light, active failures are the unsafe acts (both errors and violations) 
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that are committed at the "sharp end" of the system.  Analogous to the Herald, these are the 
immediate providers (e.g., the nurses, surgeons, internists) whose actions have immediate, 
adverse consequences.  Latent failures, by contrast, result from the executive organizational 
decisions upper management.  These failures may lay dormant for long periods before ever 
encountering a situation that breaches the underlying deficiencies.  In the example of the Herald, 
the triggering factors were the spring tide and loading difficulties at the Zeebrugge harbor.  Thus, 
active and latent failures are distinguishable based on (1) the length of time before the failures 
contribute to a bad outcome, and (2) the level at which the failure occurs.   
To recap, though human error is markedly complex, cognitive psychologists 
(errorologists, specifically) offer a valuable taxonomy for understanding human error.  
According to that taxonomy (see figure 2.2.), accidents arise because of active or latent failures 
within a system.  There are three main error types, which can be divided based upon the 
corresponding cognitive stage—either the failure occurred during planning or execution.  
Planning failures are known as mistakes, wherein the actions went according to plan, but failed 
to achieve the desired result because the plan itself was deficient.  Execution failures can be 
either slips or lapses.   Though both involve a deviation from the intended plan, slips (of action) 
tend to result from attentional failures, whereas lapses are associated with memory failures.  
Slips and lapses occur during the largely automatic performance of a routine task, which is 
almost always associated with some level of distraction.  Slips, which are inadvertent, happen 
most often when people put a task on autopilot because they are distracted with other matters.  
Mistakes, conversely, are decision-making failures that result from making incorrect choices.  
Typically, these mistakes result from incomplete or inaccurate information.  Rule-based mistakes 
happen when the actor already knows the appropriate rule through training or experience but  
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Active Failures Latent Failures 
Error Types 
Planning 
Failure 
Execution 
Failure 
Mistake Slips Lapses 
Knowledge
-Based 
Rule-
Based 
Application of bad rules  
Misapplication of good rules 
Recognition 
failures 
Selection 
failures 
Violations 
Accidents 
Attentional 
failures 
Memory 
failures 
Routine 
Optimizing 
Necessary 
FIGURE 2.2. Organizational Accident Taxonomy  
 
misapplies the rule.  Knowledge-based risks arise in novel situations when the person is 
unfamiliar with the scenario.  Slips, lapses, and mistakes all differ from violations.  Violations 
are deliberate deviations from standard operating procedures, standards, or rules.  
Methods 
To better understand how to study human error within the medical field, it is also useful 
to consider how experts analyze human error generally.  Reason listed five main approaches for 
studying accidents: corpus gathering, questionnaire studies, laboratory studies, simulator studies, 
and case studies.152  These five approaches provide a basis to understand the specific methods for 
investigating medical error.  
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For decades, psycholinguists and cognitive psychologists have been 'corpus gathering' to 
better understand human error.  This is a naturalistic method of investigation that is concerned 
with the identification and classification of naturally occurring slips and lapses.  This 
methodology focuses on describing and observing naturally occurring phenomena—in this 
instance, everyday human errors.  With a large enough corpus, this approach provides a robust 
and comprehensive representation of the species of error.  This analysis enables researchers to 
identify recurrent error patterns.  However, the limitation of this approach is that, with such a 
broad qualities account, it is difficult to draw scientifically sound conclusions—the causal chain 
is simply too attenuated.  
Another method asks subjects to self-disclose information about their own experience 
with slips and lapses through the use of questionnaires.  Though questionnaires can be useful 
supplements to naturalistic investigation, this method is also limited by the biases and distortion 
of each subject's perspective.  That said, studies have confirmed that these self-reports correlate 
to genuine behavior.   
Laboratory studies and experiments offer a path to attempt to better control for the 
weaknesses inherent in naturalistic observation and self-reporting.  While this methodology is 
the gold standard in some scenarios, in the case of eliciting human error, it is difficult to recreate 
the natural conditions and pressures that tend to evoke cognitive failure in everyday life. 
Computer-based simulation studies attempt to better mimic the dynamic features of real-life, 
complex decision-making that was impossible to capture in a static experimental study.   
Finally, case studies examining instances of catastrophic errors offer a lens into the 
circumstances that led to a particular event or accident.  This allows investigators to examine the 
interaction and responses in an extended sequence that would be nearly impossible to recreate by 
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other means.  Naturally, the difficulty in this approach is again the reliance on the individuals 
involved to provide accurate reports.  Not only do most accident reports tend to focus on shifting 
blame, but each person typically has an inaccurate or limited understanding of the events.    
Within the context of investigating medical error, Thomas and Petersen categorized eight 
healthcare-specific methods of study: administrative data analysis, record review, electronic 
medical record (EMR) review, direct observation, clinical surveillance, autopsy, root cause 
analysis, claims analysis, and error reporting systems.153  These eight methods apply the five 
general approaches for studying human accidents to the healthcare industry.  As table 2.6 
depicts, each method offers its own set of advantages and disadvantages.   
TABLE 2.6. Methods for measuring medical errors   
Study Method   Advantages Disadvantages 
Administrative Data Analysis The data is readily available Inexpensive 
The data may be incomplete or 
inaccurate 
The data is unconnected to the 
clinical context   
Record Review The data is readily available Commonly used  
The provider’s judgments may not 
be reliable  
The medical record may be 
incomplete  
Hindsight bias    
EMR Review 
Inexpensive (after initial investment) 
Can monitor in real time  
Integrates multiple data sources 
Susceptible to data entry / 
programming errors 
Expensive initial investment 
 
 Direct Patient Care 
Observation 
Potentially accurate / precise  
Provides data otherwise unavailable 
Detects more active errors  
Time consuming and expensive 
Difficult to train reliable observers 
Could risk confidentiality 
Possible to be overwhelmed with 
information 
Active Clinical Surveillance Potentially accurate and precise  Time consuming and expensive  
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Autopsy Can suggest contributory factors Familiar to health care providers  
Hindsight bias 
Reporting bias 
Focused on diagnostic errors 
Infrequently used  
Case / Root Cause Analysis 
Can suggest contributory factors 
Structured systems approach 
Includes recent interview data  
 
Hindsight bias 
Tends to focus on severe events 
Insufficiently standardized  
Claims Analysis Provides multiple perspectives (e.g., legal, providers, patients) 
Hindsight bias 
Reporting bias 
Non-standardized data source 
Error reporting systems 
Can provide multiple perspectives 
over time 
Can incorporate into routine 
operations 
Hindsight bias 
Reporting bias 
Sources: Adapted from Charles Vincent, Patient Safety, 2nd ed. (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2010), 53-56.  
 
These methods differ in a number of ways.  First, some focus on detecting the incidence of error, 
while others are oriented towards understanding their causes and contributory factors.  Second, 
each method relies on different sources of data: some use first-person observation, others 
voluntary reports, and still others various forms of existing records.  In this light, no single 
method is foolproof—each only painting a partial picture.    
Because the Joint Commission mandates RCA after every sentinel event, it is one of the 
more familiar methods of investigation in the United States.154  The United States Department of 
Energy originally developed root cause analysis (RCA) to investigate industrial accidents.155  In 
an earnest attempt to learn from other high-risk industries, healthcare systems adopted RCA as a 
method for structured risk identification and management following an adverse event.  RCA is 
not a single technique, but a range of approaches and tools156 that aims to identify the true cause 
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CASE SUMMARY  
This case example demonstrates how a hospital may fail to learn from an incident in 
spite of RCA. 
 
A patient presented to a large, acute hospital for a routine cataract surgery—a relatively 
low-risk procedure. Though an experienced ophthalmologist performed the procedure, 
the wrong lens was inserted.  After discovering the error, the patient underwent a 
second procedure to correct the error, which was successful.  
 
A RCA identified that there were two lenses in the OR: one brought by the surgeon (the 
correct one) and one by an operating department assistant. The investigation 
concluded that the incident occurred because of both the duplicate lens in the OR and 
a failure to follow the double-check protocol. The action plan called for the development 
of a new protocol that emphasized the surgeon’s individual responsibility to select the 
appropriate lens and had posters made to remind providers of the importance of double 
checks.     
 
One year later, a different surgeon made the same error (implanting the wrong lens); 
however, in this instance, the surgeon selected the wrong lens.  
of a problem and suggest solutions to prevent similar problems in the future.157  One limitation 
with RCA is the implicit implication that there is only one single root cause; rather than promote 
a global investigation of all of the latent and active factors that contributed to an adverse error, 
some RCA techniques tend to result in a linear narrative that is far too simplistic to capture the 
system’s complexity.158  RCA is also susceptible to hindsight bias and sometimes lacks the 
structure needed to produce effective results (see figure 2.3).159   
FIGURE 2.3. Lessons from RCA 
 
As it happens, many of the methods for measuring harm are susceptible to bias—
particularly hindsight bias.  Hindsight bias (the inclination to overestimate error in cases with 
worse outcomes) is a particularly troubling problem for retrospective analysis of medical error.  
In fact, several experts posited that "hindsight bias is the greatest obstacle to evaluating the 
performance of humans in complex systems after bad outcomes."160  Hindsight bias, or the 
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“knew it all along” effect encourages people to overestimate their ability to control future 
events.161  When observing past events, this bias leads people to exaggerate what other people 
should have been able to anticipate in foresight and embellish what they knew themselves.  This 
phenomenon is further fueled by how unaware people are of the extent to which outcome 
knowledge influences their perceptions of the past.  For those striving to make sense of past 
events, knowledge of the outcome provides an unconscious schema for historical judges to 
assimilate prior facts.  In the moment, however, the series of events do not present themselves in 
such a linear fashion; each participant would tell a different story based on their immediate 
concerns.  Hindsight bias tempts observers to view the convergent narrative as having been the 
expected or obvious outcome.   
With respect to medical harm, hindsight bias also tempts researchers to label the events 
leading to an accident as errors simply because of the negative outcome.  This is also sometimes 
called outcome bias.162  As the harm from an accident increases, so does the likelihood that the 
events leading to the harm will be considered erroneous.163  With the bias of already knowing the 
end result (and believing the outcome to be more foreseeable), even ‘objective’ reviewers will 
overestimate how easily someone could have prevented the outcome in real time.     
Given the limitations of the methods for studying medical error when used 
independently, there is a greater case to be made for utilizing a large-scale, national reporting 
database.  While the database will be subject to the limitations of error reporting systems, 
generally, it is possible to develop a system that could potentially allow for greater access to a 
more comprehensive picture of error.  With this in mind (and given this dissertation’s central 
thesis), let us more closely examine the use of error reporting systems as a methodology for 
studying error.  
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In the most basic sense, error reporting systems are relatively straightforward: regardless 
of their scope, these systems are intended to serve as a repository of information to solve a stated 
problem.  Beyond this general goal, there is extensive disagreement at almost every level.  
Experts disagree on whether the system should be voluntary or compulsory, whether it should 
solicit any and all information or institute limiting factors, and more.  As stated, the IOM report 
called for the establishment of both a voluntary and mandatory reporting system, to be operated 
separately.164  In their view, the mandatory system should be primarily concerned with the 
prevention of only the most severe errors (i.e., errors that have a strong likelihood of causing 
serious bodily injury or death).  Voluntary systems, by contrast, are encouraged to continue to 
focus on the overall goal of improving patient safety.   
Though, like most other methods, error reporting systems are susceptible to bias, 
designing a user-friendly, effective system that providers will readily use is their biggest 
obstacles.  Indeed, the level of bias within a report is irrelevant if entities are failing to even 
submit the reports to begin with.  In this light, the success or failure of this approach is highly 
dependent on the level and adaptability of the system’s technological design.  Like any 
technology, the user must not only accept the program, but must be motivated to engage and use 
the technology.  Here, that translates to both agreeing that an error reporting system has the 
potential to improve patient safety, and believing that the system offers more benefits than 
disadvantages.  When polled, participants identified several key features that would motivate 
them to utilize a reporting system (see table 2.7).  Of note, the participants felt that the reporting  
system must not only be time-efficient, it should also be incorporated into their current work 
structure.  This poses a technical challenge but offers the greatest promise in addressing concerns 
about time constraints and underreporting.   
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TABLE 2.7. Motivators and Barriers Related to a Medical Error Reporting System   
 Motivators  Concerns 
Feedback   “There  has  to  be…  a  high  
likelihood  of  getting  some  
positive  benefit…  rather  than  
just  another  place…  reports  
are  sent  [to]  vanish”  
Ease  of  Use   “Ease  of  use  so  that  we’re  not  
talking  about  adding  10  min  or  
more  of  paperwork  per  day  to  
the  schedule.”  
   “I  think  the  real  plus…  would  
be  if  there  would  be  some  
way  to  get  instantaneous  
feedback…  [b]ecause  I  
suspect  that  most  errors  that  
people  would  report  have  
occurred  before.”      
Privacy   “I  don’t  trust  confidentiality.  It’s  
breached  too  often.”  
Mandatory  
System  
  “…are  you  going  to  take  
extra  time  out  in  an  
extremely  busy  day  to  say,  
‘Oh,  yeah,  I  get  to  go  report  
this  to  a  voluntary  
committee?’  I  don’t  think  so.”  
System  
Abuse  
“I’m  not  sure  how  to  present  this  
in  a  way  that  it’s  not  going  to  be  
used  for  legal  reasons…  And  
that,  I  think,  is  my  biggest  fear…  
that  this  would  eventually  come  
out  and  be  able  to  be  used  
against  us.”  
   “I  almost  think  if  you  don’t  
make  it  mandatory  you  aren’t  
going  to  get  much  
information.”  
  
Length  of  
Report  
“Well,  if  you’re  going  to  have  
pages  upon  pages  to  fill  out,  you  
know,  it’s  not  going  to  get  done.”  
   “There  are  so  many  things  to  
do  in  the  day  that  some  
voluntary  things,  you’d  
almost  have  to  have  
missionary  zeal…”  
   “My  biggest  concern  would  be  
that  [it  seems  that  errors]  would  
be  more  likely  on  the  days  when  
we’re  busiest,  and  I  would  be  
worried  that  any  system  that  
we’d  come  up  with  would  be  
cumbersome  and  therefore  just  
not  used.”    
Financial  
Incentives  
“I  think  it  would  taint  [the  
reporting  if]  we’re  not…  
[reporting]  for  professional  
pride  or  trying  to  fix  a  
recognizable  problem,  that  
we  have  to  be  bought  in  
order  to  do  something.”  
  
Punishment   “Why  should  they  report  
anything,  if  there  is  going  to  be  
any  retaliation  or  punitive  things  
happening.”  
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Other  
Incentives  
“…perhaps  by  having  
reported  an  error  early,  you  
would  get  some  sort  of  
recompense  or  whatever  
from  whatever  malpractice  
action  might  occur  or,  you  
know,  disciplinary  action  
might  occur  within  your  
facility.”  
Reporting  
Near  Misses  
“Well,  unless  there  was  an  
adverse  outcome,  I  don’t  think  
people  are  going  to  take  the  
time  to  report.”  
Sources: Adapted from Ben-Tzion Karsh, Kamisha Escoto, John Beasley, and Richard Holden, 
“Toward a Theoretical Approach to Medical Error Reporting System Research and Design,” 
Appl Ergon 37, no. 3 (May 2006): 283-295.  
 
 Regardless of the method used, it is incredibly difficult to obtain a clear understanding of 
the overall magnitude of harm because of the challenges of measuring error; perhaps the greatest 
of which is defining harm.165  Because error depends on intentionality, it is difficult for 
researchers to uncover and separate instances of error—even more so when those researchers are 
not employing a robust program.  Even if investigators only focus on outcomes, it is hard (if not 
impossible in some instances) to select indicators that could isolate cause and effect.  Injury in 
medicine is simply not that straightforward.  For instance, it is difficult to discern what injuries 
were due to medical management from the harm that was caused by the disease process itself.  
Even when it is possible to identify error, professionals frequently disagreed about the extent of 
the harm from the medical error.166  While this difficulty is no reason to shy away from the task, 
it is important to always be cognizant of the ways that the selected method will depict overall 
error frequency.  Kaveh Shojania calls this is the “elephant of patient safety,” such that the 
picture of harm is predicated on what part of the animal you are looking at.167  To combat this 
limitation, it is imperative that healthcare systems integrate various methods.   
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2. The Psychological and Financial Impact of Medical Errors 
However you define, classify, or study it, medical harm is a major cause of human 
suffering.  For the families of victims, the devastation is all too obvious.  However, health care 
providers also often experience a range of emotional and psychological repercussions—
sometimes referred to as the "second-victim" phenomenon.168  For providers like Kimberly Hiatt, 
the feelings of guilt and self-doubt are unbearable.169  After an unblemished, 24-year career as a 
registered nurse, Kim was fired from Seattle Children's Hospital when she accidentally gave an 
infant a potentially fatal dose of calcium chloride.  Intending to dispense 140 milligrams of 
calcium chloride, she accidentally miscalculated the dosage when converting the milligrams to 
mL and drew up a 14-mililiter dose, dispensing 1.4 grams.  That same day, she reported the error 
in the hospital's feedback system, admitting that she may have made the error because she was 
distracted, since she was talking to someone while she was drawing up the medication and 
making her calculations.  She vowed to be more careful in the future and admitted that she felt 
sick about the error.  Despite this, the hospital had Hiatt escorted from the property and 
immediately placed on administrative leave.  Within a few weeks, she was fired.  The hospital's 
notes suggest that Kim failed to appreciate her responsibility for the error, stating that she did not 
show an appreciation for how her deviation from hospital policy caused the error.  The note 
further suggests that a veteran nurse, such as Kim, should have greater precision and attention to 
detail—seemingly implying that accidents are only expected at the very beginning of a nursing 
career.  Interestingly, just two weeks prior to the overdose, an evaluation lauded her as a "leading 
performer."   Ultimately, it was never even clear whether the mistake was directly fatal, though it 
may have exacerbated the child's cardiac dysfunction, which likely contributed (at least in a 
small part) to her death five days later.   
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After the patient's death, hospital notes detailing Kim's termination meeting are 
concerning.170  In one section, ICU Director Cathie Rea, is put off by what she describes as Hiatt 
being incredulous, noting that Kim reacted to the termination in disbelief: "I am a 24-year 
employee—I make 1 mistake in 24 years and I lose my job? This is brutal—we all agree this was 
human error, right?”  Cathie writes that she responded, "no—we all agree you did not follow 
policy."  Though the state nursing commission allowed Kim to keep her license, with the 
condition that she complete a four-year probation specifically forbidding her from dispensing 
any medication without being supervised, these restrictions made it difficult for her to find a new 
job.  Wrecked with grief and feeling utter despair about the likelihood of regaining employment 
in health care, Kim hanged herself.   
In addition to millions of deaths and injuries, medical errors also result in astronomical 
financial loss.  One 2010 study estimated that, in 2008, the total cost of measurable medical 
errors in the United States equaled $19.5 billion.171  About $17 billion (or 87 percent) were 
directly attributable to additional medical costs, including: prescription drugs, ancillary services, 
and inpatient and outpatient care.  $1.1 billion accounts for the cost of ten million sick days.   
Since 2004, one organization (HealthGrades), has been regularly measuring patient safety 
with a specific emphasis on extrapolating these costs to individual hospitals.172  Using data 
related to 13 of the most common patient safety incidents, which cost the U.S. health care system 
nearly $7.3 billion and 79,670 deaths in the Medicare population between 2007 and 2009, the 
study parsed out the real costs based on patient safety hospital performance (table 2.8).  
According to their findings, they concluded that Medicare could have saved nearly $1.8 billion—
and prevented 20,688 deaths—had all of the patients been admitted to the best performing 
hospitals.   
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TABLE 2.8 Comparing Different Performance Categories (2007-2009) 
Patient  Safety  Indicator   Top  
Hospitals  
Bottom  
Hospitals  
Relative  
Risk  
Decrease  
with  Top  
Hospitals  
Compared  
to  Bottom  
Hospitals  
#  of  
Potentially  
Avoidable  
Deaths  
Death  in  low  mortality  DRGs*   .691   1.200   42.40%   1,266  
Pressure  ulcer     .731   1.249   41.49%   7,163  
  Failure  to  rescue*   .808   1.150   29.74%   4,179  
Foreign  body  left  after  procedure   .447   1.729   74.16%   3  
Iatrogenic  pneumothorax     .835   1.193   30.01%   239  
Catheter-­related  bloodstream  
infections  
.693   1.459   52.48%   394  
Post-­OP  hip  fracture   .629   1.580   60.15%   32  
Post-­OP  hemorrhage  or  hematoma   .825   1.219   32.35%   130  
Post-­OP  physiologic  and  metabolic  
derangements  
.612   1.628   62.38%   441  
Post-­OP  respiratory  failure   .771   1.348   42.81%   3,663  
Post-­OP  pulmonary  embolism  or  
DVT  
.805   1.318   38.92%   1,676  
Post-­OP  sepsis   .717   1.487   51.80%   1,387  
Post-­OP  abdominal  wound  
dehiscence  
.754   1.317   42.72%   115  
Sources: Adapted from “Health Grades Quality Study: Patient Safety in American Hospitals,” 
Health Grades, March 2011, http://patientsafetymovement.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Resources_Reports_Patient_Safety_in_American_Hospitals_Study.pdf 
 68 
Another study—using the benchmark (and arguably outdated) figure of 98,000 deaths 
from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report—estimated that the economic cost in terms of lost 
earnings and other contributions was as much as $98 billion in Quality-Adjusted Life Years.173   
Applying the same formula to data from studies that argue that medical error contributes to far 
more death than the IOM considered, the economic impact may reach nearly $1 trillion—in 
terms of lost human potential.   
Somewhat paradoxically, several other researchers uncovered a negative relationship 
between a hospital's fiscal health and patient safety.174  As hospital profit margins decline, 
adverse patient safety events increase significantly.  Though the exact impact is unknown, the 
researchers hypothesize that financial pressures reduce costly investments in patient safety 
improvements and detract from a strong safety culture.  The relationship between patient safety 
and profit margins can be tricky, however.  On the one hand, lower profit margins will induce 
hospitals to cut costs.  The more severe the financial problems, the more likely the hospital is to 
employ cost-cutting measures that impacts patient care (e.g., cuts in nursing staff).  While this 
makes logical sense, it fails to demonstrate that poor patient safety is causally tied to poor fiscal 
health.   
That said, however, with excess inpatient costs soaring at $17-29 billion per year, it is 
easy to imagine how these costs might worsen a hospital’s financials.  Not surprisingly, patient 
safety advocates urge hospitals to invest in safety improvements to reduce the high costs they 
incur as a result of adverse events—an argument sometimes called the business case for patient 
safety.  Yet, it is important to consider the extent to which hospitals themselves actually absorb 
these costs.   
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In examining the rate to which hospitals do incur the costs of adverse events, Mello et al. 
found that hospitals shift the majority of the costs (not including indirect costs, such as negative 
publicity) related to medical harm to external parties.175  For the purposes of the study, Mello et 
al. considered two main types of direct costs: un-recoupable costs for extra medical services that 
cannot be billed and compensation related to malpractice claims.  On average, hospitals 
externalized approximately 78 percent of the costs of all injuries, and 70 percent of the costs of 
negligent injuries.176  These costs average between $1,246 and $2,013 (depending on the type of 
injury), but hospitals externalize the bulk of the burden.  After passing the majority of these costs 
to the injured patient, their families, and their health insurers, the hospital is only responsible for 
22 percent of the costs.  These findings could suggest that the hospital’s share of the direct costs 
of medical error is too minimal to create strong enough incentive to improve patient safety.  
Even still, the tide may be quickly changing.  Public and private payers continue to 
modify their reimbursement policies to exclude payments for care resulting from preventable 
injury.   In 2005, Congress enacted a statue permitting the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services to adjust its payment system to incorporate incentives for hospitals to prevent errors.177 
Medicare implemented the Hospital-Acquired Conditions policy in 2008, eliminating additional 
diagnosis related group (DRG) payments for 10 types of complications thought to be 
preventable.  Similarly, insurers nationwide began testing their own non-reimbursement policies. 
Aetna no longer reimburses for any of the 28 National Quality Forum listed “never events.”178  
Even more aggressive is the 2012 implementation of Medicare’s Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) 
and Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP).  Under the Hospital VBP program, a 
byproduct of the Affordable Care Act, Medicare withholds a small percent of base hospital DRG 
payments (the amount is 2% as of FY 2018), which is redistributed to hospitals based on the 
 70 
quality of care provided.  At the same time, the HRRP penalizes hospitals for higher-than-
expected readmission rates.  For fiscal year 2018, 2,573 hospitals are being penalized—a small 
decline from the 2,597 hospitals in 2017.   While that might seem like slow progress, the news 
overall is encouraging: not only did the readmission rate fall from 21.5% in 2007 to 17.8% in 
2015,179 studies also found that the readmission rate fell more quickly at hospitals affected by the 
HRRP when compared with exempt hospitals.180   
The question still remains, however, is such a small overall bonus (2% for the Hospital 
VBR) sufficient enough to drive a meaningful culture shift?  Is the amount lost comparable to the 
amount of investment required in safety improvements to prevent injuries?  While patients, 
health insurers, and third-party payers have strong financial incentives for safety, healthcare 
organizations still may appear to benefit by not investing in patient safety.  This provokes two 
critical public policy questions.  First, do healthcare organizations have an obligation to develop 
patient safety systems?  Second, if so, is it important to provide economic incentives for patient 
safety? 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE ETHICAL IMPERATIVE TO IMPROVE PATIENT SAFETY  
The public should be screaming that we deserve 
better.1 
 —Dr. Peter J. Pronovost  
 
 
Hazards in the healthcare setting are matters of public safety.  As such, the public is 
justified in expecting—and even demanding—that healthcare organizations act to prevent 
continued public harm.  It is no longer appropriate—both from a practical and an ethical 
standpoint—to attempt to hold individual practitioners accountable for harm that is attributable 
to the organization.  The standard is clear: healthcare organizations have a moral obligation to 
develop patient safety systems.   
To provide a context for understanding the responsibility healthcare organizations owe to 
patients in improving and developing patient safety systems, this chapter first explores the 
history and evolution of the patient safety movement.  In order to appreciate the way forward, it 
is critical to understand the terminology and methods that guide the modern approach to patient 
safety.  This begins with examining the debate as to whether patient safety should concern itself 
with reducing errors or preventing harm.   
In spite of this clash over terminology and goals, patient safety is perhaps best 
characterized as a movement focused on transitioning to a systems-based approach to safety.  At 
its core, this movement reinforces the assertion that, both from an ethical and practical 
standpoint, health care organizations must evolve into safer organizational systems. That is, the 
patient safety movement reveals, that although human error may be attributable for the majority 
of adverse events within health care, the solution lies in redesigning the system itself.  This is the 
foundational element that embodies the systems-based approach to patient safety.  Section A(2) 
examines this theory, and reveals that preventing unintended injury depends on applying a 
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systems-based approach to identify and eliminate deficiencies within the organizational systems 
that permit obvious, but often irreversible, human errors.   
Armed with this understanding, Section B focuses on the application of a systems-based 
approach to develop a safer health system.  Within this context, this section examines how 
organizations can apply systems thinking to organize a patient safety program.  A prevalent 
argument is that the widespread culture of blame within healthcare organizations is principally 
responsible for the abundance of medical errors.  Informed by system theory, proponents of this 
approach contend that healthcare organizations must first stop blaming individual clinicians in 
order to improve safety.  Section B(1) (avoiding a culture of blame) examines this contention, 
noting the strengths of this position while also explaining why improving quality and safety 
requires a more comprehensive understanding of organizational attributes.  Organizational 
culture is complex and the promotion of safety hinges on the development of additional 
dimensions (beyond just blame).  In this light, Section B(2) (creating a culture of safety) further 
analyzes the broader notion of safety culture.    
A. The Modern Approach to Patient Safety  
As examined in chapter 2, the traditional approach to medical errors within the healthcare 
system has been to focus blame on the individual provider and treat the accident in accordance 
with the civil or criminal system of jurisprudence.  Somewhat paradoxically, a popular argument 
within patient safety literature is that this prevailing culture of blame is primarily responsible for 
the high rate of medical error.2   The basis for this claim is that a culture of blame misdirects 
responsibility from the system to the clinician.3  By blaming individuals that are not ultimately 
responsible for the error, the underlying factors and conditions that did contribute to the error 
will remain unchanged—making it likely that the same error will continue to proliferate and 
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recur.  Proponents of this approach recognize that healthcare organizations must abandon this 
practice of attributing blame to individual providers and instead begin to critically examine the 
defects within the system.  In this way, the modern patient safety movement replaces blame with 
systems thinking.4   
Within this context, patient safety is best described as the avoidance, prevention, and 
amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries from the delivery of health care.5   This definition 
reflects the fact that patient safety is concerned with more than the overall quality of care—that 
examination is a focus for the quality improvement movement.  Though there are some areas of 
overlap between the two movements, the patient safety movement is more specifically concerned 
with eliminating care that is actually harmful.  At the same time, patient safety involves more 
than merely trying to avoid damage—it is not just another phrasing for disaster management.6   
Formed in 1997, the National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF) is an independent, 
nonprofit organization dedicated to the improvement of patient safety.  In 2000, the NPSF sought 
to articulate the defining characteristics of patient safety and set an “agenda” for forthcoming 
research and development within the field.  The NPSF first aimed to delineate a common 
definition, being careful to distinguish patient safety from the overlapping study of quality 
improvement.  The NPSF outlined that: 
1.   Patient safety has to do primarily with the avoidance, prevention, and 
amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries stemming from the processes of 
health care itself. It should address events that span the continuum from what may 
be called “errors” and “deviations” to “accidents.”  
2.   Safety emerges from the interaction of the components of the system. It is more 
than the absence of adverse outcomes and it is more than avoidance of identifiable 
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“preventable” errors or occurrences.  Safety does not reside in a person, device or 
department.  Improving safety depends on learning how safety emerges from the 
interactions of the components.   
3.   Patient safety is related to “quality of care,” but the two concepts are not 
synonymous.  Safety is an important subset of quality.  To date, activities to 
manage quality, such as quality assurance, continuous quality improvement, total 
quality management, etc., have not focused sufficiently on patient safety issues.7  
In characterizing the distinction between accidents, near misses, errors, and deviations, the NPSF 
referenced a model that compares the correlation to an iceberg (see figure 3.1).  This analogy has 
been used to describe the relationship between accidents and the active or latent conditions that 
ultimately cause them because of just how many of these combinations of conditions are lurking 
below the surface.  The problem may look small at first glance, particularly when only 
investigating the rare, visible accident, but the bulk of the iceberg (as it were) is not immediately 
visible below the surface. 
Though the (relative) rare occurrence of error in contrast to the high numbers of error-
causing conditions may initially seem beneficial or even positive, it poses a real challenge for 
high-risk systems.8  Here, the infrequency of accidents (as compared to the number of system 
failures) makes it more difficult to collect meaningful data to learn from and impose corrective 
actions.  In industries with higher risks of accidents with catastrophic consequences, this problem 
is all the more significant.  In this light, it is essential for patient safety interventions to examine 
all of the human and systemic conditions that contribute to error. 
Similarly, patient safety (as a movement) should be careful not to become distracted with 
the singular goal of preventing error.9  Of course, any genuine approach towards improving 
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FIGURE 3.1. An Iceberg Concept of Errors 
 
patient safety demands that institutions reduce errors of all kinds; yet, it is equally as important 
to pay adequate attention to the reduction of harms.  Not only do a number of harms threaten 
patient safety regardless of error, there are also a number of minor errors that do not comprise 
patient safety.10  Accordingly, while considering error is important in order to avoid, prevent, and 
ameliorate adverse outcomes, the overall aim of patient safety is to reduce harms.11  After all, 
harm is what patients care most about.  Errors only entered the conversation because, typically, 
preventable harm involves errors.12  
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1. Focusing on Preventable Harm 
There is a debate, however, as to whether patient safety research should focus its 
attention on error or on harm.  Indeed, a number of different paradigms have emerged for how to 
direct patient safety improvement efforts.  Karsh et al. identify three broad categories:13   
•   Focus on reducing overall error rates 
•   Focus on reducing patient harm 
•   Focus on improving evidence-based medicine.  
The first paradigm focuses wholly on reducing error.14  It recognizes that errors can lead to 
patient harm, and, thus, concludes that preventing errors will eliminate harm.  The IOM report, in 
proposing that a critical component for safety involved the design of safer systems, advocated for 
this paradigm.  The Institute of Medicine reiterated this point in a later report, explaining that “a 
new delivery system must be built to achieve substantial improvements in patient safety—a 
system that is capable of preventing errors from occurring in the first place, while at the same 
time incorporating lessons learning from any errors that do occur.”15  
Conversely, the second paradigm prioritizes reducing patient harm itself because it 
recognizes that patient harm and errors are not always linked.16  Indeed, the causal relationship 
between error and harm is a major challenge to understanding medical error.  Not all errors cause 
harm.  More serious errors that do not result in adverse events (or harm) are typically 
characterizes as near misses or close calls.  Sometimes, these near hits occur simply because of 
luck.  For instance, a patient might not suffer any adverse reactions to an incorrect medication.  
Other times, the error is not clinically significant enough to have any physiological effect.  
Lastly, the error could be caught before any harm results.  Because there are many instances 
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when errors do not result in harm, advocates of this paradigm argue that it is not effective to 
devote resources to trying to eliminate those types of errors.   
 
FIGURE 3.2. Comparing Error and Harm 
 
 
In the same way that not all errors cause harm, not all harms are caused by error.  As the 
safety movement grows, experts increasingly prefer to focus on preventable harm—or 
preventable adverse events.17  An adverse event is an unintended and sufficiently serious injury 
that is caused by medical management rather than the disease process—it need not be caused by 
error.18  Figure 3.2 depicts this relationship.  As the figure shows, there are a great number of 
errors that do not cause a patient harm event (i.e., adverse harm) for the reasons listed above.  
Accordingly, proponents of this paradigm argue that efforts should focus on redesigning the 
system of care to eliminate factors that contribute to harm—which only partially overlaps with 
factors that cause error.   
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Likewise, it is important to clarify the distinction between preventable and non-
preventable harm (i.e., adverse events).19  A determination as to whether harm is preventable 
depends on a separate judgment concerning causation.  However, given the complicated nature 
of patient injury and the subjectivity inherent in identifying errors, discovering the causes of 
harm can be problematic.  As a moderately subjective assessment, determining the proximate 
cause of the injury to assess preventability is not entirely reliable and can lead to self-fulfilling 
analyses.   
Not only is it sometimes impossible to make those determinations of causation, many 
safety experts also reject this distinction because of concerns that it is defeatist to accept that 
certain harms are not preventable.  Remember, until fairly recently, all medical errors were 
regarded as the price that society must pay for medical progress.20  As such, it may be difficult to 
identify which harms are not able to be prevented based solely on contemporary knowledge.  A 
compelling example that captures this argument involves the prevention of central line 
infections.   
Before the patient safety movement took hold, hospital epidemiologists and other 
infection control staff were responsible for preventing hospital-acquired infections.  As catheter 
access to the central bloodstream became more common, so too did central line-associated 
bloodstream infections (CLABSI).  Estimates find that as many as 20,000 patients die each year 
from CLABSI in the United States alone.21  These infections occur when bacteria or other 
contaminants enter the bloodstream through the catheter, causing infection.22  With the average 
cost of treatment for CLABSI hovering around $45,000, CLABSI cost up to $2.3 billion dollars 
each year.23   
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Though the CDC began studying CLABSI in the 1970s, their early efforts to reduce 
infections showed little success.24  Clinicians largely believed CLABSI were simply inevitable.  
With a series of small-scale interventions, however, that attitude changed.  Using evidence-based 
strategies, a handful of clinicians and researchers dedicated themselves to reducing their rates of 
CLABSI.  Several hospitals participated in a CDC collaborative to help prove the concept that 
CLABSI were preventable, but it was the Keystone Project in Michigan that sealed the deal: 
more than 100 ICUs throughout the state reported a stunning 66% reduction of CLABSI within a 
mere 18 months.  
Exceptional patient safety stories, such as the prevention of CLABSI really bolster the 
argument that it is not prudent to label some harms as being nonpreventable.  Yet, at the same 
time, ignoring this already-present distinction carries its own risks.  First, allowing or 
encouraging efforts to reduce harms that have proven to be difficult (if not, impossible) to 
prevent could contribute to burnout.  Additionally, with the high rates of harm, overall, patient 
safety resources primarily be concerned with preventing harms that are already recognized as 
preventable.  Further, blurring this distinction could imply to the general public that all harm 
results from error—which is demonstrably false.    
In this light, the distinction regarding preventability (which is already widespread) does 
help reinforce the fact that not all injury results from errors.25  Likewise, studies reviewing cases 
of harm in hospitalized patients have largely concluded that approximately half were 
preventable—a ratio that makes sense to pay attention to for now.26  Acknowledging levels of 
preventability can also yield a number of other advantages.  For instance, because the language 
focuses on outcomes rather than individuals, it may encourage disclosure and reduce individual 
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blame.  For patients, who care most about their health care, more information is a welcomed 
compromise.   
Focusing on this primary concern of providing quality patient care, the third proposed 
paradigm for patient safety is most devoted to implementing evidence-based practices to ensure 
patients receive more appropriate and higher quality care.27  Advocates for this model argue that 
higher quality care is, by definition, safer care.  Though these proponents acknowledge that 
safety science can offer meaningful contributions for how to design higher quality systems, they 
argue that determining causation is simply too subjective an undertaking.  Not only does this 
make it difficult to measure and compare progress, they maintain, this preoccupation with 
accident prevention is also less effective.  That is, according to these critics, few safety 
interventions (even those that appear to reduce errors) have demonstrated evidence of decreasing 
preventable harm.     
Although the debate over terminology will continue because of its importance when 
attempting to prioritize efforts and measure progress towards improving safety,28 the central aim 
must remain focused on finding ways to design safer care.  Notably, though these paradigms 
disagree on the specific means of directing efforts to improve safety, all three paradigms agree 
on one essential theme: the importance of redesigning the healthcare system.  Whether the focus 
is on reducing error, preventing harm, or providing higher quality care, the general consensus is 
that the changes must be made within the system.  Disappointingly, the paradigms offer little 
insight into how system redesign will affect outcomes such as errors, harm, and quality.  Karsh et 
al. suggests that these paradigms left unanswered the question, “what type of system design will 
lead to error / injury reduction or quality improvement?”29  
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In considering the type of system design that will produce a safer healthcare system, a 
fourth paradigm—one that seeks to integrate all three—may be most helpful.  Indeed, the various 
elements and outcomes within any complex system are all interconnected.  Accordingly, system 
inputs can affect multiple outcomes simultaneously—using a broader approach based on human 
factors engineering offers a mechanism to integrate the main paradigms.  While it is critical to 
focus on system factors that influence patient outcomes, human factors science is better suited to 
redesign the system from a broader perspective of reducing hazards (as opposed to being 
preoccupied with reducing errors or injuries).  This approach may also help to shift towards a 
more positive outlook (e.g., support performance with fewer hazards versus reduce bad 
outcomes).  By not focusing on the errors or “bad” things that providers have done, this model 
can better communicate to providers that they are not the problem—the system is.   
As an example, consider an incident wherein a nurse disregarded evidence-based 
treatment and administered an incorrect medication.30  An error reduction strategy could focus on 
providing better information at the bedside, whereas the evidence-based medicine strategy might 
seek to ensure that providers have better training in order to follow appropriate guidelines.  The 
fourth paradigm would attempt to identify the hazards within the human-machine system and 
apply methods from behavioral science from the perspective of focusing on the entire system.  It 
would begin with the same goals as the other paradigms, but delve deeper into system design in 
an effort to improve performance and reduce hazards.  For instance, it may more thoroughly 
investigate readability, interpretability, access, problem identification, and problem solving as it 
endeavors to redesign the entirety of the system to support the end user.   
The major difference distinguishing these paradigms is a matter of perspective: rather 
than try to redirect the end user (i.e., the clinician) to behave differently (which is the approach 
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all three primary paradigms employ), human factors focuses on better engineering the system to 
support the end user.  After all, it is this very shift from individual blame to systems thinking that 
characterized the rise of the patient safety movement.  
2. Adopting Systems Thinking  
Errors: Systemic and Inevitable 
A key point for patient safety is that errors within our large, complex healthcare system 
are unavoidable.  The healthcare field is immensely technical, and the environment is 
particularly complex even from a sociological standpoint.31  Medical technologies and 
instruments themselves are complex and sometimes difficult to operate even under the best of 
circumstances.  Similar types of medical equipment might operate differently within different 
floors or units, complicating practitioners’ efforts to provide error-free care.   Even with the most 
sophisticated cognitive enhancements to extend our human abilities and think better or faster, 
those in high-risk occupations will never be able to eliminate errors within these dynamic and 
changing environments.32  In this light, Richard Cook observed: 
The potential for catastrophic outcome is a hallmark of complex systems.  It is impossible 
to eliminate the potential for such catastrophic failure; the potential for such failure is 
always present by the system’s own nature.33 
This emphasis on the systemic nature of failure is central to understanding how to improve 
patient safety.   
 To better capture the systemic nature of harm-causing errors, consider the surgical horror 
story involving Willie King.34  Willie King was a 51-year-old diabetic with severe peripheral 
vascular disease.  In February 1995, King presented to Tampa University Community Hospital 
complaining of pain in his right leg.  Upon examination, he had no pulse at the popliteal level in 
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either of his legs, which were both cold to the touch with gangrenous lesions.  A radiologist later 
testified that the disease in each leg was so severe that it was hard to make a comparison between 
the two sides, but, ultimately, determined that the left leg seemed worse.  Dr. Rolando Sanchez 
recommended vein bypass surgery in an attempt to save the leg, which might prolong amputation 
by another year or two.  Though both of his legs would eventually require amputation, Mr. King 
was experiencing such horrendous pain in his right leg that his first priority was having it 
removed.  In keeping with King’s request, Dr. Sanchez asked the nurse to have Mr. King sign a 
consent form to amputate his right leg.  Even still, Sanchez remarked that “it was clear to me, 
though, that the left leg would need to be amputated in the near future.” 35  Indeed, the earlier 
examination revealed that the arteries in his left leg were almost totally occluded.   
 The series of events that followed are the archetype for understanding catastrophic error, 
which Cook eloquently captures: 
Because overt failure requires multiple faults, there is no isolated ‘cause’ of an accident. 
There are multiple contributors to accidents. Each of these is necessarily insufficient in 
itself to create an accident.  Only jointly are these causes sufficient to create an accident. 
Indeed, it is the linking of these causes together that creates the circumstances required 
for the accident. Thus, no isolation of the ‘root cause’ of an accident is possible.36  
Though the investigation never revealed why, the operating room schedule listed the procedure 
as a left below-the-knee amputation.37  The day before the surgery, a floor nurse luckily caught 
the error and called the OR to notify them of the mistake.  The floor nurse also told a surgery 
pool nurse, who made a handwritten correction to the surgical schedule and gave that corrected 
copy to another nurse at the end of her shift.  In handing off the schedule, however, the nurse did 
not discuss the error or the handwritten correction.  The corrected information also never made 
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its way back to the computer system.  Because the computer’s schedule was never corrected, all 
of the subsequent printed copies continued to mistakenly identify the wrong leg for the 
procedure.  An uncorrected copy was distributed in the operating room, and the same 
information was noted on a blackboard there.   
There was still another chance to correct the error: before being sedated, King identified 
the right leg as the correct limb for the surgery when discussing the procedure with circulating 
nurse Willie Mae Jones.38  Jones noted this in the hospital records.  Around this time, a 
technician arrived to set up the operating theatre.  Seeing the operation listed as a left leg 
amputation on the official schedule and the blackboard, he sets up the leg holder on the left side 
of the operating table.  Despite the nurse’s recent conversation with Mr. King about which leg 
should be amputated, given the configuration of the operating table and the multiple incorrect 
surgical schedules and blackboard information, she prepped his left leg.  Mr. King’s medical 
chart with his signed consent form and medical record, including Jones’ own notes that his 
procedure was scheduled for the right leg, were available in the operating room, but the effective 
standard of care did not require that anyone review that information before beginning the 
surgery.  
Well after the procedure began, nurse Jones started reviewing Mr. King’s records.39  At 
once, she noticed the consent form clearly dictated that the amputation was for the right leg.  A 
report notes, “Ms. Jones, who had been facing away from the operating area of the room, turned 
towards the area where the surgery was taking place.  She looked under the draped blanket. She 
began to cry, and the surgical team then discovered that the wrong leg was being amputated.”40  
Dr. Sanchez recalled that they were already three-quarters of the way through the procedure 
when he saw the nurse start shaking.  The error was discovered too late, and Dr. Sanchez had no 
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choice but to finish the operation.  Willie King was transferred to another hospital who 
amputated his remaining leg (the intended leg) about two weeks after the initial error—leaving 
King a double amputee several years or more before it would have otherwise been necessary.  
As is common with most cases, multiple errors occurred throughout the entire system 
before resulting in the harm Willie King experienced.  In essence, errors are the inescapable by-
product of individuals operating within a system structure that allows errors to occur.41  In fact, 
after studying the safety of complex systems, Charles Perrow argues that accidents within 
complex systems are simply inevitable.42  In his book, Normal Accidents, Perrow attempts to 
capture one of the defining characteristics of complex systems: that accidents are normal 
events—an approach now referred to as normal accident theory (NAT).  Perrow, who considers 
himself an organizational theorist, arrives at this conclusion after considering numerous 
examples of disastrous accidents.  Through examining the events preceding each of these 
accidents, he demonstrates that not only were the accidents “unexpected, but [they were] 
incomprehensible” to the persons responsible for ensuring the safe operations of those systems.  
Accordingly, Perrow asserts that system accidents are normal.   
As Perrow puts it, the “essence of the normal accident [is]: the interaction of multiple 
failures that are not in a direct operational sequence.”43  Most of these normal accidents will also 
possess a significant degree of incomprehensibility.  The criterion of incomprehensibility is key.  
Though Perrow argues that accidents are normal, he does not posit that accidents are an inherent 
property of complex systems.  Instead, the problem is that engineers and designers are helpless in 
preventing what Perrow terms normal accidents because they wholly fail to anticipate even their 
possibility.  Here, complexity is the true enemy of safety.44  
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Safety, instead, depends on the ability to anticipate and resolve systemic flaws.  This 
approach is similarly reflected in the latent failure model.  As Reason articulated: 
Rather than being the main instigators of an accident, operators tend to be the inheritors 
of system defects created by poor design, incorrect installation, faulty maintenance and 
bad management decisions. Their part is usually that of added the final garnish to a lethal 
brew whose ingredients have already been long in the cooking.45 
To understand this idea of system accidents, consider how systems become complex.  
Fundamentally, a system is a group or set of interacting parts that (when assembled as a 
whole) work together for a specific, unified purpose.46  As the IOM report stated, “a system is a 
set of interdependent elements interacting to achieve a common aim.  The elements may be both 
human and non-human (equipment, technologies, etc.).”  The critical component is that the parts 
are interdependent—without this level of dependency, the set would simply be a collection or 
grouping of parts.  All systems share several defining characteristics:  
•  Systems have a discrete purpose, defining and unifying it; 
•  All parts of the system must be present for it to perform optimally; 
•  The ordering of the parts within the system affects its performance; 
•  Systems attempt to maintain stability through feedback.  
The scope and coupling of a system will affect its risk—with accidents being virtually 
unavoidable in interactively complex and tightly coupled systems.47   
Though complexity can be discussed relative to a number of different factors, Perrow 
isolated two important characteristics: the complexity of interaction and tightness of coupling.48  
Systems may be more or less linear.49  Linear interactions unfold in expected and familiar 
sequences, even when unplanned.  Non-linearity is a hallmark feature in complex systems.  
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Complex interactions progress in unfamiliar and unexpected sequences, which are either not 
visible or not immediately comprehensible.  Unlike linear (or simple) systems, which allow 
decision-makers a vantage to observe and predict unplanned sequences, non-linear (e.g., 
complex) systems are characterized with near infinite variabilities—making it impossible to 
predict interactions and consequences.50   
Sorting mail within a post office follows a linear (and, thereby, predictable) process.  
Manufacturers assembling automobiles use a production line process—a linear system.  Even the 
process that a host at a neighborhood restaurant uses when managing new customers follows a 
linear process for seating and serving those customers; with each customer following the same 
projected path: request a table, wait for an available table, be seated, order drinks and appetizers, 
order the main course, possibly finish with dessert (a predicable variability), pay and tip your 
server, and, finally, depart.  In this way, linear interactions follow an expected and familiar path.  
Conversely, providing care to an acutely ill patient is intensely complex.  It does not follow any 
single path or order.  There are so many variations and interactions that makes each patient’s 
experience singularly unique.  As a result, it is impossible to anticipate how the sequences will 
unfold.  This level of non-linearity makes it incredibly difficult for decision-makers to avoid 
accidents.  
The non-linearity of a process exponentially increases its complexity.  Such systems will 
possess these general features: 
•   Components that are not linked together in a production sequence are in close 
proximity. 
•   Many common-mode connections (i.e., components whose failures can have 
multiple effects ‘downstream’) are present.  
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•   There is only a limited possibility of isolating failed components. 
•   Due to the high degree of specialization, there is little chance of substituting or 
reassigning personnel. The same lack of interchangeability is also true for 
supplies and materials.  
•   There are unfamiliar or unintended feedback loops.  
•   There are many control parameters that could potentially interact.  
•   Certain information about the state of the system must be obtained indirectly, or 
inferred.  
•   There is only a limited understanding of some processes, particularly those 
involving transformations.51  
Complex interactions follow unfamiliar sequences, with failures surging through the system in 
confounding ways that make them incredibly difficult to manage. 
Systems also exhibit differing levels of coupling. Coupling is a way of conceptualizing 
the relationship between an action and its consequences.52  Systems are tightly coupled when the 
relationship between act and consequence is intrinsically time dependent.  Tight coupling 
dictates that, once a process has been set in motion, an established consequence will result every 
time.  The relationship between placing your hand in a flame and being burned is tightly 
coupled—a burn will always result.  In addition to not tolerating delay, tightly coupled 
interactions have invariant sequences and negligible slack.  Loosely coupled systems, by 
contract, have slack and reserve their time and resources.53  Parts can be isolated or sacrificed to 
protect the others.   
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To summarize a definition for normal accident theory, Perrow eloquently offers the 
following recap: 
Nothing is perfect, neither designs, equipment, procedures, operators, supplies, or the 
environment.  Because we know this, we load our complex systems with safety devices in 
the form of buffers, redundancies, circuit breakers, alarm bells, and whistles.  Small 
failures go on continuously in the system since nothing is perfect, but the safety devices 
and the cunning of designers, and the wit and experience of the operating personnel, cope 
with them. Occasionally, however, two or more failures, none of them devastating in 
themselves in isolation, come together in unexpected ways and defeat the safety 
devices—the definition of a “normal accident” or system accident. If the system is also 
tightly coupled, these failures can cascade faster than any safety device or operator can 
cope with them, or they can even by incomprehensible to those responsible for doing the 
coping. If the accident brings down a significant part of the system, and the system has 
catastrophic potential, we will have a catastrophe.54   
As Perrow states, that is essentially the foundation for Normal Accident Theory.  According to 
Perrow: for highly complex, tightly coupled systems, accidents cannot be prevented because they 
arise from the characteristics of the systems themselves.  Operators fail to cope because they 
assume something else is happening—something they can understand—and are unable to 
intervene.  Perrow suggests that this is the core of the common organizational problem.  
As an example, Perrow offers the following scenario.55  Your boss gives you an 
ambiguous order, which leaves you confused between doing A or doing B.  You know that 
alternative A would be the right choice if something were terribly wrong or unusual.  B is the 
correct alternative for a common situation that was not very serious. Given this, you decide your 
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boss wanted to you do B.  After all, you have done B before, and it is easy to accomplish. You 
go about completing the various steps for option B and, as expected, all of the consequences that 
should occur at each stage in the process materialize in the right order.  Feeling satisfied, you 
conclude that alternative B must have been the right choice because all of the expected outcomes 
were realized.  In the face of uncertainty, you must, of course, make a judgment, even if only a 
temporary one—this act results in a “mental model” or expected universe. The downfall of this 
organizational problem is that is allows operators to confirm mental models that are congruent 
with their basic assumptions or interpretations without any actual relation to what is objectively 
true.  This is precisely what happened with the operators leading to the accident at the Three 
Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI) nuclear plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on March 28, 1979.56  
This accident at TMI was the most serious nuclear power plant accident to ever occur in 
the U.S.  The accident began at around 4 a.m. in the cooling system. TMI had two cooling 
systems.  The primary system circulates water through the core to remove heat from the reactor.  
The cooling water filling the reactor chamber, gets heated by the nuclear reaction.  As the water 
temperatures rise, the pressure also continues to rise.  The heated water rises to a steam 
generator, which heats the water in the secondary system.  This transfer of heat from the primary 
to the secondary system keeps the nuclear reactor from overheating.  The heat from the primary 
system also eventually converts the secondary system to steam, which spins the turbines to 
generate electricity.  The steam is then cooled and reused to make more electricity.  
Though the reason was unclear at the time, a seal within the secondary coolant system 
leaked.  The moisture from the small leak interfered with the air pressure reading on two 
feedwater pump valves.  This interruption stopped the feedwater pumps.  This interruption of the 
cold water flow into the cooling system triggered an automatic shutdown, stopping the turbines.   
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Within seconds of the shutdown, an automatic safety device to relieve the pressure—a 
relief valve (PROV)—opened as intended.  About ten second later it should have closed, because 
if too much water escapes the pressure drops too low.  The PROV failed and did not 
automatically close.  With the relief valve open, coolant from the reactor core was leaking at an 
increased rate.  With too much coolant escaping, the pressure was rapidly dropping.  This is 
dangerous if the water temperature is not also rapidly cooling because without pressure, the 
superheated water (over 2,000° F) will convert to steam which does not effectively cool the core.  
Steam also creates bubbles that block the flow of coolant, allowing certain spots to get much 
hotter than others and start fissioning again.    
At the same time, another safety measure is designed to automatically start pumping fresh 
water to the steam generators.  Even with the turbines off, the secondary coolant system still 
needs to function to remove heat from the reactor core.  Perrow compares this to a teapot.  
Simply stopping the turbines is analogous to removing a whistling teapot from the stove with a 
plugged opening; even though it’s no longer being actively heated, the already hot water in the 
metal pot will continue to produce steam.  If that steam does not have a way to release, the pot 
may explode.  Similar to how you would need to pour cold water over the tea kettle to keep it 
from exploding, the emergency feedwater pumps are supposed to come on to compensate for the 
boiling water until the reactor cools.  The emergency feedwater turned on, as expected, but the 
operators did not realize that both pipes were blocked.  A valve in each pipe was left closed after 
maintenance, leaving the water pumping into a closed pipe.  With the steam generators not 
getting added water, they eventually boiled dry.  This caused the reactor coolant (in the primary 
system) to heat up again because the secondary system stopped removing heat from the primary 
one.   
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Responding to the loss of cooling water, high-pressure injection pumps automatically 
pushed replacement water into the reactor system.  As water and steam escaped through the open 
relief valve, the cooling water surged into the pressurizer, helping to compensate for the lost 
water.  After the HPI came on, the operators were receiving conflicting information from two 
dials: one indicating that the pressure in the reactor was still falling, but one indicating that the 
pressure in the pressurizer was dangerously high—and rising.  The pressurizer is supposed to 
control the pressure in the coolant system, and, as such, it should have the same pressure as the 
reactor.  One could be wrong; but, which?    
According to the control panel, the operators believed that the there was plenty of water 
going into the core through the coolant pumps (not knowing of the blockage) and through the 
HPI.  With all of this water going into the core, it did not seem comprehensible that the pressure 
would fall; especially because the control panel also had a signal light confirming that the PROV 
was closed.  A supervisor testified: 
I think we knew we were experiencing something different, but I think each time we 
made a decision it was based on something we knew about. For instance, pressure was 
low, but they had opened the feed valves quickly in the steam generator, and they though 
that might have been “shrink.”  There was logic at the time for most of the actions, even 
though today you can look back and say, well, that wasn’t the cause of that, or, that 
shouldn’t have been that long.57 
Operators were faced with a dilemma between ambiguous readings. If they believed the core 
pressure indicator (alternative A) that would mean that the core was slowly being uncovered by 
water.  This option was unheard of and had never happened at any large commercial light water 
reactors in all their years of operation. Trusting the pressurizer dial (alternative B), was more 
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aligned with their training and made sense with the information they had at the time.  Afraid of 
letting the pressure rise much higher, and aligning with their strict training not to go solid (i.e., 
allowing the HPI to send too much water to the core, flooding the pressurizer with all solid water 
and no steam), the operators acted on alternative B and throttled back the HPI.  As expected, the 
pressure dropped in the pressurizer after HPI was cut back.  Unbeknownst to the operators, 
however, cutting back the HPI uncovered the core—melting the fuel rods and releasing 
radioactive material into the cooling water.   
Having no framework to anticipate the unexpected or unlikely interactions, the operators 
at TMI made decisions and processed information to fit their expected world—finding reasons to 
exclude or rationalize any potentially contradictory information.58  These limited constructs of 
reality made it impossible for the TMI operators to properly intervene.  Given the impossibility 
of eliminating errors through human corrections, it is essential for industries (especially those 
that are high-risk) to employ other strategies to mitigate the consequences of errors.  Indeed, this 
is the only sensible way to combat the human error problem.   To achieve this goal, patient safety 
researchers have looked to other high-risk and complex industries (e.g., aviation, nuclear) to gain 
insights into how to better anticipate human factors in order to manage safety.59 
Many of the important developments regarding the psychology of error (generally) 
originated after studying tragic accidents that occurred within complex industries.  Researchers 
drew on this knowledge to approach error within the healthcare setting with a more sophisticated 
understanding of the nature of error.  One of the first pioneers in this area, Jeffrey Cooper, was a 
bioengineer who worked for Massachusetts General Hospital.60  Massachusetts General Hospital 
tasked Cooper with developing machines to assist anesthesiology researchers.  In this role, 
Cooper noticed that the anesthetic machines were contributing to high rates of error because of 
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their poor design.  For example, the machines were not standardized—whereas a clockwise turn 
of a dial on one machine would decrease the concentration of an anesthetic, it would increase 
that same concentration on a different machine.  Not surprisingly, this was highly conducive to 
error.  
In 1974 Cooper presented some of his concerns during a lecture at a NATO conference 
on Human Factors in Healthcare entitled, “The Anesthesia Machine: An Accident Waiting to 
Happen.”61  An attendee suggested to Cooper that he should consider using the critical incident 
technique that Flanagan pioneered to actually study errors, not merely observe them.  This 
technique offers a set of procedures for collecting observations of human behavior.   
As Flanagan notes, the critical incident technique was first used within of the United 
States Army Air Forces Aviation Psychology Program during World War II.62  One of the first 
applications of this technique was used in the summer and early fall of 1941 to analyze why 
1,000 expelled pilot candidates failed to learn to fly.  This initial study examined the proceedings 
of the elimination boards, in which pilot instructors and check pilots reported their justifications 
for eliminating potential candidates.  Though many of the reasons were subjective 
generalizations (e.g., lack of inherent flying ability, unsuitable temperament, insufficient 
progress), a number of specific behaviors were also reported.  The results provided some helpful 
behavioral standards to use when selecting pilots.  However, it also indicated the need to find 
better data regarding pilot performance.   
Accordingly, the program carried out a second study during the winter of 1943-1944.  
This study emphasized the importance of collecting fact-based performance reports from 
competent observers.  Despite the stress placed on recording precise facts, the official reports 
still failed to account for all of the factors and events.   
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In the summer of 1944, a third study investigating combat leadership endeavored to 
gather specific incidents of effective or ineffective behavior specific to an activity.  The 
instructions asked combat veterans to report incidents that involved behavior that was either 
especially helpful or detrimental towards accomplishing the assigned mission.  The instructions 
also explicitly directed the respondent to describe the officer’s action.  The several thousand of 
incidents collected from this study provided a rather factual and objective definition for effective 
combat leadership.  
 Towards the close of the war, the summary volume for the Aviation Psychology 
Program Research Reports provided a robust basis for understanding the technique and its 
procedures: 
The principle objective of job analysis procedures should be the determination of critical 
requirements.  These requirements include those which have been demonstrated to have 
made the difference between success and failure in carrying out an important part of the 
job assigned in a significant number of instances.  Too often, statements regarding job 
requirements are merely lists of all the desirable traits of human beings.  These are 
practically no help in selecting, classifying, or training individuals for specific jobs.  To 
obtain valid information regarding the truly critical requirements for success in a specific 
assignment, procedures were developed in the Aviation Psychology Program for making 
systematic analyses of causes of good and poor performance.     
Essentially, the procedure was to obtain first-hand reports, or reports from objective 
records, of satisfactory and unsatisfactory execution of the task assigned. The cooperating 
individual described a situation in which success or failure was determined by specific 
reported causes.  
 103 
This procedure was found very effective in obtaining information from individuals 
concerning their own efforts, from subordinates concerning errors of their superiors, from 
supervisors with respect to their subordinates, and also from participants with respect to 
co-participants.63  
As the summary reflects, this approach relies heavily on collecting large samples of direct 
observations of human behavior.   
After World War II ended, some of the psychologists who worked in the Aviation 
Psychology Program established the American Institute for Research, an organization devoted to 
the systematic study of human behavior.  In some of its early studies, the American Institute for 
Research more formally developed the technique and gave this approach its present name.  One 
of the Institute’s first studies within an industrial situation sought to determine the critical job 
requirements for General Motors employees.  First foremen collected 2,500 critical incidents by 
interviewing other foreman in the plants.  Using that data, a form was developed (the 
Performance Record for Hourly Wage Employees) for foremen to collect incidents on a regular 
basis.  Three groups of foremen (each split into groups of 24) were tasked with reporting 
incidents at regular intervals: with the first group recording daily, the second group reporting at 
the end of each week, and the final group submitting reports bi-monthly.  Though each group 
was exposed to comparable work conditions, it became very apparent that daily recording 
provides the best results.  The foremen who reported weekly (155 incidents) forgot nearly half of 
the incidents that they would have likely reported on a daily basis (315 incidents). Even worse, 
the foreman who reported bi-monthly only submitted 63 incidents—only 20% of the amount that 
the daily reporters observed.  
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From this discussion, it should be evident that the critical incident technique is a 
procedure to discern important facts about behavior for specific and defined situations.  A 
hallmark of the technique—which is best understood as a flexible set of principles, rather than a 
single set of rules—is that it only requires observers to report simple observations.  In fact, the 
critical incident technique is quite elegant in its simplicity.  
After researching this technique, Jeffrey Cooper and his colleagues realized that they 
could benefit from learning from the perspectives and knowledge of the frontline workers.64  
Based on their findings, the team investigated various preventative strategies.  They developed a 
prototype machine, “The Boston Anesthesia Machine,” that was displayed during the 1976 
Association Society of Anesthesiologists’ annual meeting.  This suggestion also pushed Cooper 
to publish a landmark study on anesthetist-reported incidents, which eventually led to the 
enactment of minimum monitoring standards.   
As Cooper pointed out in his study (Preventable anesthesia mishaps: a study of human 
factors), prior studies examining human error contributing to anesthetic risk only concentrated on 
quantifying the overall risks.  While useful, this information did not provide any insights into 
how to reduce that risk.  Instead, using the critical incident technique, Cooper endeavored to 
identify the etiology of error.  Unlike other studies, his study “focused on the process of error—
its causes, the circumstances that surround it, or its association with specific procedures, devices, 
etc—regardless of final outcome.”65   
Cooper and his team used a modified critical incident analysis to examine 359 critical 
incidents, which staff anesthesiologists, residents, and nurse anesthetists self-identified during 
interviews.66  A mishap was considered a critical incident when it was an occurrence that could 
have (if not discovered) or did lead to an undesirable outcome (e.g., anything from an increased 
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hospital stay to death).  Each incident was also required to meet four additional criteria: (1) 
involve an error committed by a member of the anesthesia team, or an anesthetic equipment 
failure, (2) occur while the patient was under an anesthetist’s direct care, (3) be described in clear 
detail by a direct observer, and (4) be clearly preventable.  Acknowledging the difficulty of 
determining preventability, Cooper excluded incidents that left any doubt as to the likelihood of 
preventability.   
Ultimately, Cooper realized that the scope of the problem was much larger than 
equipment-related errors.  Cooper and his colleagues found that equipment error only accounted 
for 14% of incidents, with human error accounting for the remaining 82%.  As Cooper tells it, 
though, another man was integral to translating his research into meaningful action.67   
Ellison C. Pierce Jr., or “Jeep” as Cooper knew him, was the Chairman of the Anesthesia 
Department at the Deaconess Hospital and, in 1983, became the President of the American 
Society of Anesthesiologists.  Partially motivated by his own experiences of loss after a friend’s 
child died due to anesthetic error, Jeep was fiercely dedicated to improving anesthesia safety.  In 
1984, Jeep and Cooper (along with Dick Kitz) organized an international meeting to discuss how 
to prevent anesthetic catastrophes.  The discuss led to disagreement, and Jeep suggested that they 
should create a foundation dedicated to examining these events and determining how to prevent 
them.  Together, they formed The Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation.   
Because of an ongoing malpractice crisis that was dramatically impacting 
anesthesiologists’ income, The Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation was able to garner enough 
support to stay viable.  Jeep was able to use the ongoing threats to the field to encourage 
anesthesiologists to support his goal of preventing the events that were leading to exorbitant 
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malpractice awards. In working towards this common goal, the focus on safety led to meaningful 
decreases in the risks to patients.   
Cooper went on to co-author the landmark IOM Report, To Err is Human, and was 
integral to the formation of the National Patient Safety Foundation.68  In many ways, his initial 
analysis of human factors in the safety of healthcare birthed the development of the patient safety 
movement.  Indeed, unlike other practices, anesthesiology is the one specialty that identified a 
patient safety problem long before the 1999 IOM Report.   
The critical incident technique—though used more frequently now—is still often 
neglected as a meaningful way to approach the etiology of error and system failures.69  As 
applied in Cooper’s original study, the technique collected direct reports of human errors and 
equipment failures that caused actual or potential patient harm.  After Cooper published his 
landmark study, many anesthesiologists conducted their own studies.  Interestingly, one of these 
studies employed same methods in Australia.  The resulting paper was one of the major 
influences towards the development of the Australian Incident Monitoring System (AIMS); one 
of the first national reporting systems to collect data on patient safety incidents in an attempt to 
tackle the systemic nature of medical error.  Though this type of reporting data can provide 
necessary and essential data for how to focus systemic defenses to improve patient safety, 
healthcare organizations must first adopt a systems-based approach. 
Applying Systemic Defenses to Healthcare 
When things go awry in health care (and elsewhere), the most common response is to 
attempt to identify and blame the culpable individual(s).70  Interestingly, as James Reason 
explains, the desire to blame people for errors (as opposed to institutions or situations) developed 
in response to the predominantly Western concept of free will.71  Psychologically, blaming 
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individuals is emotionally more satisfying than targeting institutions.72  This is founded in the 
assumption that humans are capable of choosing between right and wrong.  As such, humans 
perceive errors as voluntary and culpable actions.  Although the study of human error and 
accident theory demonstrates that errors (by definition) are unintentional, society continues to 
hold the belief that individuals can somehow will themselves to be error-free.  Not only does this 
belief encourage unnecessary guilt and shame, it also overlooks the most important factor for 
change.  Focusing on who to blame distracts us from understanding the most critical issue when 
an error occurs: how can it be prevented.  The systems approach to error challenges this model of 
individual blame.    
 Historically, however, the healthcare system (as a whole) tasked individual providers 
with the responsibility to ensure quality.  Take, for instance, the American Medical Association's 
first code of ethics: 
A physician should not only be ever ready to obey the calls of the sick, but his 
mind out to be imbued with the greatness of his mission, and the responsibility he 
habitually incurs in its discharge. Those obligations are the more deep and 
enduring, because there is no tribunal, other than his own conscience, to adjudge 
penalties for carelessness or neglect.73    
In other words, the nineteenth-century American doctor was solely accountable to himself.  
Though doctors are not quite so independent today, the assumption that physicians are uniquely 
qualified to safeguard quality is a lasting hallmark of the medical profession.74   
In fact, most contracts describe physicians as independent contractors—not employees.  
This is an important legal distinction, which reflects the tradition role of the institution to 
maintain the building wherein private practitioners cared for their private patients.75  Because 
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physicians were independent contractors, hospitals had no right to control the manner or 
provision of any treatment.  However, this view of the relationship between physicians and 
organizations—which depicts hospitals as plain structures that added as shared workspace for 
medical providers—is outdated.  Today, hospitals act as independent medical centers.   
Accordingly, institutions implement stringent control procedures and policies to regulate and 
manage the delivery of health care.  As patient safety experts continue to assert, contemporary 
healthcare has become an incredibly complex institution with an even more complicated 
relationship between organizations and providers.  Nevertheless, given the role organizations 
traditionally played, it made sense to attempt to identify and punish the culpable individual.  This 
encouraged the proliferation of the person-based approach to medical error, which focuses on 
individual blame.76   
The person approach focuses on specific errors and violations; blaming individual nurses, 
physicians, and pharmacists for forgetfulness, inattention, and recklessness.77  It views unsafe 
acts as arising primarily (if not entirely) from individual errors—attributing the poor 
performance to the individual’s personality or ability.78  To address these failures, 
countermeasures focus on reducing the error-causing flaws in human behavior.  The methods for 
intervention include launching poster campaigns to incite fear, writing additional protocols or 
procedures, levying disciplinary measures or punishments, threatening litigation, and other 
blaming and shaming tactics.  People who support this approach commonly view errors as moral 
shortcomings, which is often fueled by a personal need to be able to believe that the world is 
orderly and just.79   
Psychologist Melvin Learner first articulated this phenomenon, introducing it as the just-
world hypothesis.80  Learner proposed that individuals need to see themselves and others as 
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deserving of the rewards or punishments that they experience in order to give meaning to their 
actions: 
Individuals have a need to believe that they live in a world where people generally get 
what they deserve.  The belief that the world is just enables the individual to confront his 
physical and social environment as though they were stable and orderly. Without such a 
belief it would be difficult for the individual to commit himself to the pursuit of long 
range goals or even to the socially regulated behavior of day to day life.81  
Quite simply, this concept declares that good things happen to good people and bad things 
happen to bad people.82  Even though this is patently false, this phenomenon helps to provide 
psychological defenses against a harsh and random world.  In a sense, it preserves a sense of 
justice and helps insulate people from vulnerability.   
 Not only does the person approach encourage unnecessary guilt and shame, however, it 
also overlooks the most important factor for change: causality.  The primary psychological flaw 
with the person-based approach is that it treats errors as moral failures.  A person-based approach 
disregards the fact that well-trained, careful, and caring providers commit the majority of 
errors—which, by definition, are accidental.83  Further, by focusing only on the individual 
sources for error, unsafe acts are isolated from their system context.   Remember an important 
feature of errors is is that they are unintentional deviations.84  In this light, it is impossible to 
avoid errors or otherwise increase patient safety simply by encouraging or cajoling individuals to 
try harder.   
Perhaps more importantly, the person-based approach is also factually flawed.  Even if 
errors were moral failures, this approach does not examine the incidence of error in the context 
of the broader healthcare system.  Remember, human error is inevitable in complex systems.  
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Accidents result because of poor system design, not poorly trained healthcare providers.  
Because the institution, not providers, controls quality policies and procedures, it is unjust to 
hold individual providers responsible for system flaws.  Ultimately, all of the various approaches 
towards patient safety agree on this one major tenant: that large system failures occur as the 
result of multiple seemingly minor faults.  For this, and many of the aforementioned reasons, 
blame is especially counter-productive.  
Pioneers in accident theory and organizational science were the first to suggest that the 
human is the system component that is most difficult to change.  Thus, they advanced the 
argument that the main response to an accident should be system-based—not person-based.  
Rather than get distracted with who or whether an error occurred, this view directs its efforts 
towards improving the system function.  After all, blameworthiness aside, the most critical issue 
when an error occurs is not who made the error, but how to avoid repeating the error.   In this 
way, the system approach focuses its efforts on building system-level defenses to avoid or (at the 
very least) mitigate the effects of error.  
  The systems-based approach acknowledges that humans are fallible, focusing instead on 
improving system defenses, barriers, and safeguards to prevent errors.85  Given the additional 
difficulty of classifying and identifying error, proponents of a systems approach also argue that 
(if nothing else) it is simply more effective to focus on improving the system.  Psychologist 
James Reason first articulated a developed theory explaining this model.  The latent theory 
model’s main proposition is that disasters result, not from a single, large failure, but from a series 
of relatively minor failures.  To illustrate this, Reason proposed the Swiss cheese model of 
system accidents (figure 3.2).86   
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FIGURE 3.3. The “Swiss Cheese” Model of Accident Causation 
Source: James Reason, J. Carthey, and MR deLeval “Diagnosing 'vulnerable system syndrome:' 
an essential prerequisite to effective risk management,” Quality in Health Care 10, no. 2 (2001), 
ii21-ii25.  
 
 
Reason’s Swiss Cheese model emphasizes the fact that in complex systems (such as 
healthcare) a single error usually will not cause harm.  Systems, especially high technology 
systems, have many defensive layers.  Almost always, errors need to breach multiple defensive 
layers.  Although each defensive layer should be intact, Reason explains that (in fact) the layers 
more closely resemble multiple slices of Swiss cheese.  Unlike cheese, however, the many holes 
in the overlapping layers of protection are also continually shifting, opening, and shutting as the 
system adapts and changes.87  Typically, holes in a single slice of cheese is not enough to cause a 
negative outcome.   To result in a bad outcome, holes need to be aligned throughout successive 
layers of defense—allowing for a trajectory for harm. 
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These holes arise for two reasons: active failures or latent defects.  Reason asserts that 
almost every loss involves a combination of both active failures and latent defects.88  People at 
the sharp end (those in direct contact with the patient) such as surgeons, physicians, nurses, and 
pharmacists, represent active failures when they fumble or make mistakes.  This is where the 
person-based approach investigation ends—with a direct cause to explain the occurrence of any 
unsafe acts, followers of the person approach have no reason to look any further.  However, 
because an accident only occurs when the holes in the defenses align to allow a trajectory of 
harm to occur, Reason argues that accident theory must also consider latent conditions.  Latent 
conditions are still casually connected to the adverse event, their connection is just earlier in 
time.  Referring again to the figure, the holes in the overlapping layers of protections represent 
these latent errors.   Latent conditions are the ‘resident pathogens’ within the system that arise 
from management decisions.   These pathogens can lie dormant within the system for years, only 
revealing themselves when a unique set of circumstances align that breach the system’s defenses.  
An adverse event (or, accident) occurs when the trajectory happens to line up with holes in all of 
the layers of protection (slices of cheese).  Because it is impossible to change the human 
condition, this modern approach to error management focuses on changing the conditions within 
the system to anticipate and prevent errors.  
Though it might initially seem as though this model merely shifts the blame from the 
clinicians at the “sharp end” to the system managers, its central theme is that both the clinicians 
operating at the sharp end and the managers further down the sequence are victims to a complex 
environment.89  Each inherited, not necessarily instigated, the latent accident sequence.  Indeed, 
managers operating within a non-linear, complex system face the same hurdles in attempting to 
anticipate the effects of their actions or policies.  In this light, the best method for minimizing 
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accidents (and improving patient safety) is to learn how to uncover and understand the 
significance of latent failures before they produce disaster.90   
In order to anticipate and prevent errors, the Swiss cheese model also acts as a framework 
to guide investigations of adverse events.  Though the model serves as an incomplete framework 
when it comes to accident analysis, it nevertheless emphasizes the importance of considering the 
contributing factors for an adverse event—not just the single, active error (sometimes called the 
sharp-end because of the error’s immediate effects).91  Though Reason focuses more specifically 
on complex explanations and latent conditions, he also recognizes the importance of 
understanding the human factors that affect system performance.  Those factors could 
materialize as either latent or active failures.  This is similar in nature, but different from root 
cause analysis, which attempts to trace causation back to a single cause.92  
Root cause analysis (RCA) is a tool that is used to systematically investigate an event in 
order to identify and correct the causal factors to prevent reoccurrence.93  The goal of RCA to 
deliberately and comprehensively identify systems factors that contributed to the error and 
uncover ways to prevent recurrent errors.94  Some underlying root causes could include an 
organizational culture of low expectation, production pressures, a lack of safety protocols, poor 
supervision of junior staff, and heavy workloads.95   
There are a number of different techniques for RCA that healthcare organizations can 
adopt to investigate the occurrence of error.96  The simplest method is to repeatedly ask why 
(apparently referred to as the ‘ask why 5 times’ technique).  Another technique is to create a 
causal tree to diagram the root causes.  Placing the event at the top of the tree, this method 
continues to stack causes—the causes for the top event are first, followed by the causes for those 
secondary causes, and so forth—until all of the endpoints are reached.  In every technique, the 
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analysis focuses on what and why, not who.  In this way, root cause analysis embodies the 
systems approach to error.  Identifying the latent errors within the system makes it possible to 
decrease the likelihood that an error trajectory will pass through multiple layers of protection, 
thereby increasing safety.  Therefore, a successful root cause analysis does not assign blame 
based on personal performance but rather determines how to improve the system.97   
Within the framework of systems thinking, the swiss cheese model supports the goal of 
RCA, which is probably best described as a tool for quality improvement.  In both cases, 
however, the concept works because individuals cannot be considered in isolation from the 
system.  This is not only because health care is a human endeavor, but also because it occurs 
within a complex system.98  Health care can be defined as a series of personal interactions 
between patients and clinicians.99  While this definition seems relatively simple, health care also 
includes a number of additional component parts: support staff, infrastructure, technology, 
therapeutic agents, and so on.  As such, complexity theory would hold that health care is a 
complex adaptive system that is marked with elements of unpredictability, codependency, and 
nonlinearity.100  Indeed, a system is complex when the number of interactions makes long-term 
predictions impossible.  This is because complex problems are too complicated to be reduced to 
a series of policies or rules.  Accordingly, even though individual clinicians can implement their 
own strategies to optimize or reduce risk, deficiencies in the system will continue to frustrate 
their good intentions.101  That said, efforts to improve safety must not neglect sharp-end errors.  
To truly foster a culture of safety, an institution must eliminate the dysfunctional aspects of the 
environment and organization that constrain individuals (systems error) and also establish 
strategies to prevent human errors. 
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In sum, healthcare organizations are more likely foster a safety culture and adopt a 
systems approach if they implement investigatory tools that focuses on accident causation 
globally (be it the swiss cheese model or root cause analysis) rather than a person-centered 
investigation, which is marked with blame.102  To emphasize the systems thinking inherent 
within this approach, some critics, such as Charles Vincent, prefer using the notion of systems 
analysis rather than root cause analysis.103  Vincent argues that root cause analysis is a 
misleading term that tends to imply that incidents occur from a single (or small number) of root 
cause(s).  Additionally, Vincent contends that the term only reflects the purpose of the 
investigation—e.g., to determine what happened and what caused it.  Instead, he argues that it is 
more appropriate to use a term that suggests that the purpose of the analysis is to prospectively 
create a safer healthcare system.  Either way, however, this picture of harm and its causes helps 
to clarify the significance of organizational systems for patient safety.  Regardless of 
terminology or investigative technique, most of the latent conditions or causes of serious 
accidents within complex systems are present long before an accident sequence occurs.104   
Finally, human factors researchers have also been working to develop system-based tools 
for organizations to manage unsafe acts.  Error management from this perspective has two 
components: reducing the occurrence of dangerous errors and creating systems that can better 
tolerate errors.  As opposed to spending energy trying to improve individual performance, the 
systems approach targets the person, team, and organization collectively.  To best understand 
how to develop a resilient system, safety scientists identified high reliability organizations.  
These organizations—systems operating in hazardous conditions that have far fewer adverse 
events—are prime examples of the system approach at work.  Unlike traditional systems, that 
strive to eliminate human unreliability, high reliability organizations accept human variability.  
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These organizations realize that, due to human variability, they will never be immune to adverse 
events.  Instead, high reliability organizations learn to use these setbacks to enhance and improve 
the system, making their ability to adapt to changing events one of their most important 
safeguards.  Here, the pursuit of safety is characterized by an ever-constant vigilance to make the 
system as robust as possible in the face of its operational hazards.  Though these organizations 
are fairly removed from healthcare, their defining cultural practices could be easily replicated to 
apply to clinical settings, which will be discussed at greater length in the upcoming section.  
Through understanding the nature of harm within complex systems, it is apparent that the 
preoccupation with blame and personal accountability is largely irrelevant to the reduction of 
medical errors, which are often precipitated by external circumstances.105  This context is 
essential in order to deliver safer health care.  Moreover, focusing entirely on the concept of error 
is, in many ways, counterproductive to the ultimate goal of improving patient safety.  Instead, 
creating a safe system of health care is an ongoing process that must constantly adapt to 
circumstances within the environment to maintain and improve safety.  It is neither a static 
process, nor is it a linear process.  Because it is impossible to change the human condition, this 
modern approach to error management focuses on changing the conditions within the system to 
anticipate and prevent errors.  Not only is this a more practical approach, it better identifies the 
root cause of medical harm: poorly designed healthcare systems.   
In sum, enhancing patient safety requires a far broader target than simply diminishing 
errors.  It requires a total system redesign.  Though the frameworks set out in this section help to 
clearly conceptualize and analyze accidents, they stop short of illustrating clear models for 
change and system design.  The following section builds on this foundation to explore methods 
to re-design the healthcare system for patient safety.   
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B. Organizing a Patient Safety Program 
 
"Trying harder will not work. Changing systems of 
care will."106 
—Institute of Medicine, “Crossing the Quality Chasm 
 
 
 Understanding that system reform is part of the comprehensive solution to reducing 
preventable harm, this section more closely examines the various components of a successful 
system.  One of the major pre-requisites for system-wide change of a systems-based approach is 
implementing safe practices at an organizational level.  Although there are a number of different 
factors to consider for implementation, the obvious conclusion is that employing systems change 
requires a dramatic cultural shift within the institution.   
1. Avoiding a Culture of Blame 
The IOM argued that the biggest challenge to building a safer health system is shifting 
from a culture of blame to a culture that treats errors as opportunities to improve the system.107  
To fully appreciate this complexity, it is useful to first examine the concept of organizational 
culture.   
Defining what we mean by culture is hotly debated.  One of the most challenging is the 
debate between culture and climate.  In 2013, the Healthcare Foundation organized a round table 
in an attempt to distinguish the terms: 
Climate emerges through a social process, where staff attach meaning to the policy and 
practice they experience and the behaviors they observe.  Culture concerns the values, 
beliefs and assumptions that staff infer through story, myth and socialization, and the 
behaviors they observe that promote success.  In other words, culture is more 
interpretative.108  
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Culture is a shared experience.109  One that deeply intertwined with the history of a group, which 
is why it is often referred to as the collective memory.  As a memory, there is the implication that 
culture must be learned.  Because it is not clearly enumerated, group or organizational culture is 
always a bit fuzzy.  Group members may not always agree about the set of attitudes or beliefs, 
but yet, these basic assumptions will influence and guide each member’s behavior within the 
group.  Regardless of the level of complexity, when humans interact to achieve something, they 
will develop a culture.  
 Some experts regard organizational culture as a phenomenon that goes well beyond the 
notion of practices. 110  Culture is related to everything we think and perceive, and it cannot 
easily be separated or changed because it is so deeply ingrained throughout the many subsystems 
within an organization.  As a concept, organizational culture gained notoriety in the 1980s.  
Edgar Schein most clearly articulated this concept in his book, Organizational Culture and 
Leadership.  Schein defines organizational culture as: 
as a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its problems of 
external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well enough to be 
considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.111  
While there is no standard definition for organizational culture, Reason introduces a slightly 
simplified iteration, defining it as a set of shared values and beliefs that interact with the 
organization’s structures and systems to produce behavioral norms.112  There are at least two key 
elements within this definition: (1) the articulation of values, (2) which are accepted by the 
members of the collective as normative.  Having a set of shared values is instrumental to shaping 
behavior in a way that cultivates a sense of culture.   
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Put simply, culture is the “way we do things around here.”113  As the phrasing suggests, 
the process of socialization is integral in transmitting that culture to new employees.  Thus, the 
attitudes that manifest from an organization’s culture are going to be closely and directly tied to 
employee behavior.   
At a systemic level, a culture of blame is characterized by a set of norms and attitudes 
that typify an unwillingness to take risks or accept responsibility for any accidents because of 
fear of criticism or punishment from within the organization.114  This type of culture cultivates 
fear and distrust, and encourages individuals within the system to quickly shift blame to someone 
else within the organization to avoid being personally reprimanded.  This type of organizational 
culture also tends to stagnant, as individuals are too afraid of the consequences of being wrong to 
to suggest new ideas.  Though toxic, an organization might not purposefully or even knowingly 
choose to implement a blame culture.  Instead, such a culture tends to naturally evolve from a 
management style that is “highly rule-oriented, compliance-driven, and focused on assigning 
blame or accountability to individuals even for system-level failures.”115  Few environments are 
more demoralizing than a blame culture.  Though individuals who are skilled at office politics 
usually thrive in these cultures, most hardworking employees are left feeling helpless and 
frustrated.  Rather than leave ample time and energy for providers to focus on patient care and 
continuous improvement, a blame culture distracts employees by forcing them to protect 
themselves with mounds of paperwork and blame shifting (not unlike the concept of defensive 
medicine).   
In response to insights of systems thinking, the term no-blame culture thrived during the 
1990s.  The basic premise behind the popular phrase was that, because a large proportion of 
unsafe acts were not blameworthy, systems should move away from punitive cultures entirely. 
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Proponents argued that establishing a no-blame culture encourages reporting of errors, near 
misses, and minor incidents.116  Such a culture would allow individuals to freely discuss mistakes 
in order to embrace learning and improvement.  Moreover, supporters point out that the creation 
of a blame-free culture would improve full participation in incident reporting—allowing ongoing 
quality improvement and safety initiatives to achieve greater success.    
While it is important to cultivate a culture that allows for a frank examination of error, 
one of the recent concerns is that the push towards a blame-free culture is an overcompensation 
that could also diminish quality.  Commentators worry that an entirely blame-free environment 
undermines individual accountability, which is equally as important as systems accountability.117  
Although the momentum behind the no-blame culture is frequently attributed to James Reason, 
the father of modern error theory also agrees that it is neither feasible nor desirable to design a 
culture with blanket immunity for all types of unsafe behavior.118  Indeed, every safe industry 
still has firing offenses—and for good reason.  Not only would a blame-free culture undermine 
individual accountability, it would hinder morale and lessen perceived credibility.  Specifically, 
Reason warned that the no-blame concept has two serious weaknesses.119  First, it often ignored 
(or, at the very least, failed to confront) individuals who willfully engaged in dangerous 
behaviors.  Second, it did not address the issue of how to distinguish between culpable and non-
culpable unsafe acts.  From a practical standpoint, there must be some distinction between 
unacceptable behavior and blameless unsafe acts. 
Thus, while it is important to avoid unnecessarily blame, a blame-free culture is both ill-
advised and hard to sustain.120  Taken literally, it would eliminate personal accountability and 
challenge any social, disciplinary, and legal restraints to promote safe clinical practice.  A much 
better objective is to create a ‘just culture’ wherein blame is appropriately restricted.121  
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According to the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, a just culture is one that identifies 
and addresses systems issues that encourage individuals to participate in unsafe behavior while 
also maintaining accountability.  Reason defines a just culture as an atmosphere of trust that 
encourages—and even rewards—people for being forthcoming with safety related information, 
while also appreciating the balance between acceptable and unacceptable behavior.122  
Although the notion of just culture is an ideal (and, by definition, unachievable), 
determining whether an organization has succeeded to increase justice will depend on the 
perspective of its members.123  If the majority of its members agree that the organization will act 
justly, particularly in response to human error, it is fair to assume that the organization supports a 
just culture.   
A prerequisite for engineering a just culture is that the system fairly determines, and the 
staff clearly understands, what is considered culpable behavior.124  For example, Reason suggests 
that reckless non-compliance and substance abuse deserve severe sanctions.125  Drawing an a 
priori line for culpability, however, is difficult.126  Culpability is socially constructed—it is not 
inherent within any single act or person.  Instead, it depends on how people describe and 
perceive acts.  In this way, whether an unwarranted act is culpable does not reflect a quality of 
the act itself, but rather the application of social rules and expectations to the act.  As such, 
deciding culpability is a complex assessment that relies equally on factual and ethical 
determinations.  The consequence is that it is impossible to be completely independent or 
objective when labeling culpability.  This can be problematic.  For instance, in a series of 
experiments, Alicke found that people are inclined to attribute responsibility to the most morally 
blameworthy factor—not necessarily causation.127  He showed that people blame the driver who 
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caused an accident when that driver was on an immoral errand despite other plausible causes for 
the accident (e.g., blind spot, another driver, poor weather conditions).   
Fairly discerning when unacceptable behavior justifies punishment has been an ongoing 
challenge within the legal system, as well. In considering whether punishment is appropriate, 
legal system theorists consider the philosophical justification for punishment.128  Most often, the 
tension is resolved by distinguishing between retributive or restorative justice.  These 
conceptions of justice generally aim to achieve one of two goals: (1) control behavior or (2) 
restore the balance of justice.129  There are a number of ways to pursue either objective, which 
can be either punitive or constructive.  The justice system can attempt to control behavior 
through deterrence (specific or general) or incapacitation—these are punitive responses.  
Alternatively, it could also pursue rehabilitation, which could be viewed as a constructive 
approach.  When seeking to balance justice, the response ranges from pure retribution to 
restoration (generally through a modified conception of mediation).  That is, to atone for a prior 
harm, the system could either unilaterally impose a punishment or the victim, offender, and 
community could attempt to resolve the imbalance and agree together on an acceptable 
resolution.  The notion underlying the theory of retributive justice is that the punishment itself 
will restore justice.  Curiously, the philosophical justification substantiating this approach (in any 
instance other than confinement or compensation) defies the ethical edict that ‘two wrongs don’t 
make a right.’  Further, because retribution is applied unilaterally, the offender is not taught to 
accept responsibility or show contrition or remorse.130  For these reasons, the retributive model is 
troublesome.  The model risks imposing additional suffering or harm without any noticeable 
gain.  Therefore, an organization should carefully consider blameworthiness and the goals of 
punishment before imposing disciplinary measures in order to build a safer health system.  
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2. Creating a Culture of Safety 
As such, rather than simply increase funding for patient safety initiatives, healthcare 
organizations need to look more closely at their organizational culture.  While it is important to 
move away from the ‘blame and shame’ model, building a safety culture requires more than 
engineering a just culture.  Not surprisingly, fostering a safety culture takes time.   
This is particularly true given the difficulty of actually knowing the characteristics that 
define a safety culture.  The term first emerged after the 1986 explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear 
power plant.  The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) referenced the lack of 
safety culture in a report summarizing the findings of their investigation. The International 
Atomic Energy Agency defines safety culture as, “that assembly of characteristics and attitudes 
in organizations and individuals which establish that, as an overriding priority, safety issues 
receive the attention warranted by their significance.”131  One of the primary factors considers 
the employee’s perception of the level of priority to assign to safety.    Pinpointing the precise 
criteria necessary to foster a safety culture is difficult given the number of approaches that 
organizations can take.  That said, studies have shown that there are six essential components: 
•   Caring and safe environment free of blame—leadership listens to and cares about 
patient safety concerns. The response to the problem focuses on improving system 
performance rather than on blaming individuals. 
•   Commitment and drive to be a safety-centered institution—the resources, 
incentives, and rewards are provided by the organization to allow this 
commitment to occur.  
•   Communication—action is taken on patient safety suggestions when 
communicated. 
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•   Collegiality and openness about errors—colleagues encourage employees to 
report safety concerns, and there is an openness about errors and problems.  
•   Priority of Safety—patient safety is constantly reinforced as the primary priority.  
•   Safety—Management does knowingly compromise patient safety concerns for 
productivity.132 
Other characteristics that are important to a culture of safety are an informed culture, reporting 
culture, flexible culture, and learning culture.133  Many of these characteristics are 
interdependent: a safe culture is an informed culture, which, in turn, depends on creating an 
effective reporting culture, which must be supported by a just culture.  This means that systems 
must create institute infrastructures to collect, analyze, and disseminate relevant safety 
information.  Systems must also ensure that the information is available to managers and 
operators who understand organizational factors to effectively assess the system safety.  To 
ensure that the system understands the hazards threatening safety, the systems must also 
encourage a reporting culture.  Because the effectiveness of a reporting culture depends on the 
willingness of the members to report errors, the organization must instill a sense of trust within 
its staff that they will be treated fairly—it must be a just culture.  Finally, the organization must 
be willing to learn and adapt.  
An ideal safety culture will drive the system to maximizing safety regardless of 
leadership or commercial concerns.134  However, this may be an elusive goal.  Institutional 
support and commitment to safety is a prime component for safety culture.  In fact, the role of 
leadership cannot be understated.  Indeed, senior leaders need to convey the message that safety 
is a priority, creating a leadership-driven cultural shift. For instance, senior leaders can construct 
the necessary organizational culture by supporting and expecting learning and innovation, 
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valuing and empowering staff, focusing on patients, rewarding collaboration and teamwork, and 
remaining flexible.135  After establishing a safety culture, the existing culture should ensure that 
incoming leaders share similar values; however, if a culture becomes dysfunctional, the ultimate 
responsibility falls to senior leadership.136   
Transforming an entire healthcare organization to exemplify all of these necessary 
organizational factors, however, can seem a bit of an onerous task.  While it is certainly a large 
undertaking, transformation only requires that all of the basic conditions be in place.137  
Transformational leadership theory distinguishes two types of leadership that are important for 
safety: transactional and transformational.138  Transactional leadership describes an effective and 
efficient management style, whereas transformational leadership is concerned with conveying 
purpose and vision.  While transactional leadership is useful and important to maintaining an 
efficient infrastructure, a growing body of literature suggests that transformational leadership is 
more closely related to safety climate.  Indeed, senior leaders need to convey the message that 
safety is a priority, creating a leadership-driven cultural shift.  
This is precisely the preoccupation with safety that is characteristic of other organizations 
that effectively addressed errors.  Organizations such as airlines, nuclear power plants, and 
computer chip manufacturers all enjoy being known as high reliability organizations (HROs) for 
becoming relatively mistake-free.139  High-reliability theory defines the level and degree of the 
effort that people, at every level within an organization, need to perform in order to ensure 
consistently safe operations.140  HROs share four main characteristics: preoccupation with 
failure, commitment to resilience, sensitivity to operations, and a culture of safety.  
Organizations in these industries acknowledge the high risks associated with their activities and 
act accordingly.  They are vigilant and attentive to issues facing their workforce and are 
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committed to developing capacities to detect unexpected threats before harm occurs.  And, 
perhaps most importantly, they empower individuals to draw attention to potential or actual 
failures without fear of punishment or retribution.  While the HRO literature will not offer 
specific examples of how to enhance safety in health care organizations, it does provide a 
structured way of conceptualizing what factors are important.    
Given the multifaceted, systematic nature of safety, it is likely that sustained 
improvement can only be achieved by integrating all of the interacting components within a 
comprehensive strategy for safe health care.141  This approach challenges the contemporary 
viewpoint that financial means and a highly skilled staff are the most important considerations 
for promoting safety.  Instead, the major implication is that systems in health care must also 
assess other organizational factors, such as processes and culture.  Five transforming concepts 
are informative towards accomplishing this goal: (1) transparency, (2) integrated care platforms, 
(3) consumer engagement, (4) purposeful work environment, and (5) education reform.142   
Transparency is perhaps the single most important attribute.  The uninhibited sharing of 
information is foundational for the development of a safety culture.  In this sense, transparency is 
a precondition to safety.  Unfortunately, healthcare leaders are timid when it comes to authentic 
transparency—especially with the public.  Not only do organizations need to develop 
informational cultures that share information intra-organizationally, it is a moral imperative to 
keep patients informed about error and harm. However, until, as a nation, we can relinquish 
dependence on a punitive system of malpractice, this will be unattainable.  
Together, these transforming concepts can help to direct an organization’s efforts to 
foster a culture of safety.  Without them, an organization will struggle to make progress.  Indeed, 
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the nature and psychology of error demands a more robust approach wherein organizations 
radically change the way they think about health care.   
C. Conclusion 
To provide a basis for appreciating the ethical duty healthcare organizations owe to their 
patients, this chapter critically examines the history and evolution of the patient safety 
movement.  More than just exploring the debate as to whether patient safety should be more 
concerned with reducing errors or preventing harm, this chapter helped to frame this 
dissertation’s reference to patient safety.  Patient safety is best characterized as a movement 
focused on transitioning from a person-based to a systems-based approach to safety and error 
management.  At its core, this systems-focused approach, bolsters the argument that healthcare 
organizations must evolve to be safer organizational systems.  Indeed, the patient safety 
movement makes clear that, because human error is unavoidable, the key to improving patient 
safety lies in redesigning the healthcare system.  Because it is impossible to change the human 
condition, this modern approach to error management focuses on changing the conditions within 
the system to anticipate and prevent errors.  Not only is this a more practical approach, it better 
identifies the root cause of medical harm: poorly designed healthcare systems.   
Understanding that system reform is part of the comprehensive solution to reducing 
preventable harm, this chapter further explored how organizations can implement safe practices 
at an organizational level.  Although there are a number of different factors to consider for 
implementation, the obvious conclusion is that employing systems change requires a dramatic 
cultural shift within the institution.  Given the difficulties of moving away from the ‘blame and 
shame’ model, the Institute of Medicine argued that the biggest challenge to building a safer 
health system creating a culture that treats errors as opportunities to improve the system.143  
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Sadly, this discussion is only relevant in organizations or systems that have accepted the charge 
to genuinely tackle patient safety.  In the United States, the biggest challenge is still a matter of 
accountability and incentive.  Without incentive to seriously address medical error, healthcare 
providers are not fighting to be at the forefront of patient safety efforts.  Too often, an 
organization’s core values and mission statement is merely a flashy document that fails to 
cultivate ethical decision-making.  In this light, it is painfully obvious that healthcare 
organizations must be held accountable for the epidemic of patient harm.  Unfortunately, this has 
not occurred—which begs the question: why? 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ORGANIZATIONAL MORAL AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Armed with the recognition that healthcare organizations have an ethical responsibility to 
improve patient safety, this chapter ethically examines the philosophical foundation for the 
notion of organizational moral agency in order to analyze the application of organizational ethics 
to healthcare organizations.  First, Section A defends the stance that a healthcare organization 
should be held accountable to improving quality and safety.  Specifically, this subsection argues 
that, given the uniqueness of healthcare organizations as providers of human well-being, the 
healthcare industry should be considered an industry affected with the public interest—much like 
public utilities.  Moreover, organizations should be held criminally responsible for breaching 
their ethical duty to the public.  This approach, however, faces several obstacles.  Most difficult, 
opponents argue that organizations are not moral entities capable of having ethics at all—
positive or negative.  Accordingly, Section B offers a normative framework to hold healthcare 
organization's morally accountable.  
A. An Industry Affected with The Public Interest  
If, as safety experts suggest, errors are caused by flaws in the system, rather than 
individual shortcomings, then organizational accountability is easily one of the most crucial 
elements at the heart of the patient safety reform.  It is curious, then, why there is such little 
regulation in healthcare.  Business leaders throughout America are held accountable for their 
earnings reports, and can even be imprisoned for misleading the public about their performance.1  
Yet, despite the fact that medical harm is deadly, the healthcare industry is not held accountable.  
Amazingly, there is no analogous law regulating American healthcare practices.   
To fully unpack that reality, it is useful to first consider the origins of regulation within 
the business sector.  To this end, subsection A(1) explores the definition and justifications 
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supporting government regulation.  The following section delves deeper into this subject, 
examining the legal precedent for regulating businesses to protect the public interest.  With a 
strong framework for understanding the legal issues involved, subsection A(3) begins to build a 
case for regulation.  To appreciate the current regulatory state, and to also recognize the 
importance of applying the public utility concept to health care, it is critical to understand the 
historical origins of the American hospital system—as this greatly influenced the patchwork of 
regulations within the health care industry.  
1.  Defining Regulation 
Though regulation is often discussed as a rather amorphous mode of governmental 
activity, it can be defined.2  In establishing a central meaning, regulation can be thought of as the 
sustained and focused control that a public agency exercises over the activities that the 
community values.  The word, however, is used in many different ways.  Experts in law and 
economics—Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, and Martin Lodge—explain that it is perhaps more 
useful to understand the ways that the term is predominantly used.  They posit that regulation is 
used to refer to: (1) a specific set of commands, (2) a deliberate state influence, or (3) all forms 
of social or economic influence.  In thinking of regulation as a specific set of commands, 
Baldwin et al. speak of the role of regulation in promulgating specific and binding rules.  These 
rules are applied by a governing body founded for and devoted to the purpose of regulation.  An 
example would be the occupational safety and health administration standards, enacted and 
enforced by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to ensure healthful working 
conditions.  Regulation can also refer to the larger series of state actions that are intended to 
influence either business or social behaviors, typically through the use of economic incentives 
(e.g., taxes and subsidies).  Lastly, regulation can also be used to refer to all of the mechanisms 
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affecting behavior (including both state and private actors) that can broadly be deemed 
regulatory.  In keeping with this expansive viewpoint, it is not even necessary for regulatory 
effects to be deliberate or intended.    
Not only can the term be used in varying ways, there is also no single set of 
circumstances to adequately explain the rationale for every instance of regulation.3  
Governments, acting in pursuit of the public interest, advance several technical justifications for 
regulation.  Three are most widely cited: the presence of concentrated economic power, the grant 
of public perquisites, and the potential for public harm.4   
The most persistent and traditional justification to support regulation, involving 
concentrated economic power, can also be thought of as an instance of market failure.5  The 
government justifies intervening in these cases based on the argument that the uncontrolled 
marketplace will, invariably, fail in a way that negatively impacts the public good.  This is based 
on two assumptions:6 first, this theory presumes that unhindered markets will fail because of 
market failures, such as monopolies.  Additionally, the theory posits that the government—a 
benign entity—is able to correct for those failures through regulation.  
The presence of monopoly is a prevalent market failure rationale.7  Monopoly defines the 
situation wherein one seller produces all of the supply for the entire industry.  The lack of natural 
competition facilities the market’s failure.  In most cases, the theory supposes that a company 
with a monopoly over the market will seek to maximize its profits by overcharging customers.  
Being the only supply source, the company can limit its output (to ensure sustained demand) and 
raise its prices above marginal cost.  These same risks exist in a “natural” monopoly; however, in 
these cases it is less costly to society to allow a single firm to provide for the entire range of 
demand.  For instance, in the case of railways and electric companies, it is most efficient to only 
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lay one set of tracks or cables rather than have a whole handful of competing firms install 
multiple, competing sets of tracks.  In these circumstances, because it is costlier to society to 
allow competition, states will sanction their monopoly while simultaneously imposing other 
regulations to protect consumers from abuse.8  In these cases, the regulator will attempt to set 
prices in a way that would simulate the output and pricing that would have been created under 
normal competitive conditions.  
Another form of concentrated economic power occurs when a firm earns a windfall (i.e., 
excessive) profit by finding a supply source that it much cheaper than what is available within 
the marketplace.9  This could result from a fortuitous discovery or sudden change in market 
structure that creates a supply shortage.  For instance, a firm may happen to locate a large deposit 
of a valuable mineral; or, perhaps, it owns the only boat in a desert town that has been flooded.  
In every case, a windfall represents an unanticipated—and unearned—benefit that the recipient 
did not plan or cause to occur.  Because these excess profits were not earned (in the sense that 
the profit resulted from the firm’s useful and meaningful efforts), it makes sense that the 
government would intervene to ensure that the public is similarly allowed to benefit from the 
windfall.  To ensure that the public is protected, regulation may be necessary to either share an 
allocation of the profits or to ensure that the public is not harmed.  
Some argue, however, that the market failure rationale is insufficient.10  Notably, Tony 
Prosser argues that this approach treats regulation as being second-best to market allocation.11  In 
this light, regulation would only be necessary to correct market failures—even if true, this 
rationale fails to justify the scope of current regulatory practices.  Instead Prosser posits that 
regulation should be viewed as a primary method to protect human rights and further social 
solidarity—two rationales for regulation that Prosser contends are equally, if not more, important 
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than market-centered regulation.  Indeed, more recent definitions have expanded the concept of 
regulation to include social priorities beyond pure economics: 
Regulation is the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behavior of others according 
to defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified 
outcome or outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information-
gathering and behavior-modification.12  
This approach, expanding the bounds of economic regulation, echoes the Court’s holdings.   
2.  The Legal History of Business “Affected with the Public Interest”  
 
Only history can help us make sense of a health-care system that, from the perspective of 
its results, makes very little sense at all.13  
 
—Paul Starr, Remedy and Reaction 
 
 For about six decades, between 1877-1934, the Unites States Supreme Court adopted the 
position that there was a class of businesses (or industries) that were sufficiently affected with a 
public interest to justify legislative regulation despite the due process protection guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.14  Within this series of landmark decisions involving constitutional 
law, the court continued to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited regulating 
exclusively private industries—those that were not affected with the public interest.  Cases 
sanctioned regulation of grain elevators, banks, fire insurance companies, and insurance agents.  
Over the vociferous dissents of several justices (e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis D. Brandeis, 
and Harland Fiske Stone) the Supreme Court, however, ruled that the manufacture of food, 
clothes, and fuels, and the operation of employment agencies, gas stations, and ice plants were 
essentially private in nature—and, thus, beyond the reach of state regulation.  
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Munn v. Illinois, decided in 1877, was the first case to test the right of the government to 
regulate private business.  Munn, in judicially approving economic regulation, did not predicate 
the authority to regulate on the monopolistic character of the industry.  Instead, the Supreme 
Court held that the dispositive factor was the public interest.  From a historical standpoint, the 
holding can be traced back to the common law contributions of Lord Chief Justice Hale.15   
 Around 1670, Sir Matthew Hale was the Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in 
England.  Some hundred years later, Francis Hargrave published Lord Hale’s private paper 
concerning the ports of the sea, De Portibus Maris.  In his analysis, Lord Hale outlines the 
King’s rights and powers with respect to regulating trade and commerce.  He first acknowledges 
that ports are places with keys, wharves, cranes, and warehouses.  The king is the prima facie 
owner of every public port, yet merchants may acquire property interests through charter or 
prescription. The public also has an interest in constructing and maintaining facilities for 
merchants and traders to utilize.  This is the jus privatum, which is superimposed upon by the jus 
publicum.  Lord Hale pointed out that when facilities (such as ferryboats or wharves) held 
themselves out to serve the public, they became affected with a public interest and ceased to be 
juris privati only.  This treatise had important influence over the judiciary in both Britain and 
America.  
  The adaptation of Lord Hale’s principle into American constitutional law opened with a 
misstep.16  In Munn, the Supreme Court gave the first interpretation of public interest.  At the 
time, the Fourteenth Amendment was only eight years old.17  Regulation was not absolute—
liberty of contract was the leading legal principle, which influenced the way the courts 
approached regulation.  Though the government did regulate private activity in many cases, it 
was aggressively attacked for violating the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Munn formulated 
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the first approach to reviewing these claims.  It established that: (1) the principle of sovereignty 
granted government the inherent power to regulate, (2) the government had the authority to 
regulate activities vested with public interest, and (3) its exercise of regulation through the police 
powers was limited by the due process of law.18   
Munn v. Illinois involved a state legislation regulating the prices of grain elevators.19  
Midwestern farmers, seeking to ship their grains to distant markets, would transport their grains 
to Chicago for distribution.20  There, grain elevators would transfer grain brought to Chicago by 
railroads to boats that would transport the grains further east.21  Thus, Chicago was a transfer 
point—shipping grain from western rail and lake traffic to Atlantic ports.  This made the grain 
elevators a dominant feature in the grain trade.   
The grain elevators—almost acting as adjuncts of the railroads—were contractually 
obligated to store all of the grain that their affiliate railroads tendered to them.  In order to 
distribute from Chicago, farmers had no effective control over which of the fourteen grain 
elevators received and stored their grain—the railroads reserved the right to select the receiving 
grain elevator.  In the fall of 1865, the Chicago elevators announced a unilateral rate increase—
one they argued was necessary because the grain was in poor condition and would be difficult to 
store through the winter months.  Farmers and grain dealers complained that the elevator owners 
had been gauging prices.   
To help protect consumers, the state had recently passed the Illinois Regulate Public 
Warehouses and the Warehousing and Inspection of Grain acts of 1871.  These regulations 
established maximum rates, limiting how much grain elevators in Class A cities could charge for 
storage.22  The firm, Munn & Scott, operated a grain warehouse in Chicago, a Class A city.  
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Munn & Scott were fined for continuing to charge higher rates than the statue allowed.  The firm 
then sued, alleging that the statute violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process.23   
 Attorneys for Munn & Scott maintained that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee that 
no law shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law also 
protected private business from arbitrary government interference.24  The key to winning their 
argument was to convince the court that the rate regulations amounted to confiscation.25    
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Waite held that private property that is “affected 
with a public interest,” is subject to regulatory control by the state.  Though Waite did not 
explicitly deny the theory of substantive due process, the Chief Justice wrote that state regulation 
of private property does not automatically deprive the owner his property without due process: 
“under some circumstances they may, but not under all.”26  Though the state has an extremely 
limited ability to interfere in exclusively private property, Waite (reciting Lord Chief Justice 
Hale’s treatise, De Portibus Maris) held that: 
when private property is “affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati 
only.”27 
Waite continues, “this was said by Lord Chief Justice Hale more than two hundred years ago, in 
his treatise De Portibus Maris… and has been accepted without objection as an essential element 
in the law of property ever since.”28  Justice Waite explained that “when one devotes his property 
to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that 
use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the 
interest he has thus created.”29   
Though there is a level of plausibility in applying Lord Hale’s principle in the Munn case, 
Chief Justice Waite took it too far.30  The grain elevators, as a type of tollway to access the 
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eastern ports, are analogous in many ways to the wharf or crane of the seventeenth century port.  
Lord Hale acknowledged that these and other conveniences were affected with a public interest 
because they were necessary to the public’s access and use of the King’s public port. In fact, in 
many cases the businesses even had to obtain a charter from the King to operate—strengthening 
the argument that they could be regulated.  Munn dramatically expanded this somewhat narrow 
view to include all private property; not just businesses operating under a government grant.  In 
citing Lord Hale, Chief Justice Waite used language that was so broad that it could be applied to 
any form of private property: “when private property is “affected with a public interest, it ceases 
to be juris privati only.” However, that is not what Lord Hale concluded. Lord Hale stated that 
“now that the wharf and crane and other conveniences are affected with a publick interest, they 
cease to be juris privati only.”31  As a consequence, Waite enlarged Lord Hale’s proposition, and 
transformed American law.  
Not surprisingly, because Munn expanded the principle such that it would apply to any 
property, regardless of how private, it was met with strong dissent.  Many argued that the Court 
blurred the line between impermissible and permissible regulation by holding that grain elevators 
were distinguishable from other exclusively private businesses such as shoemakers or tailors.32  
Justice Field, who penned the dissent in Munn, was clear in his belief that Waite’s opinion was 
far too expansive: 
I do not doubt the justice of the encomiums passed upon Sir Matthew Hale as a learned 
jurist of his day; but I am unable to perceive the pertinency of his observations upon 
public ferries and public wharves… to the questions presented by the warehousing law of 
Illinois.33 
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Justice Field argued that Lord Hale’s principle only applied to private property that was 
dedicated—in a strict legal sense—to public use.  He cautioned that the majority opinion would 
grant the government a blanket power to regulate every type of property (“from a calico gown to 
a city mansion”34).   
 In subsequent cases, the Court began retreating from its holding in Munn—particularly 
with respect to its doctrine granting unfettered legislative power to control rates.  Indeed, though 
Munn introduced the “public interest” principle, in upholding the Chicago regulations, the Court 
also held that the extent of government power should be controlled through local elections: 
We know that this is a power which may be abused; but that is not argument against its 
existence. For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the 
polls, not the courts.35  
Breaking from this approach, the Supreme Court began using substantive due process to 
aggressively protect economic liberties from government interference.36   
When the Court decided Munn v. Illinois, it judicially upheld the right of the government 
to regulate private business subject to the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.  At the 
time, however, this was interpreted to mean procedural due process. Yet, the dissenting opinion 
developed a corollary argument that became known as substantive due process.  According to 
this legal theory, the Constitution not only requires that laws follow fair procedures before 
depriving a person of their interests (i.e., procedural due process), but it also demands that the 
government must demonstrate a compelling reason for such a deprivation.37  Through this 
concept, a majority of justices reliably voted in support of business interest and repeatedly struck 
down state laws regulating private business—a significant reversal from the Munn precedent.  In 
fact, almost 200 state laws were declared unconstitutional from 1905-1937.38  With the onset of 
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the Great Depression, however, justices had a difficult time supporting substantive due process, 
as it prioritized business interests to the detriment of the general public.   
Then, nearly at the moment of Munn’s demise, the Supreme Court finally appeared to 
break with its past holdings.39  In 1934, some 57 years after the Supreme Court first addressed 
the issue of regulation, it decided Nebbia v. New York.   
Slightly before the Court would decide Nebbia, President Roosevelt was earnestly 
working to promote economic reactivation after the recent disastrous economic collapse (i.e., the 
Great Depression).  One of the primary approaches President Roosevelt pursued was pledging to 
offer Americans a New Deal—one that used government regulation to protect the public welfare 
from marketplace corruption and greed.  States followed suit and enacted their own New Deal-
inspired regulations and economic reforms.   
This was the state of the economy when New York shaped its own New Deal legislation 
to regulate the milk industry.40  After a thorough investigation, New York found that the milk 
industry was suffering from unfair and destructive trade practices.  Producers were too weak and 
unorganized to put pressure on their distributors to protect their own economic interests.  As a 
consequence, providers were not receiving fair rates of return.  To correct for those market 
failures, New York passed a law in 1933 establishing the New York Milk Control Board to better 
regulate the prices of milk—including setting state-wide minimums.  The facts of the case were 
relatively straightforward:41 the New York Milk Control Board set a fixed minimum price for 
milk, prohibiting dealers from selling milk for less than nine cents per quart.  A grocer, Nebbia, 
sold a bottle of milk and a loaf of bread for the minimum price for the milk.  Nebbia was indicted 
and convicted. He then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the law deprived him of his 
right to due process.  
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 In deciding Nebbia v. New York, the Supreme Court continued to struggle with how to 
apply the concept of a business ‘affected with a public interest.’  Prior cases had attempted to 
offer a clear test, but critics maintained that the phrase was too vague and illusory to pass 
muster.42  The leading standard that developed in Tyson, Ribnik, and Williams for how to 
determine whether a business was ‘affected with a public interest’ required determining whether 
the business was (1) devoted to the public use, and (2) an interest in effect was (3) granted to the 
public in that use.43  The drift from this holding became so great, the Supreme Court ultimately 
found that “it could no longer be deemed a controlling authority.”44  One such dissent succinctly 
expresses the views that ultimately prevailed in Nebbia: 
A regulation valid for one kind of business may, of course, be invalid for another; since 
the reasonableness of every regulation is dependent upon the relevant facts. But so far as 
concerns the power to regulate, there is no difference, in essence, between a business 
called private and one called a public utility or said to be ‘affected with a public interest.’ 
…The notion of a distinct category of business ‘affected with a public interest,’ 
employing property ‘devoted to a public use,’ rests upon historical error. …In my 
opinion, the true principle is that the state’s power extends to every regulation of any 
business reasonably required and appropriate for public protection. I find in the due 
process clause no limitation upon the character or the scope of regulation permissible.45 
In keeping with this view, the Nebbia Court sustained Nebbia’s conviction; holding that “in the 
light of the facts the [regulation] appears not to be unreasonable or arbitrary, or without relation 
to the purpose to prevent ruthless competition from destroying the wholesale price structure on 
which the farmer depends for his livelihood, and the community for an assured supply of 
milk.”46   
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 The issue of the public interest still lingered.  The defendant did not contend that the 
State lacked the authority to regulate the milk industry, generally.  Instead, Nebbia argued that 
price-fixing was prohibited because the milk industry was not a business affected with the public 
interest—which, in his view, is the only subset of business that may be subject to price controls.  
Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts responded to this contention by holding that the phrase 
“affected with the public interest” did not refer to a fixed class of businesses.  The Court 
explained: 
We may as well say at once that the dairy industry is not, in the accepted sense of the 
phrase, a public utility. …It goes without saying that those engaged in the business are in 
no way dependent upon public grants or franchises for the privilege of conducting their 
activities.  But if, as must be conceded, the industry is subject to regulation in the public 
interest, what constitutional principle bars the state from correcting existing 
maladjustments by legislation touching prices?  We think there is no such principle. The 
due process clause makes no mention of sales or of prices any more than it speaks of 
business or contracts or buildings or other incidents of property.  The thought seems 
nevertheless to have persisted that there is something peculiarly sacrosanct about the 
price one may charge for what he makes or sells, and that, however able to regulate other 
elements of manufacture or trade, with incidental effect upon price, the state is incapable 
of directly controlling the price itself. This view was negatived many years ago [in 
Munn].47  
Roberts continued to hold that the expression meant “no more than that an industry, for adequate 
reason, is subject to control for the public good.”48  The Court made clear that “there is no closed 
class or category of business affected with a public interest, and the function of the courts in the 
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application of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is to determine in each case whether 
circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of governmental 
authority or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory.” 49  Thus, Nebbia found that “‘affected 
with the public interest’ [was] the equivalent of ‘subject to the exercise of police power.’”50   
 In this light, many scholars have argued that Nebbia overruled Munn, thereby discarding 
the concept of a ‘business affected with the public interest.’51  However, it is important to note 
that, while Nebbia signifies a radical turning point for the United States Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the due process clause, this reflects a nuanced aspect of Constitutional law that 
expands rather than eliminates this concept.52   
Munn introduced the principle of “affected with a public interest,” which the Court later 
used it to specifically broaden the scope of police power in price-fixing cases.  Though Munn did 
not specifically limit its holding to price-fixing regulations, the justices continued to argue about 
the limits of the doctrine; leaving lower courts confused about the Supreme Court’s opinion 
about which businesses were and were not immune to price regulation.  The justices in Nebbia 
were faced with finding a compromise; continuing to treat businesses affected with a public 
interest as a closed category would limit the Court’s ability to uphold state regulations.  In 
finding an approach to uphold state regulations, the Nebbia court ultimately opted to free the 
scope of legislative power from the confines of businesses “affected with a public interest.”  In 
this way, the Court eliminated the standard in order to expand the governmental police power 
(“It is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses affected with a public interest, 
and the function of the courts in the application of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is to 
determine in each case whether circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a 
reasonable exertion of governmental authority or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory”53).  
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Thus, while contemporary scholars are correct to suggest that the Court discarded the tests 
developed in Tyson, Ribnik, and Williams for how to determine whether a business was ‘affected 
with a public interest,’ it is misleading to use that fact to imply that the Court no longer considers 
regulations based upon the public interest.  To the contrary, the Court merely expanded the 
government’s authority to “adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to 
promote public welfare.”54  As such, the Nebbia case left it up to state legislatures to determine 
whether a business or industry is affected with the public interest.55   
3.  The Case for Regulation  
With the legal hurdle removed, legislatures can look to the social sciences for insights 
when determining whether to enforce regulations.  In every case, the government is justified in 
regulating private enterprises because they are unique in an important way—namely, that their 
business is of particular importance to the public welfare.56   
The argument to apply this practice to health care is straightforward.  Similar to other 
regulated industries, the healthcare field is profoundly affected with a public interest.57  
Moreover, hospitals are uniquely positioned to impose an unprecedented level of public harm—
harm that rises to levels far more serious than other public utilities.  Furthermore, as providers of 
life-saving medicine, hospitals also tend to exert monopoly power.  After all, patients in dire 
health are not in any position (supposing that there even is another hospital in the region) to 
bargain for a better rate or transfer to a different hospital.  To fully appreciate the relevance of 
this concept for the healthcare industry, however, a brief historical review is warranted.  
The Rise of the Modern Hospital System 
In America, the practice of regulation is as old as the precepts that underlie democracy.58  
The foundation for regulation can be traced back to medieval Europe, when the government first 
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asserted that the prices industries charged for “public” products (e.g., tollways and inns) must be 
fair and reasonable.  In this way, public utility regulation has played a pivotal role in the 
development of the modern regulatory state—which has similarly shaped contemporary health 
law.59  As detailed above, the Court embraced the common law practice of regulating private 
businesses affected with a public interest near the end of the nineteenth century.  The category of 
businesses determined to be affected with the public interest were inconsistently referred to as 
public callings, public service corporations, or public utilities.  In explaining the concept, legal 
historian James Hurst noted that: 
The public utility concept rests on recognition that some economic power is wielded at 
key points of intersection of human relations—for example in operating a railroad or an 
electric power generating plant. The men who stood at such a key point… had too much 
practical capacity to effect the lives of too many other people, to let them alone in 
market… So we brought the law more and more into play at these key points of 
intersection. Public policy insisted that these new forms of organized power, 
characterized by great aggregations of capital and capacity to affect life, should be 
legitimized by the criterion of utility and that this criterion should be enforced more and 
more by the law, and less and less by the market.60     
Thus, any industry with sufficient market power to manipulate or abuse consumers (which did 
not necessarily need to rise to the level of monopoly) and served an important human need could 
be labeled a public utility.  Nevertheless, during the early years, medicine was conspicuously 
missing from most lists.  Why?  
The original exclusion of medicine is less a statement about its positioning as a public 
utility and more a byproduct of its small and limited scale.61  Though institutions devoted to 
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patient care have provided medical care for centuries (the first ones date as far back as the 
Roman empire), these wards were extremely rudimentary by today’s standards.62  During the 
early development of medical practice in America, medicine lacked any institutional structure or 
economic market.63  There was no commercial nature to the practice of medicine.  It was not a 
commodity.  Insofar as the market for services were further limited by the conditions of rural 
life, practitioners who did enter the field made relatively little money.  Given the high costs 
involved, most families simply did not have the means to spend on medical care.  This 
encouraged most families to care for the sick a within the family and communal circle.  These 
economic conditions also forced doctors to keep their costs affordable in order to drum up any 
business at all.    
The few hospitals that did exist emerged as religious and charitable institutions built to 
care for the poor.64  These institutions merely tended to the sick and destitute.  They were a last 
resort for people who did not have family or friends to care for them.  In this regard, hospitals 
did not exist to cure patients of their ailments.  As a result, hospitals were dreaded places.  
Patients were just as likely to acquire new diseases than overcome the one that brought them to 
the hospital in the first place—it was far safer for the sick to stay home.  This left little demand 
for the services of general hospitals.  Nevertheless, these almshouses laid the foundation for the 
radical metamorphosis that would transform these dreaded places into citadels of science and 
order.   
Public almshouses and similar institutions gradually transformed into the modern hospital 
by first becoming more specialized and then becoming more universal.65  Almshouses, and other 
unspecialized wards, did not operate with any primary focus; mixing together the aged, the 
insane, the young, and the dying.  In one sense, they were humanitarian.  Indeed, the colonial 
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almshouse was often a religious house, which provided a substitute household for the poor or 
sick.  These charitable hospitals were also communal, resembling a typical household.  From 
there, general hospitals serving all classes of society began to appear.  By 1800, however, there 
were only two facilities that could qualify as a hospital: Pennsylvania Hospital (established in 
Philadelphia in 1752) and New York Hospital (chartered in 1771, first received patients twenty 
years later).  Massachusetts General Hospital followed in 1821.  These early institutions were 
known as “voluntary” hospitals, as they were financed through voluntary donations.    
The rise of these early hospitals did not mark the immediate decline in almshouses.66  
Urban workers were still most likely to visit an almshouse to seek care, rather than visit a 
hospital.  While the colonial almshouse was largely intended to protect the general public from 
the feeble and poor, growing urbanization (particularly in seaport cities) dramatically increased 
the demand for care.  Almshouses began to function as municipal hospitals, adding separate 
wards (isolated from the destitute, orphaned, and insane) to care for urban workers.    
Additionally, around 1828 there was shift in public policy, and states began abolishing 
home relief (also known as outdoor relief).67  Home relief was a practice of providing economic 
aid to the poor in cases of sudden necessity, generally in the form of a weekly or regular 
allowance.68  With this form of aid eliminated, almshouses offered the only form of government 
assistance—which only served to increase demand.  As a result, almshouses were often 
overcrowded and in disrepair.  These conditions persisted until the Civil War. 
The Civil War shaped the development of modern hospitals in important ways.69  First, 
the war created an immense demand for medical facilities.  To keep the armies supplied with 
healthy soldiers, American military hospitals evolved to operate as well-organized and sanitary 
models for health.  The Union army alone built hundreds of hospitals with well over 130,000 
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beds.  More importantly, the Civil War hospital was a triumph for scientific rationality,70 with 
army hospitals boasting surprisingly low death rates.71  During the last year of the war, the 
Union’s vast network of military hospitals treated more than one million soldiers with an 
impressive eight percent mortality rate.  
Second, the war helped to mobilize the professionalization of nursing.  Prior to the Civil 
War (and for a short period after), nursing was not a trained profession.  Hospital nursing had 
previously been a menial occupation for the lower class.72  As Florence Nightingale described, 
“hospital nurses were generally those who were too old, too weak, too drunken, too dirty, too 
stolid, or too bad to do anything else.”73  In fact, many almshouse nurses had often arrived as 
inmates themselves—before gradually learning the trade.  At the time, hospital nurses—who 
were regarded with slightly more respect than their public counterparts—even lived in the 
hospital, often in basements or odd spaces in the attics.  The establishment of the first three 
nursing schools in 1973, however, marked a turning point for the profession.  Nursing enjoyed a 
new prestige.  At the same time, these graduates became the main labor force to support the 
growing hospital networks—particularly in the form of unpaid student nurses.  With more 
consistent staffing, hospitals were better positioned to grow and expand.  
The advancement of medical technology, namely the advent of antiseptic surgery also 
dramatically changed the scope of hospital care.74  Before anesthesia, surgery was brutal and 
demanded that operations were quick and hasty.  Anesthesia allowed for more careful and 
precise operations, which (when later paired with Joseph Lister’s work on antisepsis) allowed for 
surgery to experience massive growth in volume and breadth.  
Finally, the industrialization after the war increased the number of people living in urban 
centers.  In 1800, America’s total population numbered 5,308,483, with only six (6%) percent of 
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persons living in communities larger than twenty-five hundred (2500).75   When the Civil War 
broke out (1861), America’s population had increased to almost 32,000,000—an eight-fold 
increase.  More importantly, not only had the population exploded throughout the country, 
American cities expanded at a particularly high rate.  By the middle of the nineteenth century, 
nearly twenty (20%) of people were living in major cities.   
As a consequence of these changes, it was no longer appropriate to care for the sick at 
home.  As a 1913 analysis concluded: “Fewer families occupy a single dwelling, and the tiny flat 
or contracted apartment no longer is sufficient to accommodate sick members of the family… 
The sick are better cared for [in hospitals] with less waste of energy, and their presence in the 
home does not interrupt the occupation and exhaust the means of wage earners… The day of the 
general home care of the sick can never return.”76  The urban family lacked the physical space 
and labor power to attend to ill family members.   
The effects of this change rippled outwards, and reform efforts focused on converting 
almshouses to public hospitals to respond to the newfound demand for hospital care.77  The 
Philadelphia Almshouse evolved into Philadelphia General Hospital, Bellevue Hospital in 
Manhattan rose from the New York Almshouse, and the Baltimore County Almshouse joined the 
Baltimore City Hospitals.  By 1910 the number of hospitals in the U.S. had surged to more than 
4,000 (from less than 200 in 1872).   
This rapid growth generally emerged in three parts: first was the foundation of private 
voluntary hospitals and the expansion of public almshouses, followed by the formation of 
religious and specialized hospitals in 1850, which finally gave rise to the for-profit model that 
developed in the early twentieth century.78  The profit-generating hospitals, which exclusively 
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relied on fees for services, were primarily small surgical centers that physicians and private 
corporations operated.  
Almost immediately, critics started lamenting the number of small, but uncoordinated 
hospitals.79  These concerns were heightened after the Great Depression began.  Simply stated, 
there were far too many hospitals.  As a result, most hospitals were operating at or around 50% 
capacity.  Many were experiencing great strain and financial pressure.  Early reform efforts to 
address these deficiencies focused on standardization, which helped to create a paradox in the 
American hospital network: a vast system of hospitals with significant uniformity and minimal 
coordination.  Without any integrated management, hospitals had increased needs for 
administrative support.  Ironically, the proliferation of small hospitals and the lack of integration 
prompted the modern-day emphasis on business operations as a way to survive the intense 
competition.  This was only further exacerbated by the American hospital system of attending 
physicians.  
Insofar as hospitals allowed attending physicians to remain largely independent, they 
enjoyed great leverage over the hospitals.80  These physicians were gatekeepers to patients (and, 
thus, financial stability)—giving them immense influence over hospital policy.  Further, by not 
directly employing staff physicians, hospitals struggled to maintain control.  Hospital 
administration became incredibly important.  The field professionalized swiftly, leading these 
administrators to establish the American Hospital Association.81  Physicians and administrators 
disagreed about the role of hospitals; with physicians regarding them as auxiliary workshops for 
their own private practices, and hospital administrators insisting that hospitals were independent 
medical centers.  In any event, given the organizational complexity and demands for external 
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coordination, administrators all but gained sole authority of the domain of hospitals.  A point that 
will become increasingly relevant as we examine the regulatory efforts that followed.  
A Look at Hospital Regulation  
There are essentially three forms of regulations or laws that govern hospital operations: 
common law principles,82 non-governmental regulations, and governmental regulations.   
Common law principles. In the United States, common law (also called stare decisis) is 
applied vertically (but not horizontally)—meaning that courts within one system (e.g., state, 
federal circuit) are not bound by decisions from lesser or lateral courts in the same system or 
courts in other systems, but they must follow precedent from higher courts within their own 
system.83  Prior to 1940, there was very little case law specifically governing hospitals.  The 
most relevant doctrine that existed during the early twentieth century regarded the duty to treat 
and aid others.84  The traditional common law rule, which applied to everyone (including 
hospitals), made clear that there was no duty provide aid absent an existing physician-patient 
relationship.  Without that contractual responsibility, neither physicians nor hospitals were held 
accountable or responsible for any harm to persons who had not entered a doctor-patient 
relationship.    
Even when the hospital may have otherwise been liable for negligence, immunity 
protections also offered significant liability coverage.  Throughout the early twentieth century, 
hospitals were immune from all liability due to charitable and governmental immunity.85   
Essentially, in both instances, public policy necessitated that the trust money should not be 
diverted away to pay for damages because it would undercut the charitable mission.  
Additionally, the doctrine contended, this policy would set a dangerous precedent that would 
discourage any public or private donations of funds.  Because donors would not want to simply 
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fund lawsuits, anything short of absolute immunity would jeopardize the very existence of 
charitable institutions.   Taken together, hospitals were essentially free to operate however they 
pleased.  
 Non-governmental regulations.  As hospitals expanded, professional associations 
began to take a more active role in shaping hospital operations.  In most states, as it still the case, 
hospitals faced more self-regulation than government regulation.86  In the early 1900s, the 
American Medical Association’s (AMA) Council of Medical Education worked to impose 
minimum standards for hospital internships.87  Around the same time, the newly established 
American College of Surgeons (ACS) published the first minimum standard for hospitals in 
dedication to its mission of safeguarding and improving standards of care.88  The ACS wanted to 
standardize not only surgical practice, but also the surgical workplace—the hospital.89  This 
document, which represents the first regulation governing hospital standardization, was the 
product of nearly a decade of ongoing advocacy.   
As early as 1910, Dr. Earnest Codman began criticizing the disgraceful condition of most 
hospitals.90  Not long after, Dr. Codman advised that, in order to measure a hospital’s efficiency, 
it was essential to have access to adequate records.  To achieve these ends, Codman proposed an 
“end result system” that would allow hospitals to track every patient in order to assess outcomes 
and influence future recommendations regarding effective care.  In plain terms, Dr. Codman 
explained:  
This system is perfectly simple, the only difficulty with it being its revolutionary 
simplicity. It requires straight forward truthful answers to these questions: What was the 
matter with the patient? What did the doctor do to him? What was the result? If the result 
was not good, what was the reason? Was it the fault of the doctor, the patient, the disease, 
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or the hospital organization or equipment? Heretofore, in hospital organization there has 
never been a bona fide attempt systematically to fix the responsibility for the success or 
failure of each case treated. I claim our record system should enable us to fix 
responsibility, and that it should be used for this purpose.91 
Though Dr. Codman failed to implement such an ambitious model of transparency and 
accountability, his urging did help set in motion the model for hospital standardization and 
regulatory framework that continues to guide accreditation to this day.   In fact, one impetus for 
the foundation of the American College of Surgeons (in 1913) was to implement Codman’s work 
on quality of care.92   
The ACS recognizing that it lacked any authority to enforce its standard, respectfully 
asked hospitals to consider voluntarily accept their minimum standard based on the merit of its 
proposals.93  After mailing a copy to all 697 hospitals with more than 100 beds in America and 
Canada, seven ACS staff members personally visited every hospital to present the standard and 
answer any questions.  The 1918 Minimum Standard was a five-point program, requiring that 
hospitals: (1) establish an organized medical staff, (2) restrict membership to only licensed 
practitioners, (3) adopt and develop regulations and policies to govern hospital administration, 
(4) maintain standardized and accessible medical records, and (5) provide diagnostic and 
therapeutic facilities, including a clinical laboratory and X-ray department.  Though participation 
was voluntary, it was difficult for hospitals to reject participation—not only were the standards 
extremely reasonable and rudimentary, many hospitals were cajoled into compliance in order to 
compete with nearby hospitals.   
The ACS began inspecting hospitals for compliance, and soon learned just how poor 
hospital conditions had been—in 1918 (the first year it was offered), only 89 out of 692 hospitals 
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passed.  At the October 1919 meeting, the ACS regents were so horrified with the dismal results 
that they burned every copy explaining these initial findings in the hotel furnace.  Hospitals were 
given a stay of execution for the first year of participation.  By 1919, the number of passing 
hospitals increased to 198 and continued to quickly improve in the coming years.  By 1924, 831 
(86.5%) of hospitals meet the standards.   
The ACS continued to oversee the voluntary program until the creation of the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH).  Founded in 1951, the JCAH was 
established to coordinate the oversight of hospital accreditation to a single organization, thereby 
consolidating all of the similar programs conducted by the American College of Physicians, the 
American Hospital Association, and the Canadian Medical Association, as well as the ACS.94  In 
1952, the ACS officially transferred oversight of the Hospital Standardization Program to 
JCAH.95   
Through a series of endorsements, state and federal authorities deferred hospital oversight 
to JCAH.  Indeed, with the passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1965, Congress 
deemed that hospitals with JCAH accreditation comply with the Medicare conditions of 
participation and eligible to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.96  Even though 
few states made it illegal to operate without JCAH accreditation, because private and public 
insurers (including Medicare and Medicaid) require accreditation for reimbursement in most 
cases, JCAH accreditation is an operational necessity for most hospitals.  As a result, 
accreditation became one of the primary regulatory tools policing hospital administration.   
The Joint Commission (the shortened name JCAH adopted in 2007), a private non-profit 
organization, is a membership organization. Though its surveys and site visits are rigorous and 
thorough, critics argue that private accreditation fails to sufficiently protect public interest.97   
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Many argue that it is too gentle and lenient with its member hospitals to meaningfully regulate 
the industry.98  
Governmental regulations.  The majority of government hospital-based regulations falls 
into the broad category of reimbursement or cost-related regulation.99  Nevertheless, there are 
three basic categories of regulations.  The initial aim of hospital regulations focused on 
organizational matters, such as licensing.  The following wave of regulations centered around the 
passage of large public programs, namely Medicare and Medicaid.  Most recently, hospital 
regulations tend to be more varied, as most new regulations tend to be responses to specific 
problems.   
Licensure is the most basic form of hospital regulations.  These statutes and regulations 
outline the basic services and functions hospitals must provide to deliver an adequate quality of 
care.  Unlike accreditation, licensure is a state-level governmental regulation.  States bar 
hospitals from operating without a license, and these regulations are very difficult to challenge.  
Provided that the statutes are not prohibitively vague or arbitrary, courts will rarely intervene.100  
The scope of licensing regulations vary, but they typically address hospital organization, required 
services, nursing personnel, safety, sanitation, record retention, and occupancy.   
Another major regulatory effort governing structural issues are certificate of need (CON) 
laws.101  These laws were motivated to help control costs.  The main inspiration for CON laws 
came from the American Hospital Association.  The hospitals, anxious to avoid less desirable 
regulatory measures, encouraged states to contain costs by focusing on capital regulation.  These 
laws required providers to obtain a certificate of need before undertaking any major capital 
expenditure of hospitals and nursing homes.  Organizations were opposed to allowing outside 
agencies get involved in regulating medical services, but not only were hospitals willing to 
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accept capital regulation, they were also positioned to benefit from CON laws as a way to limit 
competition.  The National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 mandated 
state CON laws as a condition of eligibility for certain federal health dollars.  As to be expected, 
every state (except Louisiana) had enacted a CON law in the 1970s.102  The federal government 
eventually repealed the requirement in 1987, prompting many states to repeal their own CON 
law.  Currently, 35 states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico maintain some form of 
CON program. 
Unlike countries with a national health system, any remaining government regulation in 
the United States is fragmented throughout state and local legislation.  There are few areas the 
federal government can regulate absent a centralized system, and when it does, it almost always 
imposes regulations through its ability to constrain federal funding.    
Regulating Hospitals as a Public Utility  
In the U.S., the debate over when and why the government should regulate business has 
dominated public policy.  Few industries have as much influence and oversight over how they 
are regulated; hospitals are distinctly unique in this sense.  This is likely because the historical 
association between hospital care and charity helped to insulate the industry from outside forces.  
Indeed, the government was incredibly slow to respond to the eventual evolution of hospitals 
from charitable institutions to market actors.103  Even though municipalizes brought hundreds of 
cases challenging the tax-exempt status of voluntary hospitals (a common criticism when 
hospitals began billing patients for care), governments and municipalities still treated hospitals as 
entities beyond the purview of public utility regulation.   
Traditionally, economists and jurists have defined businesses as public utilities when two 
basic considerations were met.104  First, the business in question must provide an important 
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human need. Second, there must be a reason to belief that the market presented a risk for 
oppression.  When these conditions were met, there were strong public policy justifications for 
requiring the industry to serve the public need in a reasonable and nondiscriminatory manner.   
Even as hospitals proliferated, throughout the early twentieth century, the industry 
nevertheless lacked the market influence to warrant state intervention.105  Furthermore, there was 
no need to subject charitable organizations to public utility regulation—the plain absence of any 
profit-driven motivation was believed to be sufficient.  Indeed, the prevailing notion is that the 
government should only impose regulation when a feature of the market presents a substantial 
risk that the industry would exploit its consumers.  Hospitals, as charitable intuitions, were 
unquestionably immune to these concerns. 
However, as hospitals began to behave more like market actors, critics started to question 
this distinction.  An increasing number of private, for-profit hospitals only further fueled this 
scrutiny.   Even still, at that time, the cost of medical care was still extremely affordable.  In 
1910, the average cost of inpatient care per day was just $2—even after adjusting for inflation, 
that would amount to less than $50 today.106  The lack of medical insurance also helped to keep 
costs in check.  With patients paying out-of-pocket for all of their health care, natural cost 
constraints helped to restrain the medical economy.   
However, as medicine became increasingly advanced and, thereby, costly, it gained the 
power to abuse its control over a public necessity.107  Though Nebbia discarded the public 
interest standard as a test for reviewing constitutionality in 1934, the label (“affected with the 
public interest”) still influenced regulatory efforts.  It is no surprise, then, that courts began 
applying that label to hospitals in the 1940s and 1950s.  This classification reflected an 
 162 
increasing concern that hospitals had newly acquired substantial market power—power that 
positioned it to exploit consumers.   
Efforts were soon underway to better manage hospital supply.  Congress, in 1946, first 
embraced this goal on a national level by enacting the Hospital Survey and Construction Act 
(otherwise known as Hill-Burton).108  The motivation to get involved reflected the understanding 
that access to hospitals was too important to the public welfare to leave it to market forces.  The 
downfall of this approach is that Hill-Burton did not have any real regulatory force—it was only 
able to channel and direct public subsidies.109  The IOM reported in 1980 that health planning 
was eventually viewed as inconsequential, and, often irrelevant.  For these reasons (possibly) the 
planning movement was embraced as a less severe threat when compared to direct public 
regulation.   
At the same time, medical spending was skyrocketing.  With the early Medicare system 
lavishly reimbursed hospitals, it was increasingly difficult to defend Hill-Burton.  It started to 
become evident that providing consumers with reasonably priced care would require more than 
facility construction.  Health planners turned their attention to preventing duplicative institutions.  
The preferred technique to limit supply in this way was through certificate of need legislation—
or, CON laws.  These laws were clear examples of public utility regulation, and, perhaps, the 
closest the United States has come to a nationwide public-utility model.110  Hospital interests 
were quick to support this model because it left ownership, management, and regulation intact.111  
Studies started to offer evidence that CON laws failed to meaningfully control medical inflation.   
Eventually, enthusiasm for CON faded.  Even still, the majority of states continue to enforce a 
CON law.   
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More importantly, this illustration helps to show how deeply the public utility model 
shaped the medical industry.112  Support its application or not, public utility regulation has 
dramatically influenced health law.   Indeed, public utility regulation typically involves 
controlling profits and the number of firms within an industry.  Though it does not embody a 
traditional conceptualization, the combination of CON laws and the economic conditions and 
rate limits imposed through public insurance programs like Medicare and Medicaid already 
function together to regulate medicine much like a utility—albeit using a much less organized 
and formal approach.   
The problem is not that the government has not extended the public utility concept to 
hospital regulation; the problem is that the current situation in the hospital industry requires a 
tailored approach.  Unlike other public utilities, hospitals are in a unique position to offer a 
service that is demonstrably different than electricity or telephone services.  The greatest concern 
with typical utilities is that the firm with exploit their position of power to price gouge 
consumers.  In the case of hospital care, however, the greatest concern extends far beyond the 
ability to pay.  Of course, the issue of ability to pay (and the skyrocketing cost of health care) is a 
pertinent one.  To this point, a recent news story offers a damning indictment: Leon Lederman, a 
1988 Nobel Prize winner, reportedly sold his award for $765,000 in order to pay for his end-of-
life medical expenses.113  Yet, even still, the far serious threat is the patient safety risks that the 
hospital industry tolerates in order to generate a profit.   The appropriate role of regulation is to 
ensure that firms providing key services are not permitted to sacrifice the general welfare to 
enrich their shareholders.  This is precisely what is happening within the hospital industry—and 
the market power that these institutions hold, as consumers are faced with life-threatening 
conditions, is truly unparalleled.   
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Though hospital competition is monitored in most states through CON laws, and public 
(and sometimes private) payers help to police health care costs, few regulations consider the full 
magnitude of the harm hospitals inadvertently impose by not directing more recourses to 
improving patient safety.  As it currently stands, hospitals are not legally required to report their 
complication rates, readmission rates, or other standardized performance metrics.  Most hospital 
comparisons (such as Hospital Compare, www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov) offer patient-safety 
metrics based on Medicare claims data—not medical chart review.114  Rather than carefully 
consider the implication of their scores and implement patient-safety initiatives, this approach 
encourages hospitals to spend more money to improve the accuracy of their billing and claims 
data.  For instance, one hospital, which was listed as having a high rate of accidental cuts in the 
new measures, found that most of the cuts were intentional, but had been erroneously billed 
under the code for an accidental cut.  
The only minor exception is bundled within the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) pay-for-reporting program, officially known as the Hospital Inpatient Quality 
Reporting Program.  As of January 2011, CMS began requiring hospitals to report central line 
associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI) in intensive care units to the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention's (CDC) National Healthcare Safety Network system.115  Any hospital 
that failed to submit information faced a 2% payment reduction. The Affordable Care Act also 
utilizes this information to calculate payment rates until the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing 
Program.    
The Affordable Care Act also implemented a number of additional pay-for-performance 
initiatives.  In an effort to link quality to payment and reduce overall healthcare costs, the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) implemented three new programs.  First, the Hospital Readmissions 
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Reduction Program authorizes Medicare to reduce payments by 1% to hospitals with excessively 
high rates of avoidable readmissions.  The second program—the Hospital Value-Based 
Purchasing (VBP) Program—allows Medicare to adjust payments based on clinical process and 
patient experience of care.  CMS compares hospital quality performance to national performance 
standards to determine an overall VBP score, which it will use to withhold payments from the 
worst performing hospitals (at or below the 50th percentile).  In 2014, the penalty is 1.25%, but it 
will continue to increase until reaching 2% in 2017.  Finally, the Hospital-Acquired Condition 
(HAC) Reduction Program requires the Secretary of the Department of HHS to withhold 1% of 
payments to the worst performing hospitals with respect to HACs.116  The recent Affordable 
Care Act requires Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to penalize hospitals with 
high rates of Hospital Acquired Conditions (HACs).   
In spite of these programs, hospitals allocate sparse resources towards patient safety.  
Disturbingly, only few hospitals even devote resources to collecting patient-outcome statistics—
a fatal threat—whereas almost every major company hires independent auditors to ensure the 
accuracy of their financial reports—a property threat.  In part, this is explained through the 
history of the medical profession.  
As far back at the New Deal, conservative ideology and the political strength of the 
medical profession has repeated thwarted any attempt at regulation.  While physicians may view 
themselves as healthcare providers, the ongoing advancements in technology and medical 
inflation created a flood of managed care and hospital corporations that ideologically and 
financially reject any special responsibilities to the public.  Remarkably, these corporations and 
special interests groups have protected enough of the public to make the system resistant to 
change.  Though American values are not naturally opposed to healthcare reform, Americans 
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have developed a number of peculiar moral judgments where healthcare is concerned.  For 
example, Americans do not demonize government involvement in the public-school system as 
"socialized education."  Yet, the institutional legacies have greatly influenced how people apply 
their values to social spheres.  Thus, the majority of Americans oppose the Affordable Care Act 
because in the early-twentieth century the organized medical profession successfully conflated 
public responsibility with a loss of freedom.117   In this way (by encouraging public beliefs and 
ideologies to develop in reaction to its efforts, the healthcare industry has avoided virtually all 
regulation.   
As a business affected with the public interest, it is time for healthcare organizations to 
begin to take corporate responsibility more seriously.  Particularly given the nature of the health 
care, the industry should be considered an industry affected with the public interest.118  From a 
modern perspective—one that demonstrates the way the Munn principle has adapted over time—
microeconomic literature generally recognizes two competing theories of regulation: the public 
interest theory and the Chicago theory.119  The public interest theory is an embodiment of the 
Munn holding—positing the fact that regulation should be enacted to protect the public interest.   
  Richard Posner first articulated the Public Interest Theory in 1974.120  Posner suggested 
that the traditional rationale for regulation seeks to protect and benefit the public at large.  The 
competing economic theory (the Chicago theory) assumes that regulations ultimately serve to 
protect the interest groups involved.121  Regardless of the tension between the normative value of 
the two theories, a review of the concept of public interest throughout law, politics, and academia 
clearly reveals the notion being used time and time again to support regulation for the general 
welfare.   
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As is always the case, regulation is warranted when the magnitude of harm is too great 
for the general public to influence through the market.  Indeed, the fact that a system causes 
public harm is especially important.  Individuals are not situated to mitigate the effects of 
widespread, public harm through private enforcement.  Only public enforcement is capable of 
remedying large-scale harm.122  This is evident in the failed effort to monitor healthcare quality 
through malpractice claims and tort reform.  The only untested solution left is to impose 
legislation to better control health care quality on a national level.    
Though it is clear that the public is—quite literally—dying without public regulation, the 
U.S. government is unlikely to start regulating the healthcare industry in the immediate future 
without external pressure.  Nevertheless, in order to advance an argument advocating for such 
action, it is critical to articulate a normative standard that supports holding health care 
organizations accountable in this way.  One of the biggest barriers in this respect is the belief that 
corporations are ethically neutral.  
B. The Complex Issue of Accountability 
Whether organizations agree, each participant in the healthcare system has an ethical 
obligation to provide care without perpetuating public harm.  Even more than in other industries, 
this dissertation argues that entities providing a basic necessity have a social responsibility to 
protect the public—not just their bottom line.  However, many opponents strongly reject the 
notion that corporations, as moral agents, are able to be held morally responsible for an action (or 
inaction).  Without any such moral responsibility, critics balk at the imposition of additional 
regulations.  
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1. Organizational Moral Agency 
Moral agency refers to an actor’s ability to behave morally, as opposed to immorally or 
amorally.123  Social science reveals the prominence of amoral thinking among organizations, 
wherein organizations act self-interestedly—not because of intentional wrongdoing, but as a 
consequence of simply not considering their ethical responsibilities.124  By contrast, the 
attribution of moral agency imposing moral obligations to consider normative responsibilities 
and translate those decisions into appropriate behavior.  
Without moral agency, healthcare organizations cannot be held ethically accountable for 
their institutional practices or use of systems.  This is an important distinction.  Individuals 
within the healthcare organization have historically been held accountable to normative 
standards.  A negligent clinician, for example, will encounter malpractice claims and 
professional penalties.  Conversely, organizational ethics imposes normative standards for the 
institutional structures and ethical climate within an organization.  Rather than hold an individual 
accountable, organizational ethics is grounded in the premise that organizations are subject to 
moral judgments.125  
Peter French advances one of the principal arguments for attributing moral agency to 
corporations.  He presumes that the necessary condition for moral agency is the notion of 
intentionality.126  There must be a sense that the corporation in and of itself is an intentional 
agent; that it also has its own reasons for how it behaves as a collective, beyond the motivations 
of the people working within it.  To clarify this distinction, French describes an important 
difference between an aggregate collectivity and a conglomerate collectivity.127  An aggregate 
collectivity is nothing more than a collection of individuals all working together to accomplish a 
goal through the aggregation of their individual efforts.  Conversely, a conglomerate collectivity 
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is an organized group of persons with an established internal organization to accomplish 
concerted action.  Unlike an aggregate collectivity, French argues that a conglomerate 
collectivity has the ability to act independently (as a collective) and, therefore, as a moral agent.  
Concluding that corporations all have what he terms a CID (Corporation’s Internal Decision) 
Structure, which delineates positions and levels of authority and corporate rules.  This 
distinguishes corporations from aggregate collectives.  Put another way, the CID Structure 
enables corporations to intend.  As such, French argues that society can hold organizations 
responsible because an organization acts independently according to its own intentionality.  
Admittedly, an organization is a fictional construct—it is not a person.  Nevertheless, 
through analogy, it is clearly possible to attribute moral agency to organizations.128  French’s 
argument focuses on the fact that organizations “act” much like individuals.  Although an 
organization acts through the collective decisions of its leadership and members, it functions as a 
unified system.  It identifies goals and objectives that direct and shape individual and 
organization action.  In this way, by identifying and delineating mission statements, institutional 
policies, and organizational processes, the organization functions as if it was a single person 
commanding the organization’s business practices.129  This is the same argument that the 
government adopts in order to treat businesses as separate entities under the law.  While this does 
not provide a philosophical foundation for an organization’s moral personhood, it does 
substantiate the notion that organizations have a separate identity.  Of course, this sense of 
personhood is limited.   
While an organization acts like an individual in many ways, it is still distinctly 
different.130   Unlike full-fledged moral agents, an organization can only act through collective 
direction.  It is important to hold the organization accountable as agents; however, this 
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organizational normative evaluation should not supplant the individual accountability of its 
members who are also liable for their individual choices.  On the other hand, because 
organizations do act collectively, it would be insufficient to only consider individual actions.  
Thus, there must be a balance between organizational and individual accountability.  
Organizations are moral agents, in a sense, and should be held ethically accountable.  At the 
same time, individuals, acting as agents for the organization, should be held morally accountable 
for their individual choices.  
2. The Importance of Normative Authority 
This position, that organizations can be normatively evaluated as moral agents, is 
controversial.131  Some opponents argue that it is not necessary to confer moral agency on 
organizations in order to hold them to ethical standards of conduct, insisting that it is sufficient to 
judge organizations based solely upon their actions without imposing and moral rights or duties. 
While it is certainly possible to morally evaluate organizational actions without attributing moral 
agency on organizations, this position undervalues the importance of normative authority.  For 
instance, while corporations are successfully evaluated and regulated under the law based solely 
upon organizational action, this approach is limited.  The problem with adopting this approach is 
that it can only regulate behavior based upon external motivations or consequences.  As an 
ethical approach, it is critical to maintain normative authority in order to proscribe and prescribe 
values, actions, and structures.   
Without attributing moral agency, it would otherwise be impossible to hold the 
organization morally responsible for its actions.  This approach to organizational ethics places 
the responsibility on the organization to develop its own sense of normative standards.132  Rather 
than impose universal normative obligations, individual organizations are entrusted with the task 
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of defining their own core values and ethical climate based upon their own sense of ethics.  
Consequently, this approach allows for diversity in the normative content of organizational 
ethics.  While this pragmatic approach still provides a basis to judge whether an organization is 
ethically admirable, it does not provide an argument to hold an organization morally responsible 
unless it violated a self-imposed normative standard.  
Accepting organizational moral agency, of course, has implications for stakeholder 
theory.  In the late twentieth century, business ethics scholars developed a number of conceptual 
frameworks to understand the ethics of business organizations.133  Recently, that has coalesced 
into a framework for organizational ethics called stakeholder theory.  Its main thesis is the 
normative claim that organizations must consider all of the interested parties (individual and 
collective) in order to behave ethically.  As an industry, healthcare organizations interact with a 
number of different stakeholders (e.g., patients, families, healthcare providers, other professional 
staff, suppliers, third-party payers, the community).  The critical question for stakeholder theory 
is which, if any, of the stakeholders enjoys priority when interests conflict?  This is particularly 
relevant in the current context because truly committing to safety may expose healthcare 
organizations to certain levels of risk, in addition to financial expense.   
It is not possible to resolve the issue simply by reviewing the interested parties.  In this 
case, it is important to consider the organization’s mission and core ideology.  For all healthcare 
organizations this will revolve around the provision of health care.  The significance of this 
guidance should not be overlooked.  Without looking to the notion of stakeholder theory, any 
one healthcare organization could explore the notion of corporate moral agency themselves.  In 
many instances, obligations to the organization and patients would conflict.  However, by 
considering the application of stakeholder theory, it is clear that (regardless of how the 
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organization defines its own mission) organizational ethics supports the priority of patients.  As 
such, healthcare organizations must be held accountable to discharge a set of moral obligations 
with regards to patient safety and the improvement of healthcare quality.  
C. Conclusion 
This chapter has critically examined the philosophical foundation and importance of 
conferring moral agency on healthcare organizations in order to build a case to hold healthcare 
organizations ethically and legally responsible for improving patient safety.   
Specifically, this chapter examined the legal foundations supporting government 
regulation, particularly as applied to the hospital system.  In this light, this chapter provided a 
framework to regulate private companies in order to protect the public interest.  Some academics 
argue that this is an outdated justification, as the Nebbia case discarded the concept of a 
‘business affected with the public interest.’  Yet, this chapter meticulously detailed the nuanced 
constitutional law developments, making clear that the Court used Nebbia to expand the 
government’s authority to adopt policies to protect the public welfare.  In practice, this has left 
the determination as to whether an industry or business is affected with the public interest to state 
legislatures.  Through this lens and guided by the application of the public utility concept, this 
chapter developed a case supporting patient safety regulation.   
Further, this chapter examined the extent of current hospital regulation.  After examining 
the three forms of regulation, (common law, non-governmental, and governmental), it is clear 
that current regulatory efforts are failing.  Though the government has extended the public utility 
concept to hospital regulation, it has not prioritized patient safety.  Instead, nearly all examples 
of this type of intervention were economically motivated—focusing on the public’s ability to pay 
for medical care.  Hospitals are continuing to sacrifice the general welfare to enrich their 
 173 
shareholders, however, they are not merely gauging prices.  Moreover, consumers have even less 
market power, given insurance limitations and the immediate need inherent in life-saving 
medicine.    
This chapter concludes that regulation is warranted when the magnitude of harm is too 
great for the general public to influence through the market.  For the reasons explored in this 
chapter, the public unquestionably lacks this power.  One of the primary tools at consumers 
disposal, malpractice, has failed to meaningfully influence medical practice.  This is likely 
because of the inherent limitations that patients face in even learning of any safety breaches.  
Regulation is the only untried solution left.   
Finally, from an ethical perspective, this chapter also defended the application of 
organizational moral agency to healthcare organizations—namely, hospitals.  Indeed, even if the 
healthcare industry itself is failing patients, the typical approach has been to look to the direct-
level providers.  The concept of organizational moral agency, however, provides an ethical basis 
to support the plea to hold hospitals (corporate entities, and not individual providers) responsible 
for patient safety shortcomings.  Indeed, in order to move beyond the traditional malpractice 
model, it is crucial to articulate a normative standard to hold healthcare organizations similarly 
accountable for patient safety incidents.   
In this way, organizational ethics acts as a mechanism to develop normative methods to 
improve the quality and safety of healthcare.  Without this basis, there is no normative authority 
to proscribe values, actions, and structures; organizational would only be morally accountable to 
maintain their own, self-imposed standards.  At first glance, this may not seem particularly 
necessary.  However, if the government is to impose regulations to hold hospitals accountable for 
patient harm in the same way that the law holds individuals accountable, it is imperative that the 
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hospital is viewed as an independent moral agent.  Otherwise, investigations will not only 
continue to try to identify and blame individuals within the organization, but they will also fail to 
appropriately condemn the organization for its unethical behavior.  Organizational systems must 
be held morally accountable.  There is a tremendous opportunity to apply the concept of 
organizational ethics to impose those normative standards and demand that healthcare 
organizations assume responsibility for furthering patient safety.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE DEBATE OVER ERROR REPORTING 
 Having determined that healthcare organizations have an ethical responsibility to improve 
patient safety; and, that said organizations can be held morally accountable, this chapter explores 
the significant, ongoing debate over how to best realize those goals.  Specifically, this chapter 
analyzes the debate surrounding the healthcare system's primary obligation to the protect its 
patients: namely, the debate on centralized reporting of medical error.  
 Doctors and medical associations strongly oppose mandatory reporting, and have, 
historically, blocked all attempts at implementing a mandatory reporting system.1  The prevailing 
argument is that mandatory reporting systems are unnecessary at best, and harmful at worst.  
Instead, the American Medical Association (AMA)—and organizations like it—favors voluntary 
reporting.  AMA President Dr. James Rohack explained that "the AMA championed the passage 
of the patient-safety legislation to create a system where health care professionals can report 
errors in a voluntary and confidential manner so that future system errors can be avoided as we 
learn from past mistakes."2   
 After the release of the IOM report in 1999, President Clinton was eager to implement 
their recommendations and embraced mandatory reporting.3  However, former AMA president, 
Dr. Nancy Dickey, clashed with Senators during a congressional hearing regarding the IOM 
recommendation to establish a mandatory federal reporting system, avowing: 
We are opposed to mandatory reporting.  It may well drive underground the very 
information you need to improve safety.  A number of states have mandatory reporting, 
and there's no evidence that they have greater safety or fewer errors.4   
Richard Davidson, president of the American Hospital Association at the time, outright refused 
the White House's invitation to participate in the discussion.  In a public statement, he echoed, 
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"The idea that a mandatory reporting system is going to change behavior is naïve at best. You 
need to focus on making a cultural change in hospitals, to promote open discussion of errors, and 
that's not possible if some plaintiff's attorney is climbing on your back."5  Interestingly, Mr. 
Davidson’s denouncement actually supports a call for a coordinated database.  Any error data 
that a hospital reported to a nationwide (or even statewide) reporting system should be strictly 
and legally protected from disclosure—open discussion within the hospital, however, would not.  
Additionally, while there certainly may be other methods that would successfully change 
hospital culture, it is difficult to comprehend how evidence and data regarding common pitfalls 
and errors would hurt that effort.  His statements seem to plainly evidence a general opposition 
to greater transparency (from any source), which appears to be motivated (at least in part) by a 
fear of litigation.  
 In any event, these statements highlight much of the controversy surrounding the debate 
about reporting systems.  Logically, the opposition to mandatory reporting tends to embrace one 
of two arguments for why such a system will fail: (1) empirical evidence demonstrates that even 
mandatory reporting does not solve the problem of underreporting,6 and (2) mandatory systems 
discourage participation.7   To best appreciate these arguments, it is useful to review the IOM’s 
recommendations.  
A. The Call for Error-Reporting Systems 
The IOM report envisioned a collaborative approach to reporting that would include two 
separate systems: a nationwide, mandatory system, as well as non-regulatory, voluntary reporting 
systems.8  According to the IOM, these reporting systems would serve two essential functions: 
increased accountability and improved safety.   
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FIGURE 5.1. IOM Hierarchy of Reporting 
 
 
The IOM report argued that the primary purpose of a mandatory reporting system is to 
hold providers accountable.  As such, the IOM intended for mandatory systems to only collect 
data concerning the most severe errors—those that were associated with serious injuries or death.  
The committee depicted this relationship between mandatory and voluntary reporting in figure 
5.1.9  As portrayed in the figure, the committee strongly believed that the public has the right to 
be informed about unsafe conditions—particularly those associated with serious injuries, and 
even death.  This tactic emphasizing accountability, they contended, served three important 
purposes.  First, mandatory systems help to restore public trust by providing a baseline level of 
protection against the most egregious errors.  Second, they leverage the threat of public exposure 
and penalties to pressure health care organizations to take greater steps to improve safety.  
Finally, they force all health care organizations to invest in patient safety.  Analyzing this data to 
better understand the causes of such serious errors seems to be almost an afterthought.   
Conversely, the IOM report explicitly tasked voluntary systems with the goal of actually 
improving safety.  Unlike mandatory reports, these submissions should be protected from 
 182 
discoverability.  Because these reports would be submitted in confidence, the IOM report 
reasoned that voluntary systems are particularly well-suited to collect data about all errors—even 
those resulting in minimal or no patient harm (otherwise known as a near miss).    
As likely expected, the IOM’s recommendation for mandatory reporting systems drew 
such fierce opposition because of its insistence on holding health care providers accountable.  At 
the time of the IOM report, the committee found that at least one-third of states had some form 
of reporting system.10  In developing their recommendations, the committee interviewed thirteen 
(13) of those states to learn about the scale and scope of the systems.  Most, the committee 
learned, focused on patient injuries or facility issues.  All of the states reported that they 
protected the confidentiality of certain data, but the extent of protections varied.  Most states 
cited a lack of recourses and limited data in explaining why they do not aggregate the data to 
publish information about general trends and best practices.  Rather than focus on this level of 
feedback and intervention, the state health departments used the information to follow up with 
institutions on a case-by-case determination (depending on the severity of the incident).     
After the IOM publication, critics quickly turned to the failings of the existing mandatory 
state systems.  Most officials and experts (including spokespeople representing professional 
associations and hospital systems) generally agreed that the first step in improving safety is 
collecting information in order to better understand the scope of the problem.  They further 
generally agreed that error reporting systems could present a means to gather the necessary data.  
They took issue, however, with the characterization that providers should be forced to submit 
mandatory reports.  Instead, they argued that obligatory reporting would not offer a surefire  
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solution to underreporting.  The solution, according to the industry representatives, is to simply 
remove all legal disincentives: 
We have to create an environment in which we learn from failure.  This cannot be 
achieved in an environment of punishment or fear of legal prosecution for doctors, nurses 
and other caregivers who step forward after an unfortunate mistake is made.11  
With these barriers removed, everything would work itself out.  Look at Pennsylvania, they 
argued.  At the time of the IOM report, Pennsylvania required reports for events that seriously 
compromised patient safety, such as death or gross injury (e.g., rape, infant abduction, fire, 
patient abuse).  Though the Pennsylvania statute legislated a mandatory system, the Department 
of Health only received a single report for the entire year ending in June of 1999.12  This alone, 
critics contended, proves that mandatory reporting is misguided.   
Additionally, opponents also took issue with the contradicting recommendations.  
Though the IOM report emphasized the importance of abandoning the blame and shame model, 
its preoccupation with public accountability and punitive measures contravened its own edict.  
As one expert lamented:  
[T]he IOM could not have been naïve as to its choice of the term error, with its pejorative 
connotation and its potential for misuse by those with a political or economic agenda. 
Despite the IOM’s focus on system failures, the term error suggests blame.13 
Indeed, the IOM cannot have it both ways—public shaming is either beneficial or detrimental.  
Now, perhaps the IOM intended to shift accountability from the individual provider to the 
hospital system, but surely the committee must have recognized that, practically, practitioners—
not organizations would bear the ultimate responsibility to submit reports.  Organizations, faced 
with the threat of public disclosure and punitive action, are likely to (either explicitly or 
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implicitly) discourage individual providers from admitting their mistakes.  Furthermore, given 
mounting malpractice litigation concerns, individual providers are also likely to be wary to report 
errors that caused serious harm with the knowledge that the information contained in the report 
will be released to the public.   
From an ethical perspective it is obvious why the IOM report declared that “requests by 
providers for confidentiality and protection from liability seems inappropriate” in face of the 
public’s right to be informed about safety hazards, particularly when patients are dying.14  
Additionally, the IOM’s comprehensive approach to improving patient safety relied on public 
outcry.  By threatening health care organizations with public exposure, the IOM intended to 
force organizations to invest in patient safety.  In this light, the IOM was attempting to replicate 
the same public outcry that prompted progress in all of the high profile, but singular cases of 
harm that the media exposes.   
From a public policy viewpoint, however, it is immediately apparent that this approach 
will fail.  The theory that a punitive, public mandatory system will improve quality depends on 
five key assumptions: (1) providers will report, (2) the mandatory nature of the system can be 
enforced, (3) consumers will have access to usable information within a timely fashion, (4) 
consumers will actually use that information, and (5) health care organizations will respond by 
improving patient safety.15  While past cases tends to support the fact that consumers will care 
about these risks and health care organizations will take steps to improve safety in response to 
their newly public shortcomings, there is no evidence that providers will report to a system 
against their own interests.  Further, in an industry where harm is so easily concealed, it is nearly 
impossible to envision how the government could enforce the mandatory nature of the reporting.  
The only plausible suggestion even mentioned within relevant articles notes that the United 
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States could adopt a Japanese approach and utilize the legal system to criminally prosecute 
hospitals and providers for adverse events.  While this constant worry and fear of police 
investigation and criminal prosecution has helped Japan realize substantial patient safety 
improvements, even the article’s author recognized that it would not be beneficial for the U.S. to 
adopt a similar approach.  Thus, the government will continue to struggle to enforce self-
reporting in a punitive-oriented system.   
In this light, the IOM report greatly weakened its own call for widespread error reporting; 
and, in doing so, it opened itself up to harsh (and legitimate) criticism.  This bolstered opponents, 
and offered ample ammunition to condemn mandatory reporting outright.  Indeed, this is why 
former AMA president, Dr. Nancy Dickey, was able to so easily contest the IOM 
recommendation to establish a mandatory federal reporting system.  The IOM report did attempt 
to include a counterargument to this line of attack, asserting that: 
All reporting programs, whether mandatory or voluntary, are perceived to suffer from 
underreporting.  Indeed, some experts assert that all reporting is fundamentally voluntary 
since even mandated reporting can be avoided.  However, some mandatory programs 
receive many reports and some voluntary programs receive fewer reports.  New York’s 
mandatory program receives an average of 20,000 reports annually, while a leading 
voluntary program, the MER Program, has received approximately 3,000 reports since 
1993.16   
This counterargument, however, falls flat.  First, the proffered counter-example (that New York, 
a mandatory system receives more reports than a voluntary system) is a logical fallacy.  
Suggesting that these two specific systems are representative of the group is a classic false 
dichotomy.  More damning, however, is the fact that New York law protects the confidentiality 
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of incident reports.17  That is, New York is a confidential, mandatory system.  As such, the IOM 
cannot point to New York to counter the primary opposition to its recommendation (i.e., that a 
punitive system will stifle the discussion and reporting of errors).  By purporting to make the 
debate about the voluntariness of the system, the IOM is conflating confidentiality with 
compulsion.  New York’s alleged success does not help the IOM defend a mandatory, 
nonconfidential reporting system.  A punitive-focused reporting system, as described in the IOM 
report would, in fact, seem to drive information underground.  Though it may be intuitive, 
studies further comparing different mandatory reporting systems conclude the same.   
In 2005, Weissman et al. published a study comparing the perceptions and opinions of 
hospital leadership with respect to error reporting systems.18  The authors point out that critics 
not only fear that mandatory systems have a chilling effect on reporting, but also that public 
disclosure could unnecessarily frighten or alarm the public (to their own detriment).  To help test 
these concerns, the study sought to uncover how hospital executives regarded mandatory 
reporting systems.  Weissman et al. surveyed the chief executive and operating officers in more 
than 200 randomly selected hospitals within six states.  At the time of the study, 2002-2003, two 
states had mandatory, confidential reporting systems (Pennsylvania and Florida), two states had 
mandatory reporting coupled with public disclosure (Massachusetts and Colorado), and two 
states lacked any mandatory reporting (Georgia and Texas). 
During that period, Massachusetts required facilities to submit incident reports to the 
Department of Public Health for incidents involving serious injury or death “resulting from an 
accident or other unknown cause,” along with any other “serious incidents that seriously affect 
the health and safety of patients.” Approximately 640 reports were filed in the year preceding the 
study.  Upon request, any information that the Department of Public Health learned during an 
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investigation would be provided to the public—though, patient names and identifiers were 
redacted.   
Similarly, Colorado law required facilities to submit reports to the Department of Public 
Health and Environment concerning specific serious injuries.  The state would then release a 
summary report to the public.  In addition to protecting the patient, Colorado reports redacted 
and maintained the confidentiality of the specific health care provider(s) involved—thereby only 
exposing the institution. 
Conversely, Pennsylvania and Florida had mandatory, confidential systems.  
Pennsylvania required hospitals to report to the Department of Health any “situation or … 
occurrence of an event at the facility which could seriously compromise quality assurance or 
patient safety.”  The information contained in the report is strictly confidential, except by court 
subpoena.   
At that time, Florida required hospitals to report adverse events to the Agency for Health 
Care Administration.  A state statute defined adverse events as “an event over which [a] health 
care professional could exercise control and which is associated in whole or in part with medical 
intervention, rather than the condition from which such intervention occurred.”  Finally, Georgia 
and Texas did not have any mandatory patient safety reporting (although both have since enacted 
one).   
The study utilized a questionnaire to elicit opinions about mandatory patient safety 
reporting systems, particularly as it relates to the impact of public disclosure.  The first question 
sought to ascertain whether non-confidential systems discouraged reporting.  Similarly, the 
questionnaire sought to learn more about the opinions of executive leadership had regarding the 
effect of those systems on malpractice litigation.  Next, Weissman et al. asked leadership which 
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system would best reduce hospital errors (a confidential or non-confidential one).  Finally, the 
questionnaire presented the respondents with a series of three vignettes detailed hypothetical 
errors.  After each, the survey asked respondents how likely or often this kind of error would be 
reported to a government or external organization (using a scale of always, usually, sometimes, 
rarely, or never).   
Throughout the responses, only 8% of respondents thought that a mandatory, non-
confidential reporting system would encourage internal reporting; and, 79% believed that this 
type of system would encourage lawsuits.  However, the results did suggest that respondents 
were more likely to overestimate this fact, as hospital leaders from states with nonconfidential 
systems were more likely to approve publicly disclosing information (22% as compared to only 
4%-6% from other states).  In this way, familiarity seemed to cultivate a moderate level of 
acceptance.   
Nevertheless, 73% thought that mandatory systems would have neutral or even negative 
effects on patient safety.  Additionally, respondents from states with mandatory, confidential 
reporting systems had the most optimistic perspective on the effects of reporting systems on 
patient safety.  While every other group (including those from non-mandatory reporting states) 
believed that the negative effect of mandatory systems would vary between 30% and 43%, only 
17% of leaders from mandatory, confidential states believed that such systems would produce 
negative effects.  If experts are to be believed in asserting that, ultimately, every system is 
voluntary, then this study is a glowing endorsement of a mandatory, confidential system; as buy-
in is bound to be an important factor in maintaining reporting compliance.  
Interestingly, respondents from mandatory, nonconfidential states were also far less likely 
to report incidents with less severe injury (3% to 7% as compared to 20% to 34% of leaders from 
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confidential states).  This also corresponds with the perspective that the executives had when 
asked about the level of discretion their hospital had in reporting incidents: only 6% thought that 
they had no discretion.  As administrators and executives perceive mandatory reporting as a 
threat, it is expected that they might find ways to creatively interpret reporting requirements to 
circumvent the law.19   
These findings highlight Charles Billings’ contention that all reporting is voluntary.  
Billings argues that: 
in some form, in one way or another, all incident reporting becomes voluntary.  It either 
becomes voluntary because of inertia on the part of reporters, or it becomes voluntary 
because of constraints within the establishment and the environment, or it becomes 
voluntary because hospitals… decide that they are not required to report this particular 
event because of the fine print in that particular incident reporting regulation or statute.20 
With such a malleable outlook even in mandatory systems, it should come as no surprise that 
underreporting is a rampant problem. 
With that, the next section examines the first major contention in the debate over 
reporting systems: that mandatory systems do not remedy the problem of underreporting.21   
B. Common Arguments Against Mandatory Reporting Systems 
1. The Problem of Underreporting 
 Despite the proliferation of multiple reporting systems, underreporting is an extensive 
problem that is plaguing all reporting systems.22  In fact, as many as 50%-96% of all adverse 
events go unreported.23  In one 2007 study examining rates of reporting, case note review 
detected 110 admissions with patient safety incidents.24  Of these, only six (a rate of just 5%) 
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were reported to the system.  There is no question, in this sense, that underreporting is rampant.  
This begs the question: why?  
The opponents of mandatory reporting systems would argue that forced reporting—
especially in nonconfidential systems—is to blame.  However, it is misleading (at best) to 
suggest that the empirical evidence does not support a mandatory reporting system.  As of 
January 2015, at least twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have implemented some 
form of adverse event reporting system.25  Of these, only one state system (Oregon) is voluntary.  
See Appendix 1 for a survey of the state reporting laws.  Given widespread underreporting 
throughout these state systems, critics argue that the problem is mandatory systems—that 
mandatory reporting systems simply do not work.  This contention has several main flaws.    
First, the majority of these laws were not specifically designed to improve patient safety.  
As such, it is unclear that voluminous reporting was a design goal.  That is not to say that the 
current underreporting data is not useful; but, it does undermine targeted attacks on mandatory 
systems as a whole.  It is, in fact, possible for the current mandatory systems to be failing, not 
because they are mandatory, but because they were poorly designed for the task of improving 
patient safety.   
Indeed, the mandatory reporting requirements are often surprisingly lax.  Moreover, most 
states only use the information to trigger investigations and issue correction plans for a specific 
and defined list of incidents.26  In this way, the state statutes are self-limiting.  This narrow scope 
of incidents subject to mandatory reporting could be a contributing to low rates of incident 
reports.  At least one state, Alabama, appears to only require individual practitioners to report 
errors to the medical board in an attempt to police the field.27  In Texas, hospitals are only 
required to submit an aggregated annual report for certain specified types of medical errors.28  
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Additionally, mandatory reporting critics overstate the occurrence of public disclosure within 
current mandatory systems.  Most hospital leaders argue in favor of voluntary programs, as if 
only voluntary systems offer non-punitive and confidential reporting.  Though the majority of the 
state systems are mandatory, only six states report public data with facility-specific information.  
This means that, similar to voluntary systems, twenty-two (or, 44% of) states protect the identity 
of health care organizations.  Of the remaining states, five do not report any data at all, and 
sixteen only report aggregate data.  Most of the states that do report public data—whether in 
aggregate or facility-specific—publish their findings on an annual basis.  Only four states 
publicly report data more frequently.  For example, Colorado publishes a monthly report that 
identifies both the types of facilities and the types of events that occurred, while also posting an 
online summary report of every occurrence on a weekly basis.  In keeping with concerns about 
lag time (to be discussed in further detail below), however, the most recent data comparison 
report Colorado has published online (as of 2018) is three years behind.  The impact of data that 
is so delayed is certain to be dulled and pose far less threats to health care organizations.  
Further, as a ten-year comparison reveals through the following reporting data,29 Colorado has 
continued to improve its reporting rates over time; a fact that tends to suggest that hospitals may 
have realized they originally overestimated the negative impact of reporting.   
TABLE 5.1. All Facility-Reported Incidents by Date Entered   
Occurrence Type   2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Abuse  /  Physical   855 910 942 880 914 1043 1013 965 1044 1656 
Abuse  /  Sexual   152 177 170 175 197 189 198 222 208 288 
Abuse  /  Verbal   160 155 177 156 142 199 164 184 153 300 
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In cases where the state statutes do impose strict requirements, many reporting programs 
lack the funding or power to enforce the mandates.  Instead, empirical evidence tends to show 
that the current mandatory reporting systems in place are underfunded and poorly executed.  In 
Pennsylvania, for instance, a spokeswoman for the Department of Health explained that the law 
"doesn't provide for us to go out and see what's taking place."30  As such, even where the 
legislature intended to promote patient safety, the resulting state systems are frequently 
Anesthesia  
Complication   4 9 6 5 5 6 13 17 18 31 
Brain  Injury   105 120 136 114 144 157 146 161 184 191 
Burns   0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 
Death   42 60 68 56 90 68 86 84 81 79 
Diverted  Drugs   179 188 205 226 219 221 210 278 301 335 
Equip  Malfunction  /  
Misuse   49 64 77 89 131 186 201 339 254 279 
Property  
Misappropriation     184 212 229 268 351 396 403 442 516 666 
Missing  Person   371 431 377 351 340 400 400 359 407 505 
Neglect   93 119 177 178 295 407 440 241 249 304 
Spinal  Cord  Injury   2 8 8 5 9 7 5 7 7 10 
Transfusion   2 2 4 2 3 3 8 7 3 5 
TOTALS   2198   2455   2576   2505   2841   3284   3288   3306   3425   4649  
Sources: Adapted from Colorado Department of Public Health & Environment, “Acute Hospital 
Occurrences Submitted—Ten Year History,” April 4, 2016, 
https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/0ByqZDBabyNVSbFdKYWVfdWRWcmM. 
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underfunded and unsophisticated.  These shortcomings have rendered them ineffective, which 
again points to a flaw with the current systems rather than the entire scope of mandatory 
reporting systems.  Moreover, given prevalent ambiguity with reporting requirements (coupled 
with the lack of state enforcement power), it is often easy for facilities to argue that the incident 
did not constitute a reportable error—dodging regulations.  Consider the case of Gary William 
Clezie.31  
Gary scheduled an outpatient arthroscopic shoulder surgery at a facility in Yakima, WA.  
According to state investigation records, after a successful surgery, nurses administered a 
continuous intravenous infusion of Dilaudid—a powerful narcotic that is commonly prescribed 
to treat pain after surgery.  While IV Dilaudid (hydromorphone) is a highly effective pain 
management drug, it also carries a high mortality risk due to respiratory depression.  To 
minimize accidental overdose and narcotic-related respiratory depression, pulse oximetry 
monitors should be utilized to continuously monitor all patients receiving opioids during the 
postoperative period.32  Unfortunately, for reasons that are unclear, the nursing staff failed to 
attach a pulse-oximeter to Clezie.  As a result, the medical staff did not notice when Gary’s 
blood oxygen level became dangerously low.   Shortly afterwards, Clezie suffered a respiratory 
arrest and was found unresponsive.  He was resuscitated, but due to prolonged oxygen 
deprivation, he suffered degeneration of brain function—in effect, Gary was brain dead.    
Washington requires facilities to report adverse events, as they are defined by the 
National Quality Forum (NFQ).  The NFQ publishes a 28-item list of serious reportable events 
(SREs), which is shown in figure 5.2 below.  Even though patient safety experts have applauded 
the NFQ list for helping to standardize and clarify reporting requirements, this case perfectly 
demonstrates the way that specific, contextual variations thwart these efforts.   
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1)   SURGICAL OR INVASIVE PROCEDURAL EVENTS 
1A.   Surgery performed on the wrong site,   
1B.   Surgery performed on the wrong patient,  
1C.   Wrong procedure performed on the patient,  
1D.   Unintended foreign object left in the patient,  
1E.   Intraoperative or immediately postoperative death, in a healthy patient 
2)   PRODUCT OR DEVICE EVENTS: any patient death or serious injury associated with 
2A.   The use of contaminated drugs,  
2B.   The use or function of a device in patient care, in which the device is used or 
functions other than intended 
2C.   Intravascular air embolism that occurs while being cared for in a healthcare setting 
3)   PATIENT PROTECTION EVENTS 
3A.   Discharge or release of a patient, who is unable to make decisions, to other than an 
authorized person 
3B.   Patient death or serious injury associated with elopement (patient disappearance) 
3C.   Patient suicide, attempted suicide, or self-harm that results in serious injury, while 
being cared for in a healthcare setting 
4)   CARE MANAGEMENT EVENTS 
4A.   Patient death or serious injury associated with a medication error  
4B.   Patient death or serious injury associated with unsafe administration of blood 
products 
4C.   Maternal death or serious injury associated with labor or delivery in a low-risk 
pregnancy 
4D.   Death or serious injury of a neonate associated with labor or delivery in a low-risk 
pregnancy 
4E.   Patient death or serious injury associated with a fall  
4F.   Any stage 3, stage 4, and unstageable pressure ulcers acquired after admission 
4G.   Artificial insemination with the wrong donor sperm / egg 
4H.   Patient death or serious injury resulting from the irretrievable loss of an irreplaceable 
biological specimen 
4I.   Patient death or serious injury resulting from failure to follow up or communicate 
laboratory, pathology, or radiology test results 
5)   ENVIRONMENTAL EVENTS 
5A.   Patient or staff death or serious injury associated with an electric shock 
5B.   Any incident in which systems designated for oxygen or other gas to be delivered to a 
patient contain no gas, the wrong gas, or are contaminated 
5C.   Patient or staff death or serious injury associated with a burn  
5D.  Patient death or serious injury associated with the use of physical restraints or 
bedrails 
6)   RADIOLOGIC EVENTS 
6A.   Death or serious injury of patient or staff with the introduction of a metallic object into 
the MRI area 
7)   POTENTIAL CRIMINAL EVENTS 
7A.   Any instance of care ordered by or provided by someone impersonating a healthcare 
provider 
7B.   Abduction of a patient/resident of any age  
7C.   Sexual abuse/assault on a patient/staff member within or on the grounds of the facility 
7D.   Death or serious injury of a patient or staff member resulting from a physical assault 
that occurs within or on the grounds of the facility  
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.2. NFQ List of Serious Reportable Events  
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As a result of several nursing errors, including a misadministration of narcotics, Gary 
died within two days of a simple outpatient shoulder surgery.  Clearly a reportable error, right?  
Though Gary plainly died because of medical error, the Department of Health eventually agreed 
with the facility that the errors were (shockingly) not reportable events.  The incident was not 
reportable within 1E because Gary did not die within 24 hours of surgery—the maximum time 
frame the state considered to be qualifying as an “immediate” postoperative death.   Though 
Gary was determined to be brain dead within that time period, the state did not recognize the  
concept of brain death as human death.  Gary did not meet the definition of clinical death (or, 
cardiac death) until his family removed life support two days later.   
As a result of several nursing errors, including a misadministration of narcotics, Gary 
died within two days of a simple outpatient shoulder surgery.  Clearly a reportable error, right?  
Though Gary plainly died because of medical error, the Department of Health eventually agreed 
with the facility that the errors were (shockingly) not reportable events.  The incident was not 
reportable within 1E because Gary did not die within 24 hours of surgery—the maximum time 
frame the state considered to be qualifying as an “immediate” postoperative death.   Though 
Gary was determined to be brain dead within that time period, the state did not recognize the 
concept of brain death as human death.  Gary did not meet the definition of clinical death (or, 
cardiac death) until his family removed life support two days later.   
Similarly, the Washington Department of Health determined that 4A did not apply 
because the error was not associated with the medication itself.  Instead, a blood-oxygen 
monitoring device was never attached to monitor Gary's respiratory function while 
hydromorphone (Dilaudid) was being administrated through a continuous intravenous infusion.  
It is confusing that, even though proper monitoring could have prevented the respiratory arrest 
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that killed Gary, such a costly error is not reportable.  It is even more confusing to try to 
understand how respiratory failure from a medication overdose would not fall within the scope of 
medication error.  To this point, the assistant health department secretary explained that Gary’s 
official cause of death was improper oxygen saturation.  Even though the improper oxygen 
saturation likely resulted from an overdose, there was no evidence to that fact—only evidence 
that the nursing staff did not appropriately monitor the patient’s vitals.  Amazingly, that is not a 
reportable care management event.    
When it is so easy to circumvent the intent of the regulation it is no surprise that 
underreporting is problematic.  Further, it is questionable to cite examples of underfunded and 
unsophisticated systems to argue that mandatory systems are ineffective.  The more accurate 
interpretation is that poorly funded and executed—not necessarily mandatory—systems are 
ineffective.   Not surprisingly, these systems are unable to foster buy-in and help stimulate 
meaningful change.  After all, providers will not report to either voluntary or mandatory systems 
if it is not in their best interest—which could depend on a number of factors. In many of these 
cases, the most common reason is likely that providers are unwilling to devote time (which they 
do not have) to submitting information through a process they do not trust to yield positive 
results.  Far from an argument against mandatory reporting, this ongoing problem, instead, 
highlights the importance of garnering greater administrative support.   
Common barriers can be classified in two ways: one that views barriers from a systems 
perspective and one that considers the viewpoints of individual providers.33  A preferred 
integrative model (particularly when assessing factors that correlate with improvements to health 
care quality) is the Donabedian outcome model.34  Donabedian asserted that assessing 
improvement requires a three-part analysis, examining the interrelated and co-dependent 
 197 
  
FIGURE 5.3. Common Barriers to Incident Reporting 
 
measures of structure, process, and outcome.  According to the model, each measure impacts and 
affects the others.  Douglas Nobel and Peter Pronovost grouped provider-oriented barriers into 
three categories: attitudes, medical fears, and public fears.35  These barriers are depicted in figure 
5.3 above.   
According to the Donebedian model, reporting systems are plagued by systemic, 
organizational problems.  Overall, unclear procedures contribute to significant underreporting.  
Even absent their own biases, providers are often unsure who or how to complete reports.  Worse 
yet, even when they set out to submit a report, poor design makes it difficult for providers to find 
the time to devote to completing reports that are often far too complex.  Additionally, 
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exceptionally long lag times, as well as insufficient feedback discourages providers from 
submitting new reports.    
Indeed, studies suggest that timely and worthwhile feedback (often called, closing the 
safety feedback loop) is essential to the success of any reporting system.36  In fact, as many as 
62% of providers agree that the lack of feedback is a primary barrier to incident reporting.37  Not 
only is such feedback a critical step towards actually improving safety (as opposed to simply 
counting errors), it is needed in order to demonstrate to reporters that their time submitting 
incident reports is well spent.  Absent this, reporters are quickly discouraged.  A system must 
find a satisfactory way to close the feedback loop in a way that results in positive organizational 
changes for clinicians to believe in the importance of reporting.38  The importance of feedback in 
motivating reporting cannot be overstated.39  Indeed, when clinicians believe that management 
fails to act in response to incident reports, it leads to apathy and a reluctance to report incidents.40   
To appropriately close this loop, it is not enough to simply provide feedback.  The 
proffered feedback must include potential corrective actions and explain the specific systemic 
vulnerabilities that permitted the incident.41  To best understand the characteristics of effective 
feedback systems, researchers interviewed nineteen experts from sectors in civil aviation, 
maritime, energy, rail, offshore production, and international healthcare.  Through their analysis, 
Benn et al. identified fifteen requirements for the design of effective safety-feedback systems 
(see table 5.2) concerning the role of leadership, credibility, dissemination, and timeliness.   
TABLE 5.2. Fifteen Requirements for Effective Safety-Feedback Design  
Requirement Description  
Feedback  at  Multiple  Levels  of  the  Organization   Feedback  should  operation  at  multiple  
organizational  levels;;  across  individual  teams,  
units,  or  sub-­departments.    This  allows  for  learning  
to  be  broadly  applied  across  various  contexts.    
Appropriate  Modes  for  Delivering  Feedback   Feedback  should  be  disseminated  through  a  
variety  of  modes,  channels,  and  formats  to  
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increase  awareness.    Email  bulletins,  workplace  
leaflets,  bulletin  board  postings,  team  briefings,  
and  safety  newsletters  can  all  be  used  to  provide  
feedback.  The  more  modes,  the  better.    
Provide  Relevant  Content  within  Local  Systems   The  content  of  information  should  be  targeted  to  
individual  work  system  contexts  so  that  operators  
are  not  inundated  with  irrelevant  information.      
Integrate  Feedback  within  System  Design   Feedback  functions  should  be  embedded  within  
the  design  of  risk-­management  IT  systems  and  
incident  databases  so  that  the  reporting  
community  can  access  or  generate  custom  reports    
Control  Feedback  to  Information  Requirements  of  
Different  User  Groups  
Careful  consideration  should  be  given  to  how  to  
disseminate  information,  especially  regarding  
safety  incidents.    This  is  particularly  relevant  when  
considering  external  audiences.  
Empower  Front-­Line  Staff  to  Take  Responsibility  
for  Improving  Safety  
Effective  feedback  should  support  front-­line  staff,  
while  offering  examples  for  how  they  can  take  
responsibility  for  improving  safety  in  their  direct  
working  environment.      
Capability  for  Rapid  Feedback  Cycles   The  feedback  loop,  or  a  rapid  response  process,  
should  quickly  complete  for  incidents  involving  
immediate  threats  to  safety;;  even  if  the  initial  
response  is  incomplete  and  only  offers  a  
temporary  solution  until  a  more  thorough  
investigation  can  be  completed.    
Direct  Feedback  to  Reporters  and  Key  Issue  
Stakeholders  
Feedback  should  be  provided  to  reporters  and  key  
stakeholders  at  various  stages  throughout  the  
reporting  loop.  Feedback  and  dialogue  with  the  
original  reporters  helps  to  keep  them  engaged  and  
help  to  foster  a  reporting  culture  by  
communicating  that  reports  are  valued  and  acted  
upon.    
Feedback  Processes  are  Established,  Continuous,  
Defined,  and  Understood  
The  clear  definition  of  process  steps,  roles,  and  
responsible  parties  will  ensure  that  the  safety  
improvement  process  is  embraced  and  accepted.    
This  will  also  contribute  to  a  more  proactive  
(versus  reactive)  approach  to  patient  safety.    
Integrate  Safety  Feedback  Within  Working  
Routines    
A  formal  requirement  for  front-­line  staff  should  be  
to  be  aware  of  up-­to-­date  safety  information.    It  is  
important  to  allocate  sufficient  time  to  staff  for  
these  safety  awareness  activities;;  however,  it  is  
also  important  to  design  these  practices  to  be  
minimally  disruptive.    
Visible  Improvements  Should  be  Made  within  the  
Local  Work  System  
To  encourage  future  reporting,  it  is  necessary  to  
demonstrate  the  impact  of  reporting.    This  allows  
busy  professionals  to  justify  the  efforts  they  make  
in  reporting  their  errors,  near  misses,  and  
incidents.    It  also  challenges  the  view  that  reports  
disappear  into  a  “black  hole.”  
Front-­Line  Personnel  Should  View  Feedback  as  
Credible  
Front-­line  staff  must  be  able  to  trust  in  the  
commitment  of  org.  leadership  in  order  to  accept  
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As their findings conclude, the safety feedback loop must represent an ongoing, cyclical, and 
credible process of receiving, analyzing, and responding to incident reports.  
In addition, numerous individual barriers are responsible for low reporting rates.  When 
asked why they do not reliably report or discuss errors, providers overwhelmingly report that 
they fear damaging their personal reputations.  In one study, 182 intensive care staff elaborated 
on those reasons, listing the following barriers: threat to personal reputation (76%), malpractice 
(71%), societal and patient expectations (68%), fear of disciplinary actions (64%), concern over 
job security (63%), and personal ego or pressure from colleagues (60% and 61%).42  Even absent 
fears regarding external repudiation, medical professionals are acutely aware of how easily a 
good doctor can be labeled incompetent with just a single mistake.43  These concerns are all 
encompassed in figure 5.3 as common forms of barriers that affect individual providers.   
 Finally, incident reporting is troubled with three serious epidemiological problems.44  
Foremost, simply establishing a reporting system creates a false impression that there are 
increasing levels of error—a phenomenon known as the reporting paradox.  This concept 
acknowledges the fact that, as providers become more comfortable with the reporting process 
that  the  changes  and  safety  initiatives  that  are  fed  
back  from  their  incident  reports.    
Feedback  Should  Preserve  Confidentiality  and  
Foster  Trust  
Reporters  must  be  able  to  trust  that  there  will  not  
be  any  negative  personal  consequences  from  
reporting.    There  should  be  clear  policies  and  
guidelines  to  assure  them  of  an  appropriate  level  
of  confidentiality.      
Visible  Senior-­Level  Support  for  Systems  
Improvement  and  Safety  Initiatives  
Safety  actions  should  be  visibility  supported  by  
senior  level  management  and  executives.      
Double-­Loop  Learning  to  Improve  the  
Organization’s  Safety-­Feedback  Process  
The  safety  improvement  process  should  itself  be  
subject  to  monitoring  and  evaluation  to  continue  to  
better  detect  and  mitigate  system  vulnerabilities.    
Sources: Adapted from Jacqueline Benn et al., “Feedback From Incident Reporting: 
Information and Action to Improve Patient Safety,” Quality and Safety in Health Care 18, no. 
11 (2009): 17. 
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and structure, they will use it more readily.  This leads to an increased number of reports, but 
does not necessarily evidence any change in the underlying error rates.   
 Second, because of underreporting, aggregate reports and data analysis will be 
systematically biased.  For instance, a high percentage of incident reports from nurses involve 
falls.  While every opportunity to improve patient safety is worthwhile, the frequency of error 
from nurses in this scenario are likely to create the false impression that falls are more prevalent 
or important that other incidents.  Until reporting is equally distributed throughout an 
interdisciplinary sampling of health care professionals, it will be difficult to correctly prioritize 
safety efforts.  
 Lastly, physicians are poor reporters.  In one study at the University of Virginia, while 
approximately 72 (of 120) physicians admitted to having observed three or more incidents, 78 of 
those same physicians never submitted a single report.45  As a consequence, reporting ownership 
is strongly skewed towards nursing staff.  Indeed, the Australian Incident Monitoring System 
reported that physicians only contributed to 2% of their reports, as compared to the 88% nurses 
submitted.46  Not only does this further exacerbate systematic biases and limit the 
generalizability of data, it leads to a participation bias.  More than unfairly burdening nurses with 
the responsibility of improving patient safety, low physician reporting is problematic because it 
excludes an entire subset of risks and hazards.  For instance, despite his best efforts, a nurse is 
never likely to identify as many risks or errors affecting chemotherapy as an oncologist might.  
The exclusion of major stakeholders within the hospital system will frustrate and hinder patient 
safety efforts.   
To recap, the most prevalent reasons for underreporting are: unawareness, failure to 
perceive that an incident occurred, lack of clear definitions identifying incidents, time pressures, 
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fear of punitive measures, lack of feedback, and the lack of belief that reporting will contribute to 
positive changes in patient safety.47  Many of these barriers apply equally to both voluntary and 
mandatory programs.  In this light, while underreporting is a serious issue that any successful 
program will need to address, empirical evidence does not suggest that mandatory reporting 
systems are uniquely afflicted with these concerns.  Indeed, a recent retrospective case review 
concluded that only approximately 7% of all adverse events were reported to the National Patient 
Safety Agency—the national voluntary error reporting system in the United Kingdom.48   
Having rebuffed the argument that mandatory systems either exacerbate the occurrence 
or will otherwise fail because of the problem of underreporting (in ways that voluntary systems 
are immune), the following section addresses the broader argument that mandatory systems 
discourage participation.49  One of the primary contentions in this respect directly attacks the 
punitive nature of some mandatory systems.  
2. Fear of Malpractice Litigation 
Opponents argue that mandatory systems encourage individual blame and boost 
malpractice litigation.  However, this too, conflates a number of different factors.  Most 
importantly, (as is also true with the problem of underreporting) these are design-specific 
criticisms.  Indeed, a voluntary system could be just as susceptible to these criticisms based on 
the extent the system protects confidentiality.  In the same way that a confidential voluntary 
reporting system would eliminate worry over potential litigation, so too would a confidential 
mandatory reporting system. 
In one critique about the punitive risks inherent within a mandatory system, Dr. Michelle 
Chiang clarifies that the problem is less logical: 
[I]ncreased reporting will not be achieved through a mandatory reporting system because 
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whether practitioners report does not turn on the mandatory or voluntary nature of the 
system, but rather on whether reporters feel comfortable reporting.  
Dr. Chiang goes on to argue that, while mandatory systems understandably attempted to ensure 
accountability by holding providers responsible for lapses in patient safety, evidence does not 
support that approach because providers do not report to punitive systems.  Given this, Dr. 
Chiang purposes that the solution is to create a “well-planned, thoughtfully-designed reporting 
system” to encourage reporting.  The key, she argues, it to identify the information that the 
system needs to collect and remove the disincentives to reporting that information.  A primary 
disincentive to reporting, according to Dr. Chiang, is fear of litigation.   
Dr. Chiang contends that there are two elements that must be addressed in order to 
adequately eliminate this barrier: (1) protect confidentiality, and (2) educate providers about the 
law.  The rub, she argues, is that physicians do not fully understand the law and are 
overwhelmingly skittish about malpractice.  Partly because of repeated horror stories, physicians 
tend to grossly overestimate their risk of being sued and are generally very fearful about the 
extent of legal protections in place to protect them.50  In fact, in an internet survey, 85% of 
respondents (purporting to be healthcare professionals) did not trust that the government could 
deliver in truly protecting confidentiality in states with confidential, mandatory reporting 
systems.51   
In truth, malpractice litigation is not nearly as problematic as tort reformers suggest.  
Though it is common to hear that frivolous malpractice lawsuits are plaguing the U.S. healthcare 
system, evidence suggests that far too few malpractice claims are filed.  While more than 
400,000 patients die every year from preventable harm, most expert agree that only 85,000 cases 
end in litigation.52  Of these, about 46% (or, nearly 40,000) are settled before trial.  Yet, even that 
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small number is enough to unnerve most physicians.  Because they do not often distinguish 
between their personal and professional competency, most physicians react strongly to lawsuits.  
As Marshall Kapp notes, “A lawsuit is particularly and uniquely offensive to physicians, and the 
vehemence of their negative reaction to the experience far exceeds that of any other kind of 
professional defendant.”53  In part, this reaction stems from not understanding the law.  However, 
to an extent, it also reflects the haphazard application of privilege in malpractice cases.   
Indeed, the indiscriminate application of privilege to protect the confidentiality of 
incident reports has made it difficult for doctors to anticipate whether plaintiffs’ attorneys will be 
able to later use those reports to sue them.  Take, for instance, the case of Chicago Trust Co. v. 
Cook County Hospital.54  Chicago Trust involved a malpractice case that proceeded to trial after 
a patient was accidentally disconnected from a ventilator.  The defendant argued that incident 
and situation reports were protected from disclosure through the peer-review privilege.  The 
court disagreed, clarifying that documents prepared before a peer review committee was 
formally initiated were not protected by privilege.  Additionally, the court explained that the act 
of providing these previously prepared documents to the peer review committee once an 
investigation began would still not extend peer review privilege to the prior documents.  The 
court justified its holding by explaining that to allow the peer review privilege to protect all 
existing information at the initiation of a peer review committee “would make everything 
confidential, except for the patient’s own medical records.”   
While this seems sensible, it nevertheless fails to recognize that the peer review privilege 
was embraced as a way to encourage providers to candidly investigate and evaluate case in order 
to improve hospital conditions.  Undermining those protections, regardless of the reason, makes 
it less likely that providers will act in good faith.  As such, a crucial element in the success of the 
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peer review process is the willingness of providers to discuss mistakes.55  Widespread 
uncertainty about the extent of confidentiality protections, discourages physicians from filing 
incident reports.   
Throughout the years, most states have passed statutes granting a peer review privilege to 
remedy this problem.56  While this was a productive step forward, starting in the mid-1990s, 
court holdings and state statutes have been slowly eroding the extent of the protections.57  For 
example, Florida used to have one of the most comprehensive peer review privilege statutes.  In 
2004, however—goaded by the plaintiffs bar—state voters approved a state amendment (“The 
Patient’s Right to Know”) that gutted the peer review privilege.  Though no administrator or 
provider would officially go on record, many confessed that since the amendment took effect in 
2008, peer review investigations halted.  While, officially, these conferences are still 
scheduled—as federal and state law require—the process is essentially a farce.   
The key issue with respect to determining the appropriate extent for peer review 
privileges turns on how to balance the competing interests.  Initiated in the early 1900s, the peer 
review process was created to “decrease instances of medical malpractice and improve the 
condition of health care by allowing practicing physicians to recognize inadequacies in their 
peers’ performance and discipline accordingly.”58  Consider the following example of a typical 
scenario.59   
Six-year-old Hannah is scheduled for a tonsillectomy.  Hannah’s parents are nervous but 
Hannah’s surgeon, Dr. Gwande, reassures them that the procedure is routine; they do hundreds 
of them without incident.  Feeling calmed, Hannah’s parents wave as she is wheeled away 
towards the operating room.  Dr. Stevens administers anesthesia.  The operation proceeds 
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without incident, and her tonsils are skillfully removed.  But yet, Hannah never wakes up.  Her 
parents are devastated and confused.   
The hospital launches a peer review investigation to examine what went wrong.  During 
the course of the investigation, Drs. Stevens and Gwande openly reveal that a medical error 
killed Hannah.  They discovered that someone incorrectly mixed the anesthesia dosage, leading 
to a 100-fold overdose.  As a result of this conference, the hospital immediately implemented 
new procedures to ensure that a similar mistake does not occur in the future.  Had Drs. Stevens 
and Gwande covered up the error, the hospital would still be unaware of the latent procedural 
defect that allowed for the medication error—more patients would die.  
A year later, Hannah’s parents sue the hospital and doctors.  During discovery, they 
demand access to the information, admissions, and documents from the peer review 
investigation.  The conflict is obvious.  On the one hand, Hannah and her parents suffered a real 
and tragic loss—a wrongful harm that tort law typically compensates.  At the same time, 
however, fear of adverse litigation creates a perverse enticement for providers to hide their 
mistakes.60  When providers do not disclose, or worse, actively cover up mistakes, health care is 
less safe for everyone.  Given these competing interests, how should the court decide?   
First, it is important to note that protecting the confidentiality of peer review materials 
does not inhibit Hannah’s parents’ ability to advance their wrongful death lawsuit.  It does not 
provide hospitals or physicians with immunity.  It simply requires that the family build their case 
through other evidence.  In this light, protecting confidentiality is no different from the 
evidentiary protections that prohibit disclosure in other relationships (e.g., clergy, spousal, 
attorney-client).    
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Secondly, the extension of confidentiality in these instances is a practical necessity.  For 
example, eroding the confidentiality protections protecting statements individuals reveal to their 
attorneys or psychologists would stand as a permanent obstacle undermining the entire 
undertaking.  Put another way: without confidentiality protections, people would not trust the 
fiduciary relationship.  Psychology cannot treat mental disorders if patients are not honest.  
Attorneys cannot advise and defend clients, if those defendants refuse to talk with their attorneys 
to provide any information about the circumstances of the case for fear of that information being 
revealed on the witness stand.  Similarly, peer review will not exist without confidentiality 
protections.  Had Drs. Stevens and Gwande known that their admissions during the investigation 
would be introduced into evidence in a malpractice lawsuit, they would be far more reluctant to 
participate in good faith.  Thus, the liability protections extended to Drs. Stevens and Gwande (as 
well as the hospital) are not intended to protect them.  Rather, the privilege is necessary to 
protect the public welfare by providing a practical mechanism for the health care industry to 
prevent future deaths.  The negative impact to the families affected by relevant losses or errors is 
an unintended harm that is nevertheless necessary to ensure a greater good—it is an ethically 
justified double effect.    
Interestingly, efforts are currently underway to use Patient Safety Organizations (as 
established by the 2005 Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act) as a federal mechanism to 
conducting morbidity and mortality investigations.61  The Patient Safety and Quality 
Improvement Act (PSQIA) provides peer review protection to all information reported to a 
PSO—termed “Patient Safety Work Product.”  Congress intended that hospitals would join a 
PSO.  As incidents occur, providers meet to investigate the errors through the hospital’s Patient 
Safety Evaluation System (PSES)—taking the place of peer review conferences.  The providers 
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can openly and candidly discuss the case.  The hospital makes its own system and policy changes 
to prevent future occurrences, while also submitting the data to the Network of Patient Safety 
Database.  The database will also analyze the PSWP and promulgate regional or national 
recommendations to all of the hospitals it serves, allowing for better shared learning nationwide.  
Though the actual implementation of these protections is still questionable, the existing 
framework provides a mechanism to help alleviate physician fears of malpractice.  Though the 
current system is voluntary, making it mandatory would not undercut its protections.   
More importantly, even if mandatory reporting does encourage more lawsuits, this alone 
is not a compelling enough reason to allow the healthcare system to continue to evade 
accountability and harm patients.  There are plenty of protections in the legal system to prevent 
frivolous lawsuits; it is hardly convincing to argue that it would be unjust if litigation increases 
because patients are more informed about the occurrence of error.  Though, this is not a likely 
result.  While there are a number of factors at issue, part of the disconnect is that private 
individuals generally lack the resources to seek civil remedies from large healthcare 
corporations.  Additionally, research consistently shows that the decision to sue depended more 
on insensitive handling and poor communication than the injury itself.  In one study, 91.4% of 
respondents sued because they wanted the hospital to assume accountability and prevent similar 
incidents in the future.62  As such, full disclosure and greater accountability is proven to 
contribute to decreased litigation.   
Finally, even if these studies were inaccurate, there are better (more responsible) ways to 
discourage malpractice litigation—namely, taking proactive steps to reduce the incidence of 
harm.  Interestingly, one medical specialty did just this.63  From the 1950's through the 80's 
anesthesiologists were paying some of the highest medical malpractice premiums in the field.  
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Mortality was as high as 2 for every 10,000 administrations of anesthesia.  Undergoing 
anesthesia was one of the most notoriously dangerous procedures in medicine.  Frustrated with 
frequently losing lawsuits and paying high insurance premiums, the American Society of 
Anesthesiologists (ASA) established a Safety and Risk Management committee.  In the mid-
1980's, the ASA initiated a comprehensive claims study, which concluded that human errors 
contributed to a majority of anesthesia-related injuries.  This led to the first standards of practice 
to introduce 'safety monitoring' as a method to prevent accidents.  The ASA implemented 
protocols, established monitoring standards, improved training and education, redesigned 
equipment, and limited how many hours anesthesiologists could work.  Within ten years, the 
mortality rate plummeted to only 1 in 200,000 administrations.  The field has enjoyed 
unparalleled success in terms of patient safety—spurred, in part, by record numbers of 
malpractice cases.  
3. Psychological Processes 
 Much of the debate and controversy surrounding the utilization of error reporting systems 
relates to institutional or individual fears—usually over liability.64  Supposing that a system is 
able to thoughtfully assuage those fears, there are other obstacles that would thwart the 
implementation of a successful reporting system.  In addition to the many external barriers that 
providers face, there are internal psychological barriers that impact reporting.  As with many 
ethical decisions, individual providers will likely turn to risk-benefit analysis to determine 
whether to report any errors.65 
When asked, most physicians participating in a focus group agreed (in principle) that 
doctors have an ethical imperative to disclose instances of medical error.66   However, the 
physicians often qualified their belief based on contextual variations.  For instance, some 
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explained that the duty would be suspended if the patient only experienced trivial harm.  Others 
felt that there was likewise no need to disclose if the patient was unaware of the error.  
Curiously, this scenario is the exact reason for why physicians owe their patients full disclosure. 
Nevertheless, this sort of ethical rationalization comports with ongoing research studying the 
influence of cognitive development and self-interest in moral decision-making.   
 An individual's cognitive processing and sense of moral duty influences their moral 
decision-making.  The Theory of Planned Behavior posits that actual behavior is driven by 
intentions, which are developed through beliefs (both personal and social).  When faced with an 
error, the intention to disclose the error would only develop if the physician believes that he or 
she would derive some positive outcome.  Generally, this includes a two-pronged determination 
that factors for who approves or wants the disclosure and ranks the importance of each opinion. 
While the Theory of Planned Behavior concentrates on the correlation between belief and intent 
and intent and behavior, Kohlberg's theory of Cognitive Moral Development delves even further 
into the cognitive processes underling belief and intention.   
 Based on empirical research, Kohlberg presented six identifiable stages of moral 
reasoning.67  Using Kohlberg's theory, moral reasoning researchers have noted that individuals 
employ higher levels of cognitive moral reasoning when responding to hypothetical ethical 
dilemmas than when justifying real behavior.68   For instance, in a convenience sample of 370 
corporate managers, James Weber and Janet Gillespie found that the mean score response for 
participants who responded that cheating should be reporting (3.24) was higher than those who 
would report (3.06) and still higher than those who did report (2.73).69  Stage three moral 
reasoning focuses on a sense of duty due to how the individual will perceived, whereas stage two 
considers the sense of duty to oneself.  While stage three also includes a concern for personal 
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integrity and personal relationships, stage two primarily factors for the consequences of personal 
reward and concern for personal satisfaction.  Those who did not report the cheating used an 
even lower level of moral development to justify why they did not report (2.3).  In fact, far fewer 
participants actually reported instances of observed cheating (127) as compared with those who 
believed that cheating should be reported (296).  Interestingly, 67 of the participants who felt that 
cheating should be reported (belief) also responded that they would not report cheating 
themselves (intention).  There are two conclusions that can be drawn here: (1) individuals 
provide higher-level rationales when considering the ideal response than when making real 
decisions, and (2) most persons make ethical decisions based on stage 2 moral reasoning.  Thus, 
in the case of medical error, physicians are not likely to report incidents or errors without a 
perceived reward.  
  Without a compelling personal reward or sense of duty to oneself, providers justify 
creating caveats to their ethical duty to disclose medical error.  Moral justification is the process 
of re-interpreting immoral behavior in terms of a higher purpose.  Generally, individuals use the 
following justifications: 
•   Displacement of responsibility – blaming others. "I was only following orders." 
•   Diffusion of responsibility – deflecting the unethical behavior by attributing it to a group, 
and not one particular individual. "We all do it. It's the standard of practice." 
•   Advantageous comparison – comparing one's behavior to other's worse behavior. "We 
are better about taking responsibility than most hospitals." 
•   Disregard or distortion of consequences – minimizing the harm. "If I don't report near 
misses, no one will be hurt." 
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•   Attribution of blame – blaming someone else for causing the behavior. "I don't tell 
patients because they don't want to know. It's not my decision. I have to respect their 
wishes."70 
Individuals are able to behave self-interestedly through these processes for psychological self-
deception.71  Although the concept of self-deception seems paradoxical, it is essential in 
unethical decision-making.  Very few individuals would consciously violate ethical principles.  
These psychological processes help to eliminate negative ethical characterizations, or even 
distort them into position ones.      
 Given this reality, it is even more important to model the appropriate ethical response by 
requiring mandatory reporting—while also realizing that any reporting system (including a 
mandatory system) will fail if it does not successfully provide a perceived reward.  
4. Withholding Information to Prevent Public Panic and Mistrust 
 Though, related, there is also concern that full transparency would truly harm the public. 
Some opponents fear that disclosure may incite panic or irreparably harm patient trust.  For 
instance, one physician remarked: 
You don't want to be accused of scaring people. I've had patients tell people I was scaring 
them when I thought I was simply being informative and, you know, not being dramatic 
or anything. But clearly in those cases, I was telling people more than they wanted to 
know.72  
Another echoed that sentiment, explaining: 
My job is to relieve anxiety, not to create it. And to a certain extent when an error occurs 
that doesn't get to the patient. It's not their problem. It's my problem. 
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Indeed, trust is not only important for medicine; it holds society together.  Interestingly, while 
the public feels that nurses are significantly more trustworthy than medical doctors,73  one study 
found that 96% of nurses and 90% of all other healthcare providers felt that nurses were 
primarily responsible for ensuring patient safety.74  In fact, nurses remain the most trusted 
profession in the United States for the 13th time in 14 years.75  Yet, nurses report medical errors 
more frequently than doctors.76  During the congressional Senate hearings, vice president 
Barbara Blakeney, even relayed the American Nurses Association's unconditional endorsement 
for mandatory reporting.77  This alone rebuffs the notion that offering more transparency fosters 
mistrust.  In fact, it is quite the opposite—withholding information denigrates trust.  The era of 
blind trust and paternalistic medicine is gone; trust is more conditional now.  Patient trust is 
encouraged and sustained through forthcoming communication, respect for patient views, the 
provision of information, and reasoned and inclusive decision-making.78  
B. Ethical Implications of Reporting 
1. Non-Disclosure as a Cause of Medical Error 
Despite enduring changes in interpretation, the Hippocratic Oath has persisted as the 
paradigm of medical ethics in Western medicine.79  Some argue that the Hippocratic ethic can be 
reduced to the fundamental maxim, Primum non nocere: “Above all [or first] do no harm.”80  
Though nonmaleficence (the contemporary articulation of the obligation to avoid harm) is an 
important ethical imperative, it is dangerous to ignore the fact that beneficence is the first moral 
principle of the code (and the whole Hippocratic tradition).81  Nonmaleficence merely imposes 
an obligation to avoid harming patients; and, while this does include accidental harm, it is 
incomplete without the complimentary obligation to take positive action to act for the benefit of 
others.  Taken together, these principles require that healthcare providers must not only refrain 
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from harming patients, but that they must also contribute to their welfare when harm does 
occur.82  
Although this seems relatively obvious, the scope of the duty to disclose medical error 
remains controversial.  Providers are particularly less inclined to disclose the occurrence of 
"nonharmful" errors.83  This is problematic.  While harm may have been averted for the 
particular patient, given the systemic nature of error within the healthcare industry, the close call 
still exposes a latent defect that will likely threaten future patients.  In this light, non-disclosure 
allows for future errors—these are simply mistakes waiting to happen.  Even if disclosure will 
not make any impact on the patient involved in the incident, it will protect against future harm—
and is required by the ethical duty to act for the welfare of all patients within the healthcare 
system (i.e., beneficence).  
2. Fiduciary Duty to Disclose 
As if that is not enough justification, the special nature of the physician-patient 
relationship also creates legal obligations for doctors.  As a legal concept, the notion relies on the 
common law concept of a trust.  In legal systems, a trust is a fiduciary relationship in which one 
or more persons hold property for the benefit of another (known as the beneficiary).  Over time, 
this doctrine expanded to include similar special relationships wherein one party (the fiduciary) 
is entrusted with the welfare of another (the beneficiary).84  Because of this inherent imbalance 
of power and expertise, the law imposes duties to ensure that the fiduciary does not take 
advantage of the vulnerable beneficiary.  Generally, the duty requires that the fiduciary exercises 
undivided loyalty in promoting the best interests of the beneficiary.  One court described the duty 
as one of "'most abundant good faith,' requiring absolute and perfect candor, openness and 
honesty, and the absence of any concealment or deception."85 
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Moreover, there is a growing body of case law that is specifically finding that this 
fiduciary relationship "prohibit[s]… [physicians] from misrepresenting the nature of the patient's 
medical condition."86  This longstanding principle was evoked in a recent California case 
involving a woman who was told she had a particularly aggressive form of breast cancer.87  After 
she underwent four months of unnecessary intensive chemotherapy and a radical mastectomy, 
her surgeon discovered that the lab misread her initial biopsy slides.  In fact, they never showed 
any signs of cancer.  The surgeon conveyed this information to her oncologists, but they 
concealed the error.  As a result, the woman spent another two years believing that she had a 
terminal illness.  On appeal, the court rejected the doctor's argument that they were only liable if 
they knew that the patient was not informed of the results, implying that a fiduciary has a duty to 
disclose material facts regardless of the beneficiary's actual knowledge.   
It is worth noting that this duty also tends to extend beyond the end of the physician-
patient relationship.88  For example, after researchers studying the effects of diethylstilbestrol 
(DES) learned that prenatal exposure was linked to cancer and other health problems, several 
court cases held that the fact that the risk was not known until after the patient was treated does 
not affect the obligation; a defendant breaches her fiduciary duty if she fails to notify the patient 
(including past patients) when the risk becomes known.89  
3. Counting Mistakes v. Improving Safety 
 There is some concern, however, that the focus on disclosing errors may eclipse the more 
important goal of improving safety.90  While it is important to disclose and study errors (and all 
other forms of adverse harm), it is crucial that experts also have access to the information and are 
advising willing providers and hospital systems as to how to promptly make the necessary 
changes to improve patient safety.   
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Dr. Carl Macrae explained this problem using the symbol of the orange wire.91  As Dr. 
Macrae describes, the original goal of incident reporting within healthcare was quite simple.  It 
sought to recreate the success of incident reporting in other safety-critical industries—especially 
from aviation.  The analogy theorizes that Boeing 757 engines contain an orange wire that is 
essential to their safe and proper function.  Suppose that during a pre-flight inspection, an 
engineer noticed that the orange wire in a single aircraft was damaged in a way that suggested 
that there was a systemic default within the engine.  Because the problem is far more invasive 
than simple wear and tear, the orange wire hypothesis posits that the aviation industry would 
immediately inspect every Boeing 757 and replace any faulty orange wires.   
 This example of efficient and system-wide action is held up as a benchmark for how 
incident reporting systems should function.  In this way, the orange wire test asks whether the 
healthcare industry responds in a way that mimics the same level of rapid and system-wide 
safety improvements.  Dr. Macrae concludes that it does not.  He explains:  
 [In] translating incident reporting into healthcare from aviation, what was largely missed 
was that, in airlines and other industries, the rapid detection and resolution of safety 
issues depends on a deeply embedded and widely distributed social infrastructure of 
inquiry, investigation and improvement.92  
Within the aviation industry, incident reporting represented the natural progression from decades 
of regularly conducting thorough and systematic investigations of incidents and accidents.  The 
healthcare did not have any comparable history.  As a result, Dr. Macrae argues that the 
healthcare industry has failed to replicate the same safety gains.  He rationalizes that, without the 
coordinated organizational infrastructure to conduct systematic investigations, the healthcare 
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industry reporting systems supplanted a different image: the filing cabinet.  As such, healthcare 
has singularly focused on collecting large quantities of incident data, rather than devoting itself  
to the quality of the resulting safety investigation.  Dr. Macrea states that this focus of the 
number of reports rather than the actual task of improving safety has contributed to a number of 
problems (see table 5.3).  
Most relevant, the ever-constant goal of increasing reporting presents several 
complications.  Paradoxically, collecting too many reports can ultimately lead to an overall 
reduction in the frequency of future reports.  As discussed earlier, slow and insufficient feedback 
acts as a strong deterrent to reporting; soliciting more reports than the system can effectively 
investigate and address will cause the system to fail.   
Additionally, focusing on quantity over quality cultivates a poor culture of learning.  For 
instance, patient falls account for 20% of all of the incidents reported to the National Health 
Service in the UK.  Dr. Macrae argues that there must be more efficient ways to record the 
incidence of highly common events, thereby allowing the reporting system to focus on more 
serious events.   
With the preoccupation with underreporting in the health care industry, it is interesting to 
note that aviation safety investigators are more concerned with over-reporting.93  With much of 
investigators’ work concerned with determining which incidents are most important, aviation 
experts recognize that too many reports can overwhelm the system and complicate efforts to 
identify and prioritize new or emerging risks.   
In this light, critics concern over underreporting (while still problematic) is not nearly as 
devastating to a reporting system as their loud objections might imply.  While, it is certainly 
important for incident reporting systems to collect enough data to detect emerging risks, it is not  
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TABLE 5.3. Problems Relating to the Mismatch Between Principles and Practices of Incident 
Reporting 
Key Principles in Other Safety-Critical 
Industries 
Common Practices within the Healthcare 
Industry 
Focus  on  reporting  that  provides  serious,  
specific  insights    
Encourages  broad  reporting  of  any  and  all  
incidents,  regardless  of  relation  to  safety  
goals    
Avoid  overwhelming  the  reporting  system  to  
ensure  that  reported  incidents  can  be  
thoroughly  reviewed  
Celebrate  higher  numbers  of  incident  reports;;  
goal  is  increasing  reporting  rates    
Use  incident  reports  to  identify  and  prioritize  
significant  or  emerging  risks      
Quantify,  count,  and  chart  different  
categories  of  incident  reports  to  monitor  
performance  trends  
Harness  the  social  processes  of  reporting  to  
increase  awareness  and  reporting  of  current  
risks  
Aim  to  increase  reporting  to  address  
perceived  epidemiological  or  statistical  
biases  in  reported  data  
Expect  reports  to  be  inaccurate  and  
incomplete;;  focus  on  investigation  as  primary  
means  of  obtaining  complete  picture  
Improve  accuracy  of  incident  reports  through  
more  comprehensive  data  collection  process  
Apply  pragmatic  incident  taxonomies  that  
support  basic  analysis,  improvement  action  
and  retrospective  search  
Expect  incident  taxonomies  to  accurately  
explain  and  map  complex  realities  
Ensure  incident  reporting  systems  are  
managed  and  coordinated  by  an  operationally  
independent  group  
Incidents  reported  to  direct  supervisors  or  
other  operational  managers  within  
organization  
Reporting  constitutes  one  component  of  
broad  range  of  conversations  and  activities  
focuses  on  safety  and  risk  
Incident  reporting  represents  the  most  visible  
safety  activity  for  many  organizations    
Use  incident  reports  to  identify  and  prioritize  
significant  or  emerging  risks      
Quantify,  count,  and  chart  different  
categories  of  incident  reports  to  monitor  
performance  trends  
Source: Adapted from Carl Macrae, “The Problem with Incident Reporting,” BMJ Quality and 
Safety, September 7, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjqs-2015-004405. 
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necessary (or, possibly, even prudent) to become too distracted with overall reporting rates.  
Instead, patient safety improvements will be realized by improving the infrastructures for 
investigation, learning, and sharing.   
Unfortunately, the majority of states and experts alike measure the success of current 
mandatory reporting systems based on how many reports those systems receive.  Charles 
Billings, the architect of the oft-cited Aviation Safety Reporting System points to three factors as 
being crucial for the system’s success: reporting must be safe, simple, and worthwhile.94  With 
this guiding framework, the following section examines the existing reporting systems.   
D. A Review of Existing Reporting Systems 
 After President Clinton failed to prompt the federal government to establish a nationwide, 
mandatory public error reporting system, he called on the states to implement mandatory 
reporting systems within three years (by 2003).95   If not all 50 states adopted a mandatory 
reporting system, federal officials were supposed to offer recommendations to ensure full 
participation.  Yet, more than a decade later, only twenty-six states and the District of Columbia 
operate some version of a mandatory error reporting systems to collect adverse event data.96  
Oregon has an event reporting system in place (making it the 28th system, overall), but it is a 
voluntary system.  Further, it is important to note that, due to Hurricane Harvey (as of June 1, 
2016), Texas facilities have been required to report any preventable adverse harm data.  Section 
418.016 of the Texas Government Code suspended all regulatory statutes that would prevent or 
hinder any necessary relief efforts.97  Accordingly, there is very little data available—the 
reporting requirements were only in effect for 18 months before Texas declared a state of 
disaster.  Thus, in effect, only 26 states and the District of Columbia are currently enforcing a 
mandatory reporting requirement. 
 220 
Following the publication of the IOM Report and President Clinton’s urging, the number 
of states with adverse event reporting systems has only marginally increased.  For comparison, 
there were 15 state adverse event reporting systems in 2000.  Worse, this number has barely risen 
since 2007.  In 2007, 27 states had incident reporting systems.  Between 2007 and 2015, one 
state allowed their system to lapse due to a sunset clause (Wyoming) and two implemented 
systems (New Hampshire and Texas).  With a decade of heightened focus on patient safety, the 
United States only saw a net gain of one state adding a reporting system.  To date, the federal 
government still has not stepped in to provide a mechanism to require reporting in the twenty-
two states that have no system.   
 On an encouraging note, the participating states have made great process in standardizing 
reports, improving follow-up, and expanding the scope of facilities.  The National Quality Forum 
(NQF) was instrumental in standardizing reporting.  Fifteen (15) states have either adopted or 
adapted the NFQ’s list of serious reportable events.  Additionally, advancements in reporting 
mechanisms has allowed state systems to streamline and simplify the reporting process.  Indeed, 
in 2000, only one state was cable of accepting electronic reports.  As of 2014, however, at least 
twenty-two (2) systems could receive data electronically.98  With evidence that electronic 
reporting improves the accuracy and frequency of error reports,99 this is certainly good news.  
Finally, as the IOM intended, most state systems have expanded to gather data from a number of 
different health care facilities.  Of the 28 existing state reporting systems, all include hospitals as 
reporting institutions.100   Few, however, only require reports from hospitals (California, 
Georgia, Maryland, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Vermont)—with other states choosing to also solicit 
reports from one or more other facilities (e.g., surgical centers, long-term care centers, home care 
providers, abortion clinics, birthing centers, substance abuse facilities, and pharmacies).   
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Modest progress aside, however, there is still much left to be accomplished.  Though the 
existing reporting systems vary considerably, none have demonstrated marked gains in 
improving patient safety.  On one hand, it is difficult to measure the impact of a reporting 
system—there is no obvious or reliable way to quantify errors or incidents that have been 
prevented.  Lacking a reliable way to defend their programs, states instead point to the ways that 
the systems have increased open communication about patient safety, enabled some level of 
internal trending, and guided training to bring about heightened awareness to patient safety 
issues.101  To this end, generally, experts agree that there are seven critical characteristics for a 
successful reporting system, which are listed in table 5.4.    
In the states that have implemented a mandatory reporting system, the information is 
often protected from public disclosure.  While it is important to maintain patient confidentiality 
TABLE 5.4. Characteristics of Successful Reporting Systems  
Characteristic Explanation 
Nonpunitive   Reporters  do  not  need  to  fear  retaliation  or  punishment      
Confidential   All  information  regarding  the  patient,  reporter,  and  institution  are  kept  private  
Independent   The  program  is  organizationally  external  and  independent    
Expert  Analysis   Experts  who  can  understand  the  circumstances  and  underlying  system  causes  evaluate  the  reports    
Timely     Reports  are  analyzed  within  a  reasonable  timeframe;;  and  feedback  is  rapidly  disseminated  to  key  stakeholders  
Systems-­Oriented     Recommendations  focus  on  changes  to  systems  and  processes—not  individual  performance    
Responsive      
The  agency  managing  the  reporting  system  has  the  capacity  to  
disseminate  recommendation;;  which  participating  institutions  will  
readily  implement    
Source: Adapted from Lucian Leape, “Reporting of Adverse Events,” New England Journal 
of Medicine 347, no. 20 (2002) 1634-1636. 
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and legal protections for individual providers (see table 5.4), this does not help to realize the 
IOM's intended aim of accountability.102  Despite the IOM call, however, accountability does not 
require public disclosure.  At the same time, it does demand reasonable oversight.103  To foster 
public trust, some amount of data (even minimal) would need to be publicly reported as evidence 
demonstrating that actions are being taken to improve patient safety.  Unfortunately, when 
reporting does occur, most state statutes seem to utilize reporting as a means to investigate 
infractions and regulate the practice of medicine—much to the chagrin of providers and hospitals 
alike.  Even in states that intended for the information to be used to improve safety and 
contribute to the development of 'best practices,' overworked and underfunded receiving 
agencies are rarely able to provide much support.  These limitations raise concerns with respect 
to the goals of reporting.   
To increase transparency, the IOM called for public reporting.  Theoretically, this data 
can be used to encourage institutions to devote more resources to patient safety (as a means of 
avoiding public exposure).  It can also promote learning, depending on the availability and breath 
of data available.  Generally, states will report either facility-specific data, aggregate data, both, 
or none.  As of 2015, the distribution was as follows:104 
•   Fifteen states and the District of Columbia only release public reports with 
aggregate data:  
o   California, the District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Utah, Vermont, and Washington 
•   Three states release reports with facility-specific data: 
o   Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts 
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•   Four states issue both aggregate and facility-specific reports: 
o   Colorado, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Texas105 
•   Five states do not report any data to the public: 
o   Georgia, Illinois, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee 
Additionally, three of the five states that do not publicly report data (Georgia, South Carolina, 
and South Dakota) will provide incident-specific information upon request.  In almost all cases, 
however, the publicly reported facility-specific and aggregate data is far too limited to yield 
significant research.  Indeed, most often, the data simply identifies the number of incidents 
throughout the state (with or without specifying the facility).   
 Take, Oregon, for instance—arguably the state with the greatest emphasis on a primary 
goal of improving patient safety (as opposed to accountability).  In 2004, the legislature created 
the Oregon Patient Safety Commission (OPSC)—a semi-independent state agency to advance 
and support patient safety.106  In establishing the OPSC, Oregon sought to create a non-punitive 
haven for the collection of patient safety data in order to identify and share best practices to 
change the climate of patient safety.107  The OPSC manages and oversees the operation of the 
Patient Safety Reporting Program (PSRP), a voluntary reporting system that provides facilities 
with complete confidentiality.  The system is designed for organizations to voluntarily submit 
incident reports to PSRP, along with any strategies it developed for mitigating similar harm in 
the future.  The OPSC then analyzes and disseminates that information.  In 2017, the system 
received 453 adverse event reports.108  The OPSC then publishes an annual report with aggregate 
data about these events.  Though the OPSC states that it is committed to sharing what it learns to 
make healthcare safer, there is no indication that it will share actual data—de-identified or not.  
Instead, this promise appears to be alluding to its own work in analyzing and sharing its findings 
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through the publication of an annual report.  It is unclear how effectively hospitals could 
implement improvements based on the level of detail available.  
 For example, in addressing fall events, the 2017 Annual Report provides information 
about the statistics, the leading risk factors, pre-fall activities, patient goals (i.e., the reason the 
patient got up), and physical environments.109  To that end, in 2017 there were 45 reports of fall 
events.  Thirty-four falls (76%) resulted in physical injury.  Presumably, these injuries could 
have been prevented.  Yet, in thirty instances (83%) the patient was already identified as being at 
risk for falling, and nine falls occurred while the patient was assisted.  Most of these falls 
occurred while the patient was performing or attempting to perform a routine activity: toilet-
related (24%), transferring to or from bed, wheelchair, etc. without assistance (13%), dressing or 
undressing (11%), and walking (9%).  Loss of balance or footing was the most common physical 
cause, accounting for nineteen cases (42%).  This information clearly seems to point to 
deficiencies within the system, however, it does little to guide improvement efforts.  At no point 
in the fifty-six-page annual report does the OPSC offer any insight into how to reduce or limit 
patient falls.  The only obvious recommendation directs organizations to prevent patient harm by 
focusing on identifying root causes and system-level contributing factors in order to develop 
system-level action plans.  This same advice is echoed on the OPSC website.110  In a news 
update, the OPSC acknowledges that healthcare organizations are struggling to prevent falls.  
OPSC Patient Safety consultant Lynn Guiducci theorizes that part of the problem is that 
organizations are stopping short of determining the actual cause of falls.  Rather than look past 
the initial finding (e.g., patient did not wait for assistance), organizations need to investigate the 
system-level factors.  The OPSC does not identify these factors, but rather advises organizations 
(again) to conduct a more thorough root cause analysis.   
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TABLE 5.5. Overview of State Reporting Systems 
 
TABLE 5.5. Overview of State Reporting Systems  
 Agency Receiving Reports Purpose of Receiving Reports  
 Dept. of 
Health 
Other Sate 
Dept. 
State 
agency for 
Pt. Safety 
Regulate 
Field 
Investigate & 
publicize 
Analyze & 
develop 
best 
practices 
Aggregate 
data for 
research 
California !    !   
Colorado !    !   
Connecticut !    !   
D.C.        
Florida  !   !   
Georgia   !      
Illinois !       
Indiana !    !   
Kansas !    !   
Maine !       
Maryland !    !   
Massachusetts !     !  
Minnesota !    ! !  
Nevada !     !  
New Hampshire !   !  !  
New Jersey !       
New York !     ! !✝ 
Ohio !       
Oregon   !     
Pennsylvania   !  ! !  
Rhode Island !   !    
South Carolina !   !    
South Dakota        
Tennessee !     !  
Texas !   !    
Utah !       
Vermont !       
Washington !   !    
Wyoming§ !    !   
✝ New York data is only available upon request to facilities, not the general public.  
§ Wyoming system had a sunset clause and has expired.   
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In this light, while Oregon has seemingly collected useful data to monitor rates of error, it is not 
utilizing that data to improve patient safety.  This is a common problem.  In fact, as detailed in 
table 5.5, only New York aggregates the data into a database to encourage research.  Not 
surprisingly, many healthcare providers complain about the lack of perceived benefit.     
 Pennsylvania is unique.  It was the first state to pass legislation, and it is the first and only 
state to require mandatory reporting of both serious adverse events and near misses.111  It 
established the Patient Safety Authority (a semi-independent agency) to receive, evaluate, and 
recommend solutions to facilities for improving safety practices.  More than perhaps any other 
state, Pennsylvania is committed to sharing feedback to improve safety.  It publishes a peer-
reviewed quarterly journal, the Patient Safety Advisory, to offer clinical guidance to improve 
patient safety using de-identified information about actual events that occurred across the 
state.112  Not only does Pennsylvania also offer statewide training to thousands of providers 
annually, it takes seriously its own obligation to ensure the quality its reporting system and 
improvement efforts.  It is one of only three states that conducts formal evaluations, surveying 
facilities every year.  In addition to seeking feedback about the ease of using its reporting system, 
Pennsylvania also solicits information about how often and to what extent facilities have 
implemented the suggestions it published in the Patient Safety Advisory.  And, to a certain 
degree, Pennsylvania has achieved noteworthy success.113  In responding to a survey, patient 
safety officers reported that their health care organization had implemented more than 500 
changes in response to published Patient Safety Advisories.  These initiatives ranged from 
utilizing color-coded wristbands to note important patient information, forming a skin integrity 
task force, restricting the use of Propofol to the anesthesia department, and limiting the use of 
verbal orders.   
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However, even the robust Pennsylvania Patient Reporting System PA-PSRS (pronounced 
PAY-sirs), with its annual $5 million budget, struggles to realize marked improvements in safety.  
For instance, in 2012, the Authority offered 21 recommendations to reduce or eliminate wrong-
site surgery (data shows that WSS events are reported at a rate of one event for week).  The 
Authority also sought out individual facilities that were having continued problems to develop 
and implement programs to provide education, tools, technical assistance, resources and 
interactive forums.  Unfortunately, the numbers at the close of the first two quarters (July to 
September and October to December) of the 2013-2014 academic year are already higher than 
the previous year (20 WWS reports as compared with 17 in 2012-2013).114  
In part, these shortcomings can be attributed to two primary obstacles: limited data sets 
and insufficient organizational participation (due to lack of investment or motivation).   One 
major benefit to a nationwide (or even a smaller, but still large-scale) collaborative system is that 
it allows for organizations to learn from patient safety events that cause significant harm, but 
happen relatively infrequently at any single institution.  The incidence of such a tragic event at 
one hospital is too limited for organizations to glean meaningful insights and implement 
successful patient safety improvements.  By collaborating as a group invested in a common goal, 
however, organizations can share their findings to identify important systemic causes and 
promulgate best practices to avoid similar harms.   
In examining hospitals’ use of state-mandated reporting systems, one study confirmed 
that providers only gather mandatory reporting data to satisfy their legal obligation—they do not 
view the time as an opportunity to investigate or reduce patient safety risks.115  In their view, the 
reporting system offered no additional value.  Additionally, many hospital respondents 
complained about the way that reporting requirements can drain resources.116  Due to 
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requirements, this is exacerbated by needing to submit duplicitous reports regarding the same 
events to both the state agency and JCAHO.  By comparison, more health care personnel find 
value in JCAHO Sentinel Event Alerts: 
JCAHO alerts are valuable because they put together a panel of experts who ask hospitals 
for risk reduction strategies and review the literature for other strategies and then 
distribute this information to hospitals. This is very helpful and I believe this was the 
original intent of NYPORTS but I haven’t seen anything like this yet. You read about 
best practices in the paper before you hear about them from NYPORTS. There would 
certainly be more of a benefit of this system if the state shared best practices from the 
repository of information available to them.117  
Though respondents acknowledge that NYPORTS does publish newsletters with the same 
purported goal as the JCAHO sentinel alerts, the state delayed so long in disseminating the 
information that it lost all value: 
When the state gets information on a serious case they should immediately sent out a 
prevention strategy to all hospitals in the state. The newsletter alerts are not as good as 
they can be and are often slow to be released. In the case of a chemotherapy overdose that 
happened in 1995, the state did not issue an alert until 2001. That is pathetic.118  
This is an astounding confirmation that the current reporting systems are failing the orange wire 
test.  
 E. Conclusion 
  As the IOM acknowledged, an error-reporting program that does not foster 
accountability will be ineffectual.  Though Pennsylvania's regulation has successfully tackled the 
issue of funding and support, it still fails to demonstrate substantial gains.  Why?  This 
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dissertation argues that it has failed because without an incentive to seriously intervene to reduce 
preventable harm, facilities and providers do not take the problem seriously.  Although the rise 
of safety culture will likely encourage more frequent reporting, even the most proficient state 
statutes have only built-in incentives (or disincentives) to discourage underreporting.119  While 
underreporting is a serious problem for legislatures to address, it is not the only obstacle that 
states must overcome in order to demonstrate marked gains towards improving patient safety.  
More than healthy reporting numbers, states must develop systems that are adequately funded 
and organized to incentivize and demand that hospitals act to reduce future incidents.  Most 
programs attempt to achieve these results by requiring hospitals to conduct RCA and develop 
action plans.  Though RCA and action plans are likely to produce safer systems, these efforts fail 
to capitalize on the greatest resource states have available: data about the most prevalent and 
common safety incidents.  Hospitals need to be held accountable to implementing system-level 
remedies to common problems, but these organizations cannot fix what they are uninformed 
about.  Feedback needs to be a clear and driving priority.  In addition, the government must enact 
more broad sweeping legislation that incentivizes health care organizations to assume greater 
accountability in meeting patient safety improvement goals.  
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CHAPTER SIX: AN ETHICAL MODEL FOR CENTRALIZED MEDICAL ERROR 
REPORTING 
 
We have to create an environment in which we learn from failure.  This cannot be 
achieved in an environment of punishment or fear of legal prosecution for doctors, nurses 
and other caregivers who step forward after an unfortunate mistake is made.1 
 
 —statement of Stanton Smullens, AHA spokesman 
 
 
A. The Structure for Centralized Reporting 
In the preceding chapters, this dissertation has revealed the many ways that the current 
efforts to improve patient safety—a formidable and serious epidemic claiming the lives of 
hundreds of thousands of patients—are failing.  Regrettably, this is the same conclusion that the 
Institute of Medicine published in 1999.  It is tragic that the many attempts to address this 
problem have been so badly floundered.  Though the healthcare industry is astounding complex, 
it is inexcusable that hospitals have, nevertheless, been permitted to skirt their ethical 
responsibility to protect patients from harm.  The level of complexity, as formidable it may be, 
does not justify the lack of progress.  Ironically, the Institute of Medicine report, To Err is 
Human, is at least partially to blame.  
In an attempt to prioritize transparency and accountability, the Institute of Medicine 
advanced a principled recommendation to implement a two-tiered reporting structure.  In an 
attempt to recreate the successes of the error-reduction in the aviation industry, the IOM report 
called for a national, mandatory reporting system designed to threaten healthcare organizations 
into making greater investments in patient safety.  Despite the IOM’s best intentions, such a 
hostile and punitive approach is simply not pragmatic.  Perhaps with the appropriate enforcement 
means, the United States could have succeeded in developing such a system (indeed, similar to 
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the Japanese approach discussed in chapter five).  Yet, as it currently stands, a reporting system 
cannot succeed without robust and voluntary reporting.  Even if Congress had managed to pass 
legislation to create the mandatory system recommended by the IOM report, it would have 
failed—not only because providers will not report to a system that stands to harm them, but also 
because the complexity of the healthcare system requires meaningful participation from hospitals 
and providers.  Indeed, harm is so easily concealed given the complexities and uncertainties 
involved in patient care.  Without disclosure, most families never consider the possibility of 
iatrogenic harm.  
In this way, the IOM report was right in understanding that the system would need to 
mandate that hospitals participate; however, it was wrong to believe that the way to entice that 
participation was to threaten hospitals to embarrass them by publicly exposing their 
shortcomings.  In the same was that organizational ethics helps to establish moral agency to hold 
institutions accountable, it similarly recognizes that there are distinctions separating individual 
and organizational responsibility.  More importantly, if the patient safety movement is to be 
respected, its central messaging regarding the importance of understanding organizational 
attributes must be heeded.  Blame offers no solutions, and it is not productive to simply transfer 
the same policy of aggressive litigation and blame that harm individual providers to the 
organizations in which those providers work.   
Accountability is of paramount importance, yes.  But, at the same time, it is crucial to 
recognize that complex organizations do not operate with the same clarity of direction as 
individuals.  These organizations must be held accountable, but in the same way that the legal 
system imposes varying degrees of punishments, the consequences healthcare organizations face 
for patient safety incidents should be applied proportionately.  Our nation’s understanding of 
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justice treats accidental crimes as lesser offenses when compared to reckless or intentional 
wrongdoing—culpability is not fixed.  In this light, unrestrained blame will not create a safer 
healthcare system.   
Even if its inadvertent, organizations will discourage providers from reporting to a 
system that carries the threat of public shaming and punitive actions.  Absent overt pressure, 
providers, as contractors who are dependent on the continued operation and profitability of 
hospitals, will recognize that their job security is more closely tied to the reputation and financial 
standing of hospital than to the incidence of patient safety events.   
From an ethical perspective, it is more important to protect potential patients than it is to 
enforce moral absolutism.  As tempting as it is to want to vilify hospital leaders, overhauling the 
system to improve patient safety will require a collaborative effort. To accomplish this goal, this 
dissertation has identified five main criteria for a successful system:  
1)   Incentivize safety efforts  
2)   Protect providers and institutions from unfair punitive measures  
3)   Integrate the reporting mechanism within existing systems to streamline reporting 
4)   Ensure reporting mandates are clear and easy to interpret 
5)   Provide meaningful feedback to encourage continued reporting 
In other words, as Charles Billings contended, the system must be safe, simple, and worthwhile.2   
1. Incentivizing Safety 
A successful mandatory error reporting system must provide a comprehensive solution 
that is both practical and effective.  Without incentive to seriously address medical error, 
healthcare providers are not fighting to be at the forefront of patient safety efforts.  The fact that 
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patient safety initiatives must compete for resources with other priorities makes the need to build 
a business case even more important.  As JCAHO President Dennis O'Leary explains: 
With operational resources already strained in many organizations, potential investments 
in patient safety compete every day against other basic needs such as staff recruitment, 
maintenance of the physical plant, clinical technology upgrades simply to meet the 
standard of care and other investments to respond to community needs. Further, 
investments in patient safety—while a moral obligation—usually provide financial 
benefits to payors and purchasers rather than to the organization [a point not lost on 
stressed organization leaders].3  
Interestingly, this problem is compounded by the failure to hold hospital chief executive officers 
(CEOs) accountable for performance metrics.  It is obvious that CEOs shape the priorities and 
performance of their organizations.  For instance, senior leaders can construct the necessary 
organizational culture by supporting and expecting learning and innovation, valuing and 
empowering staff, focusing on patients, rewarding collaboration and teamwork, and remaining 
flexible.4  Given this incredibly important role, it is disturbing that a 2014 study could not find 
any connection between hospital quality and CEO compensation.5  Despite earning an average 
salary of $595,781 (in 2009), researchers could not find any link between CEO pay and hospitals' 
financial performance, quality of care, patient outcomes (such as risk-adjusted mortality rates 
and readmission rates), or community benefit.  In fact, hospitals with better mortality rates 
actually paid their CEOs $4667 less than poor performers.  Oddly enough, patient satisfaction 
scores—the most subjective quality measures—were the only quality metric that had any 
association to compensation.  Hospitals with higher satisfaction scores compensated CEOs 
$51,706 more than hospitals with lower scores (95% CI, 15,166 to 88,247).  This disconnect 
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clearly indicates that it is critical to encourage systems improvements by persuading hospital 
leadership that investing in patient safety is good business.  
 Three general mechanisms can stimulate hospitals to improve patient safety: 
professionalism (e.g., values, norms, and educational activities), regulation, and markets.  Of 
these potential influences, research shows that hospitals have primarily designed patient-safety 
initiatives in response to quasi-regulatory requirements, namely the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations6—now simply called, The Joint Commission.7   
The Joint Commission is a private-sector, non-profit organization that operates 
accreditation programs for healthcare organizations.8  Although The Joint Commission 
accreditation is not an absolute requirement in order to operate a hospital, the standard is 
recognized nationwide as a symbol of quality and safety in health care.9  Additionally, healthcare 
organizations can utilize The Joint Commission accreditation as a method to efficiently 
demonstrate compliance with federal regulations.  In order for a healthcare organization to be 
eligible to receive federal funds from the Medicare and Medicaid programs, it must satisfy 
certain Conditions of Participation (CoPs).10  Typically, the certification is granted based upon a 
survey by a state agency.  However, hospitals and other healthcare organizations with The Joint 
Commission accreditation are deemed to meet the CoPs.  Indeed, as soon as Medicare was 
founded, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) granted the Joint Commission a 
deeming authority for compliance with the CMS Conditions of Participation.  In this way, the 
governmental public programs leverages federal funding eligibility to give the Joint Commission 
inspections their force.  Consequently, approximately 77% of hospitals within the United States 
are currently accredited through The Joint Commission.11  Therefore, it is not surprising that 
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when The Joint Commission began enforcing patient safety policies and requirements, hospitals 
responded.   
While this is a noteworthy achievement, it has helped to dramatically increase the amount 
of patient-safety initiatives without providing meaningful guidance—or evidence, for that 
matter—for systemic improvement.  Even worse, because The Joint Commission requirements 
do not recommend specific initiatives and there are no superseding federal regulations, some 
experts speculate that the majority of hospitals fumble to implement ineffective safety initiatives 
simply to meet accreditation standards.12     
Normally, The Joint Commission policies mandate certain organizational outcomes (e.g., 
improve patient identification) without always identifying the specific structures and processes 
that hospitals should use to achieve them.  Prior to the development of the National Patient 
Safety Goals (NPSG) The Joint Commission developed two major patient safety requirements.  
In 1996, The Joint Commission implemented a Sentinel Events Policy, which required accredited 
organizations to identify and respond to any patient safety event that results in death, permanent 
harm, or severe temporary harm.13  The Joint Commission referred to these as sentinel events 
because of the way that these incidents signal the need for immediate investigation and response.  
The Joint Commission Sentinel Events Policy has four stated goals: to positively impact patient 
care by preventing unintended harm, to focus on understanding the factors that contributed to a 
sentinel event in order to prevent similar events from recurring in the future, to increase general 
knowledge about patient safety events, and to maintain and earn public confidence that patient 
safety is a major priority within healthcare institutions.14   
Following the publication of the IOM report, The Joint Commission also implemented an 
entire new set of Patient Safety Standards.  The original set of standards required hospitals to 
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implement patient-safety programs, prevent medical error through analysis, and inform patients 
of healthcare outcomes, including errors.15  Responding to criticism that the patient safety 
standards were not substantial enough to bring about fundamental change in institutional 
practice, The Joint Commission formed an advisory group to develop a set of National Patient 
Safety Goals.  The first set of goals, as detailed in table 6.1, became effective January 1, 2003.16   
TABLE 6.1. Joint Commission Patient-Safety Goals, 2003-2019 
Joint Commission National Patient Safety Goals Disposition 
1 Improve accuracy of patient identification 2003 
2 Improve effectiveness of communication among caregivers 2003 
3 Improve the safety of using medications 2003 
4 Eliminate wrong-site, wrong-patient, and wrong–procedure surgery 2003, Retired 2004 
5 Improve the safety of infusion pumps 2003, Retired 2006 
6 Improve the effectiveness of clinical alarm systems Reduce the harm associated with clinical alarm systems 
2003, Retired 2005, 
Revived 2014 
7 Reduce the risk of healthcare-associated infections 2004 
8 Accurately and complete reconcile medications across the continuum of care 
2005, Moved to Goal 3 in 
2011 
9 Reduce the risk of patient harm resulting from falls 2005, MTS 2010 
10 Reduce the risk of influenza and pneumococcal disease in older adults 2006, NA 
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11 Reduce the risk of surgical fires  2006, NA Retired 2010 
12 Implementation of applicable NPSG and associated requirements  2006, NA 
13 Encourage the active involvement of patients and their families in the patient’s care as a patient safety strategy   
2006; 2007 
MTS 2010 
14 Prevent health care-associated pressure ulcers 2006, NA 
15 The organization identifies safety risks inherent in its patient population 2007 
16 Boost response time when a patient's condition is worsening. 2008, MTS 2010 
UP 
Conduct a pre-procedure verification process 
Mark the procedure site 
Perform a time-out immediately prior to the procedure 
2009 
MTS = Moved to Standards  
NA = Not a goal that applied to hospitals 
 
 
In 2004, The Joint Commission added a seventh goal: reduce the risk of healthcare-acquired 
infections.  National Patient Safety Goal four (4) was superseded by the mandatory enforcement 
of The Joint Commission’s Universal Protocol for Preventing Wrong Site, Wrong Procedure, 
Wrong Person Surgery in July 2004.17  Compliance with universal protocol is required for 
hospitals to maintain their accreditation.  Additionally, National Patient Safety Goal six (6) was 
incorporated into The Joint Commission Environment of Care Standards.  The Joint Commission 
also added two new requirements: accurately and complete reconcile medications across the 
continuum of care and reduce the risk of patient harm resulting from falls. To accomplish NPSG 
eight (8), The Joint Commission directed hospitals to develop a process for documenting a 
complete list of patient medications when the patient is admitted and ensure that the list is 
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satisfactorily communicated to all providers involved in the patient’s care.  NPSG nine (9) tasks 
organizations with monitoring and assessing each patient’s risk for failing in order to attempt to 
take necessary precautions to prevent falls.  The 2006 National Patient Safety Goals retired goal 
five (5), which was incorporated into The Joint Commission Environment of Care Standards.  In 
2007, The Joint Commission added one relevant NPSG: the organization identifies safety risks 
inherent in its patient population.18  The NPSG also added one new goal in 2008, requiring 
hospitals to respond more quickly to changes in a patient’s condition.19  In 2010, the Joint 
Commission started to streamline and shorten its list of NPSG.20  Ultimately, as of its 2019 
revision, the NPSG have been consolidated into seven primary goals: (#1) identify patients 
correctly, (#2) improve staff communication, (#3) use medicines safely, (#6) use alarms safely, 
(#7) prevent infection, (#15) identify patient safety risks, and (UP) prevent mistakes in surgery.  
 While implementing The Joint Commission-related-patient-safety initiatives were a 
major focal point for hospitals, hospital respondents noted the challenge of maintaining progress 
in these areas.21 Overall, non-hospital respondents were skeptical that hospitals had made any 
major progress toward improving safety—a concern that seems to be confirmed by recent 
research regarding the sustained incidence of medical harm.  
 Additionally, despite this strong incentive to allocate finances towards fulfilling The Joint 
Commission requirements, in a 2004 study, 92% of hospitals reported that they did not have a 
budget line item for patient safety.22  On average, hospitals reported a $1.9 million budget (with 
ranges from $50,000 to $15 million), with only 58% of hospitals expecting an increase. 
Furthermore, while the risk of not complying with The Joint Commission’s patient safety 
policies provides a clear incentive and enforcement mechanism for accountability (i.e., loss of 
accreditation status) The Joint Commission does not require demonstrable progress, only that 
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hospitals implement initiatives.  Thus, even when hospitals do devote money to implement the 
required initiatives, there is no guarantee that The Joint Commission compliance translates into 
safer health care.23  While The Joint Commission requirements are motivating spending (and 
attention), the results are insufficient.  
Given the lack of regulation and societal pressures, it is also painfully evident that, in 
order to realize progress, it is important to provide organizations with a more compelling 
business case for patient safety.  This challenge moving forward will be providing a better basis 
for such a case.  While legal reforms are not likely to be the only solution, regulation can be an 
integral part of the resolution—should the public succeed in applying political pressure within 
their local or federal government. This means that the system must carefully balance competing 
stakeholders: it must be capable of evoking change through public outcry (when necessary), 
while still providing some sort of institutional reward.  
 The difficulty is identifying ways to develop a better basis for healthcare organizations to 
appreciate the value of patient safety.  The most obvious starting point is to focus on market 
forces.  Consumers have a surprisingly persuasive voice in this regard—remember that patient 
satisfaction is the only quality metric that influences CEO pay.  The obstacle is persuading 
consumers to take advantage of their collective voice.  One of the most promising incentives is to 
continue to make the public aware of the problem.  To this end, it is critical for reform efforts to 
not to lose sight of transparency and accountability.  At the same time, the threat of public shame 
must be appropriately scaled.   
A promising compromise would only use public reporting as a secondary measure to 
penalize non-compliance.  First, the central agency would provide hospitals with time statutes to 
implement new programs and demonstrate compliance.  These programs and initiatives would be 
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guided and informed by the collected reporting data.  The incentive extended to hospitals for 
their prompt and earnest compliance is anonymity—comply in good faith within a reasonable 
time-frame and there is no benefit to publicizing any investigatory findings.  The moral 
foundation for this approach recognizes that many in hospital leadership and administration are 
not intentionally allowing patient harm to proliferate.  Instead, given the complexities of the 
system, most are baffled at what steps to take to prevent patient safety incidents.   
Though it would be preferable to hospitals to prioritize efforts on their own, part of the 
usefulness of a nationwide system is that it allows analysts to access data concerning 
exceptional, but rare instances of severe harm.  Independently, a single hospital would be hard-
pressed to institute proactive measures for these sorts of instances—instead, improvements 
would be mostly reactionary to prevent similar harm after an accident occurred.  Thus, the 
reporting mechanism offers patient safety insights that hospitals would otherwise not uncover 
until after harm already occurred.   
Indeed, some of the most useful lessons from reporting systems are uncovered by 
aggregating uncommon cases across a large sample of hospitals.  For instance, through aggregate 
data spanning 132 events, Colorado learned that 100% of wrong-site surgical events involved a 
communication failure, and 72% did not perform a time-out before the procedure.24  Because of 
the irregularity of these more uncommon events, it took six (6) years and 5,927 physicians to 
identify these vulnerabilities.  A single hospital would never be able to collect enough data to 
replicate that learning.  Viewing the situation in this way, it is clear that it is ethically appropriate 
to allow hospitals the opportunity to utilize new knowledge to improve before penalizing them 
for their negligence.   
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With this in mind, it is useful to review incentive recommendations.  This dissertation 
recommends two primary incentives: economic leverage given the massive amount of federal 
monies hospitals rely on to survive, and confidentiality protections for healthcare organizations 
that are satisfactorily discharging their ethical obligation to fix system defects and improve 
patient safety. 
First, because evidence has continually demonstrated that The Joint Commission remains 
a primary driver in influencing hospitals’ approach to patient safety, it is fair to conclude that 
safeguarding accreditation status with The Joint Commission is an extremely effective incentive.  
This leaves the federal government with two options: collaborate with The Joint Commission to 
incentivize participation or circumvent The Joint Commission (but risk possibly lessening the 
influence and authority The Joint Commission currently wields).  Remember, hospitals are so 
highly motivated to maintain their accreditation status because accreditation with The Joint 
Commission is an eligibility requirement to receive federal monies.  In fact, Medicare funds 
account for approximately 40% of hospitals' revenue.25  This gives the federal government the 
opportunity to exert massive influence over hospital budgets and priorities.   
Second, the government needs to shore up confidentiality and peer review privileges 
applicable to any federal reporting system in order to credibly offer anonymity as an incentive 
for the hospitals and other healthcare organizations that are striving to improve patient safety in 
good faith.  Offering confidentiality is, admittedly, not a novel approach.  Plenty of mandatory 
state reporting systems already incorporate these protections and are not evidencing great 
successes.  The important distinction is that this recommendation attempts to combine the 
benefits of both types of systems (public and confidential; punitive and non-punitive) that are 
currently in use.   
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2. Protect Providers (and Hospitals) from Unfair Punitive Measures 
In order to preserve incentives, the system must have protections in place to protect 
providers.  Though the Institute of Medicine argued that “requests by providers for 
confidentiality and protection from liability seems inappropriate” in face of the public’s right to 
be informed about unsafe conditions,26 this contention fails to recognize how difficult it is for 
providers to improve safety—and how infrequently individuals are responsible for harm.   
Even efforts to prepare clinicians to offer more ethical care (a much less ambitious goal 
than creating safer healthcare) fall flat.  Consider the approach that Albert Jonsen, Mark Siegler, 
and William J. Winslade applied in publishing Clinical Ethics: A Practical Approach to Ethical 
Decision Making in Clinical Medicine.  The authors aspired to address the ethical issues that 
clinicians encounter in order to help clinicians practice improved clinical care. According to the 
authors, this comprehension is necessary because ethical issues (e.g., informed consent, candor, 
and end-of-life decision-making) are pervasive throughout research and clinical care.  In an 
attempt to parallel the normal diagnosis and treatment process that clinicians learn during their 
training, the authors offer a methodology to identify and analyze ethical questions that directly 
corresponds to the typical structure of a clinical case.  Specifically, their approach includes four 
components: medical indications, patient preferences, quality of life, and contextual features.  
Medical indications refer to diagnostic and therapeutic interventions, patient preferences 
consider the express choices of the patient or surrogate, quality of life examines the relative 
features of a patient’s life before and after possible interventions, and contextual features leaves 
space to reflect on broader settings, e.g., the family social, institutional, and financial 
considerations. 
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Unfortunately, like much of the (limited) formal training that clinicians receive, this book 
offers conclusory statements regarding ethical issues without offering comprehensive 
justifications.  Although the book aspires to equip providers to tackle ethical issues, it is a long-
winded—yet insufficient—summary of otherwise obvious ethical dilemmas.  It is not necessarily 
a bad book; it simply fails to accomplish its objective.  It seems that, perhaps, the authors did not 
choose an objective that was narrow enough to be managed in a single book.  With its 
incomplete analyses and perfunctory approach, the book did not fully address the range of ethical 
issues that clinicians face in practice.  In what may have been an attempt to incorporate too much 
information, the authors published a book that seems fragmented and inaccessible.  While the 
authors managed to succinctly review many topics and issues that will influence ethical decision-
making, it is unlikely to actually help clinicians practice improved care.  
Furthermore, the book did not offer many suggestions for how to address complex 
questions—which is truly when most practitioners will begin to struggle.  By not acknowledging 
this complexity and/or referring clinicians to discuss these cases with their ethics committee or 
consultants, the book enforces the notion that specific training or competencies are not necessary 
to address ethical issues in healthcare.  Indeed, the tone of the book may do a disservice when 
paired with the information if it sends the message that the introductory information offered 
within the pages provide all of the necessary competencies to ensure ethical decision-making in 
clinical practice.   
This attitude also pervades throughout the general medical community.  As a result, many 
individuals provide ethics consultations without any training.  This is precisely why the 
American Society of Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) assumed responsibility for the task of 
representing clinical ethicists, which includes the promulgation of guidelines to ensure quality of 
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care.27  The ASBH adopted and distributed the contribute of its final Task Force as its first 
edition of Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics Consultation, which it published in 1998.28  
One of the report’s four objectives was to define the nature and goals of HCEC, which included a 
determination of the most appropriate approach to HCEC.   
In addition to explaining the role of an ethics consultant, the ASBH report also developed 
a set of minimum competencies to respond to concerns that individuals participating in ethics 
consultations lacked the skills, knowledge, and attributes to perform competently.29  Indeed, 
many have expressed concern about the level of training and qualifications that the individuals 
providing ethics consults possess.30  Accordingly, the ASBH task force attempted to describe the 
requisite knowledge and skills to analyze the nature of the uncertainty and facilitate a 
consensus—the core features within the ethics facilitation model.  Essentially, the revised edition 
of the ASBH Core Competences separates the competencies into three sections: core skills, core 
knowledge, and personal traits.  Many believe that these core competencies are instrumental in 
professionalizing the field of health care ethics consultation, and that the cluster of competencies 
(specific skills, particular knowledge, and personal traits) combine to enhance the quality of the 
practice.31   
However, the response to the ASBH’s efforts is mixed.  Engelhardt harshly criticizes the 
Core Competencies for failing to recognize that ethics consultation is a social-historical 
construction, which follows a legal normativity.32  As such, Engelhardt questions the ASBH’s 
authority to even author the competencies.  As he points out, fewer than 10% of those providing 
ethic consultation—approximately 30,000 individuals—are ASBH members.33  Additionally, 
less than 4% of existing members offered feedback on the proposed document.  Thus, not only 
do the Core Competencies seem to represent an underwhelming minority of the membership of 
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ASBH itself, it is questionable whether the competencies are widely regarded outside of the 
organization.  Without credentialing or licensing requirements, ASBH publications are merely 
suggestions; and, given the remarkably low membership percentages, it is not even apparent that 
ASBH’s suggestions are strongly considered among individuals within the field.  Even worse, 
some argue that the Core Competencies report failed to address the central challenge in the 
ongoing debate about ethics consultation—characterize the role of an ethics consultant in a 
manner that would limit the practice to only those individuals with the requisite skills and 
knowledge.34 
It is clearly important to appropriately address all of these ethical questions that impact 
clinical care and practice.  In this respect, the ongoing efforts are beneficial.  If nothing else, 
encouraging clinicians to at least think about ethical concerns is a positive step in the right 
direction.  Unfortunately, many physicians treat mention of ethics as a potential threat and/or 
challenge to their own morality and professional stature.   
In this respect, the persistence of many of these ethical questions (ones with decades of 
scholarship and general consensus in terms of ethical resolutions) demonstrates that targeting 
individuals is not working.  This is why the Veteran Administration’s IntegratedEthics model is 
so innovative.  It is the first widely known attempt to consider ethics quality from a broader, 
comprehensive perspective; utilizing principles for organizational change that have proven 
success in other fields.  The effectiveness and efficiency of this type of systems approach, 
however, depends on an affirmation of moral duty and accountability.  The effort must move 
past traditional approaches to corporate ethics, which focus entirely on adherence to statutes and 
regulations (i.e., compliance).   
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For instance, central line-associated bloodstream infection (CLABSI) is one of the most 
deadly and costly hospital-acquired infections in the United States.  Pennsylvania has mandatory 
hospital-acquired infection (HAI) reporting regulations and was one of the first states to withhold 
hospital payments for HAI.  The intention was to reduce HAI, however, conversation during 
rounds tends to suggest that it created disincentives to aggressively pursue and report all 
infections.  It was clear from personal observations during rounds that the attending physicians 
were incredibly cognizant of the number of line infections.  At one point, after realizing that 
another patient had a line infection, the attending noted that infection would push the hospital 
above a certain number and would result in punitive measures.  Rather than improve safety, 
Pennsylvania inadvertently encouraged ICU staff not to check for line infections.  Specifically, 
residents were being taught not to run tests to check for line infections because they usually are 
not serious, and the hospital gets dinged for them.  In this way, efforts to enforce compliance 
continue to fail.  This is a perfect example of how incentives are remarkably unpredictable.  
Extrinsic incentives routinely conflict with other motivations.35  Benabou and Tirole 
advance a model that posits that individuals have a utility function that advances three main 
tenants.  The model contends that incentives will succeed to varying levels depending on 
individual preferences with respect to (1) the value of extrinsic rewards; (2) the extent to which 
they enjoy participating in a given activity; and (3) how greatly they care about the way that 
others view them.  In this way, incentives can have two effects: they either make the incentivized 
behavior seem more attractive, or they will accidentally trigger an indirect psychological effect.  
For instance, offering incentives for higher academic performance may inadvertently signal to 
the agent that the goal is particularly difficult or not worthwhile.   
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This is particularly relevant when considering pro-social behavior.  Gneezy and 
Rustichini conducted a study in 2000 that concluded that students who collected door-to-door 
donations for charity invested more effort when they were not compensated.  When offered a 
small compensation, the students exerted less effort.  Once compensation was introduced, the 
level of effort corresponded directly the amount of compensation.   In this light, extrinsic 
incentives crowd-out image motivation (e.g., wanting to be viewed as moral and altruistic).  This 
desire for social approval is a strong motivator.   
 The same inadvertent consequences result from efforts at disincentives.  In another study 
by Gneezy and Rustichini, a fine that intended to discourage parents from picking their children 
up late from daycare accidentally resulted in an increase in the number of late pick-ups.36  Prior 
to the institution of the fine, parents knew that the contract required them to pick up their child 
by a certain time but did not specify the penalty.  The fine that the daycare imposed was 
minimal: it only amounted to about $3.00.  The small amount inadvertently signaled to parents 
that arriving late was not that serious.  Even after removing the fine, the parents were more likely 
to arrive late to pick up their child.  Once the message is sent that being on time is only as 
important as a few dollars, removing the fine would not undo the effects.  
Rather than rely on punitive incentives, the system needs to encourage accountability 
(both organizational and individual) by candidly discussing ethical obligations.  The reporting 
system must harness the collective desire to garner social approval by encouraging providers 
(and the institutions they represent) to meaningfully engage in patient safety efforts.  This 
requires protecting those providers from a potential negative image as a consequence of 
participating.  Additionally, the corollary mandate is that ‘good’ work is publicly rewarded, 
yielding a positive image.  
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From a logistical standpoint, this requires addressing the patient safety work privilege.  
As briefly discussed in chapter five, the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act (PSQIA) 
endeavored to provide peer review protection to all patient safety information reported to a 
Patient Safety Organization.37  Congress intended for all hospitals to join a PSO.  The hospital 
would collect and analyze information related to any patient safety incidents as port of its Patient 
Safety Evaluation System.  That information would then be shared to a Network of Patient 
Safety Databases (NPSD)—a national, non-identifiable, aggregated patient safety event database.  
In this way, Congress attempted to provide a tool to resuscitate the peer review privilege.38  
Indeed, the Senate unanimously approved the PSQIA (the House proffered three 
dissenting votes) to address inadequate state peer review protections (among other reasons).  
Senate report 109-544 clearly stated: “State peer review protections are inadequate to allow the 
sharing of information to promote patient safety.”  With such a clear mandate, it is curious that 
the PSQIA has not succeeded in protecting patient safety work product (the PSQIA’s term for 
confidential peer review information concerning medical errors).   
The PSQIA defines “patient safety work product” (PWSP) as: 
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), …data, reports, records, memoranda, analyses 
(such as root cause analyses), or written or oral statements— 
(i) which— 
(I) are assembled or developed by a provider for reporting to a patient safety 
organization and are reported to a patient safety organization; or 
(II) are developed by a patient safety organization for the conduct of patient safety 
activities; 
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and which could result in improved patient safety, health care quality, or health care 
outcomes; or  
(ii) which identify or constitute the deliberations or analysis of, or identify the fact of 
reporting pursuant to, a patient safety evaluation system.39  
To date, dozens of defendants have sought to avail themselves of these protections—
nevertheless, no court has ruled that (in the context of a medical malpractice action) the PSQIA 
operates to protect peer review documents or statements.40  Tibbs v. Bunnell is possibly the most 
glaring example of the problem.41  The Tibbs court held 4-2 that the PSQIA created a narrow 
privilege that was circumvented by state law.42  According to their logic, because Kentucky law 
required hospitals to establish and maintain administrative reports (including incident reports) 
the PSES investigation and report were not privileged under the PSQIA.  
Tibbs involved a malpractice lawsuit resulting from the death of Luvetta Goff.43  Goff 
had died as the result of complications she suffered during an elective spine surgery while being 
treated at the University of Kentucky Hospital.  The Tibbs majority acknowledged Congress’s 
intent in enacting the PSQIA to encourage healthcare providers to share patient safety work 
product through PSO’s in an attempt to create an “enduring national system capable of studying, 
analyzing, disseminating and acting on events, solutions, and recommendations for the 
betterment of national patient safety.”44  The court even included the full purpose statement for 
the PSQIA as set out in the House of Representatives report:  
The IOM report offered several recommendations to improve patient safety and reduce 
medical error, including that Congress pass legislation to extend peer review protections 
to data related to patient safety and quality improvement that are developed and analyzed 
by health care organizations for internal use or shared with others solely for the purpose 
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of improving safety and quality. This bill's intended purpose is to encourage the reporting 
and analysis of medical errors and health care systems by providing peer review 
protection of information reported to patient safety organizations for the purposes of 
quality improvement and patient safety. These protections will facilitate an environment 
in which health care providers are able to discuss errors openly and learn from them. The 
protections apply to certain categories of documents and communications termed “patient 
safety work product” that are developed in connection with newly created patient safety 
organizations. This patient safety work product is considered privileged and, therefore, 
cannot be subject to disclosure....45 
Despite this, the majority determined that the plain language of the act itself excluded from 
protection as patient safety work product any information that meets the following exceptions: 
(B) Clarification: 
(i) Information described in subparagraph (A) does not include a patient’s medical 
record, billing and discharge information, or any other patient or provider record.  
(ii) Information described in subparagraph (A) does not include information that is 
collected, maintained, or developed separately, or exists separately, from a patient safety 
evaluation system. Such separate information or a copy thereof reported to a patient 
safety organization shall not by reason of its reporting be considered patient safety work 
product. 
(iii) Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit— 
(I) the discovery or admissibility of information described in this subparagraph in a 
criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding;  
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(II) the reporting of information described in this subparagraph to a Federal, State, or 
local governmental agency for public health surveillance, investigation, or other 
public health purposes or health oversight purposes; or 
(III) a provider’s recordkeeping obligation with respect to information described in 
this subparagraph under Federal, State, or local law.  
42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-21(7)(B) (emphasis added).46 
 
Based on that language, the Tibbs court held that because the PSQIA intended to establish an 
entirely separate system, “to the extent that information normally contained in such state-
mandated incident reports is intermingled with other material property privileged under the Act” 
the information is not protected.47  A scathing dissent argued that the majority holding clearly 
frustrates the Act’s purpose, while simultaneously taking issue with the implication that strictly 
protecting patient safety work product requires denying Kentucky information required pursuant 
to its regulatory duties.48  The dissent points out that the Senate Report even addressed this 
conflict, explaining: 
 ‘[P]rotecting data in a reporting system… does not mean that the plaintiff in a lawsuit 
could not try to obtain such information through other avenues if it is important in 
securing redress for harm, it just means that the plaintiff would not be assisted by the 
present of a reporting system designed specifically for other purposes beneficial to 
society.’ Importantly, the bill does not alter existing rights or remedies available to 
injured patients.  Laws that provide greater confidentiality or privilege protections are 
also not affected by this legislation.49  
The dissent explains that the reporting system should have no bearing on a medical malpractice 
claim.  In an effort to ensure that submitting data to a patient safety evaluation system (e.g., to a 
 257 
PSO) does not shield that information from state or other mandated reporting obligations, the 
majority failed to appreciate that it was allowing the patient safety information to be exposed to 
state law liabilities—it was circumventing the normal procedural channels and allowing the 
plaintiff to invade the patient safety system to search for information that, if require by law, 
should have been duplicated in a discoverable incident form.   
 As Tibbs evidences, the major flaw in the PSQIA is that it provides that nothing in the 
Act shall be construed to preempt or otherwise affect any state reporting requirement.50 Congress 
indicated that it intended to preempt state law with respect to the admissibility of PSWP, but it is 
silent on the issue of information generated as a result of a state reporting requirement.  Though 
the Tibbs dissent argued the opposite, sending the same information to a PSO that the hospital 
also sent to the state reporting system does not automatically immunize that information.  Indeed, 
because state mandates require that patient safety information exists separately, the PSQIA will 
not protect it when it is copied to the PSO.  By definition, the PSQIA only protects original 
documents—it will not protect any information that exists separately from the patient safety 
evaluation system.  This is an exceptionally narrow scope of protection.  
 Congress, as the most suited branch, needs to reform the statute to clearly recognize the 
PSWP privilege.51  Though it is not at issue, Congress was acting well within the scope of its 
power to regulate interstate commerce when it enacted the PSQIA.  Courts have affirmatively 
held that there is “no doubt concerning the power of Congress to regulate a peer review 
process.”52  To this end, Congress must amend the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act 
to unambiguously protect PSWP, making clear that this information may be accessed by state 
regulators without waiving federal privilege.53  As Congress itself pointed out in the House 
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Report, it can freely and vigorously protect all patient safety data submitted pursuant to the Act 
without depriving the plaintiff bar of other avenues for discovery.  
3. An Integrated and Effective Design 
 
[Charles] Billings stated that counting incidents is largely a waste of time, that 
reporting systems capture a fraction of the true number of incidents, and that the 
underlying population from which the reports are drawn is seldom known.54 
 
 —Charles Vincent, “Incident Reporting and Patient Safety”  
 
 
  Even with the requisite incentives and protections in place, the reporting system design 
must ameliorate and remove the many barriers that are currently preventing more frequent and 
detailed reporting.  Many barriers will be addressed through the recommended approach to 
incentives and patient safety information protections.  One major remaining barrier is more 
practical than philosophical—lack of time.  This one barrier intersects with a number of different 
co-factors, e.g., the report asks for too much information, the reporting system is too complex, 
difficult to access or use.  Though it seems obvious, the system must be designed to be easier and 
less burdensome to use.55  Experts typically advance two shared suggestions: (1) integrate 
reporting for quick and easy access in the electronic environment providers use, and (2) ensure 
the systems are incredibly easy to use with minimal or no training.56   
  One major area ripe for development is natural language processing.57  With this 
approach, (assuming that the reporting system is electronically integrated with the electronic 
medical record system) natural language processing would be running in the background as 
providers enter important data into the medical record.  That processing would be programed to 
respond to key words or phrases that would trigger a prompt to the provider suggesting that it 
might be information they would want to submit in a patient safety incident report.  Innovations 
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like these that will help to automate and streamline reporting will go a long way towards 
improving reporting systems.  The future of patient safety incident reporting must take advantage 
of these and other health information technology developments.    
4. Clear and Standardized Reporting Requirements 
 On a similar note, President Obama reportedly opposed mandatory reporting because he 
feared that it would be too impractical: 
[t]he best way to… [reduce medical errors] is to make sure not only that they're reporting 
these preventable errors, but that they're also available to consumers—the American 
people—so if you've got too many of them, after a while it starts getting embarrassing.58   
While President Obama agreed that preventable harm is a serious problem, he only supported 
mandatory reporting for infections—the administration argued that this is because infections are 
easier to document.59  While this reflects the important goal of transparency, it seems to provide 
too great of an allowance to hospitals to withhold this information.  Not surprisingly, this will 
make it very difficult for his concept, which he implemented to a degree within the Affordable 
Care Act, to succeed.  
 Though the Obama administration's argument could have merely been masking their 
pragmatic decision to avoid a fight over error reporting (in order to retain the support of the 
American Medical Association and the American Hospital Association in order to pass the 
Affordable Care Act), their premise is still valid.  It is incredibly important that reporting 
requirements are standardized nationwide.  One of the main reasons that doctors fail to submit 
reports is that the form takes too long to complete.60  Given the fact that thirty-two states and the 
District of Colombia track at least one Hospital Acquired Condition,61  it is critical that the 
process is standardized in every region.  Providers simply will not engage if there are conflicting 
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systems and reports to complete.  The Joint Commission and other quasi-regulatory 
organizations collecting this data should consider integrating with the national model rather than 
operating as a duplicitous reporting system that will only contribute to reporting fatigue.  For 
instance, a useful design might allow reporters to click a toggle box to indicate that the report 
should also be sent to The Joint Commission.   With a proper drafting of the PSWP by Congress, 
and adoption of that same standard by The Joint Commission, sharing the incident reports in this 
way would not void the PSWP.  
 Moreover, evidence shows that reporting systems are more effective when reportable 
incidents are clearly and narrowly defined.62  The criterion for what constitutes a patient safety 
incident needs to be explicit.  Similarly, the report needs to be limited in scope.  Consider the 
lessons learning through John Flanagan’s critical incident technique.63  Initial applications of this 
technique failed to provide sufficient data regarding pilot performance.  A second attempt, 
despite emphasizing the importance of fact-based reports from competent observers, still failed 
to collect information accounting for all of the factors and events.  The third study, however, did 
manage to provide factual and objective information—it appeared to succeed where prior studies 
had failed by explicitly directing the respondent to describe the officer’s actions.  Indeed, a 
hallmark of this technique is that it only requires observers to report simple observations.  In the 
same way, a patient safety reporting system will function best when it limited in scope and only 
requires for reporters to objectively describe the actions involved in the incident.   
 This is bolstered when you consider how frequently providers make mistakes when the 
reporting forms expect providers to encode and classify variables.  In fact, one study found that 
providers misclassified the event category in as many as 25% of all reports.64  Similarly, 20% of 
those reports miscoded the level of impact.  This contributes to significant waste and 
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inefficiencies within current methods that expect providers to not only report the incident, but 
also begin analyzing and classifying it.  To the extent that the PSQIA has already made progress 
in implemented a standard reporting format, it should incorporate the lessons expounded in this 
section.  
A simple and standardized reporting form will also help provide better feedback about 
needed system changes.65  Currently, the lack of standardization makes it difficult for reviewers 
to compare and aggregate data—in turn, this makes it more difficult to prevent future errors.    
5. Closing the Feedback Loop 
There are a number of different factors that will determine whether a reporting system 
will successfully close the feedback loop.66  As chapter five determined, timely and meaningful 
feedback (a process that is referred to as ‘closing the safety feedback loop’) is critical to a 
successful reporting system.67  Indeed, in one study, 86% of nurses and 81% of physicians 
agreed that they would be more likely to submit a report if the reporting system provided 
feedback about what steps were being taken to correct the system defects that allowed for the 
error incident.68  As such, the importance of this step is too great to be overstated.69   
An important aspect to understand is that closing the feedback loop requires more than 
proforma feedback.  The feedback undertaken in response to reported information must both 
identify and explain the systemic vulnerabilities that allowed for the incident, and also offer 
credible correction plans.70  Ultimately, the safety feedback loop must represent an ongoing, 
cyclical, and credible process of receiving, analyzing, and responding to incident reports.   
One critical point in that cycle calls for rapid feedback cycles: this alludes to the 
capability to quickly provide an initial response, even if that initial response is incomplete and 
only offers a temporary solution while an investigation is ongoing.71  In addition to the design 
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advantages discussed above, another major benefit of web-based reporting systems is that it 
could enable providers to access timely information on their own, comparing indicators and other 
trends with a peer group or past reports.72  Allowing providers to access this information in real 
time would help to counter concerns that reporting is wasted time.  Ideally, the de-identified 
reports could be tagged with certain markers based on their topic and primary system defects 
involved.  The reporting system could then use these markers to add updates to the applicable 
incident reports; while this would not absolve the reporting system and hospital leaders of acting 
in response to the most recent incident report, it would offer evidence that could build confidence 
that feedback is prioritized and offered.  Not only would this approach give providers instant 
access to potential solutions (helping to provide value to reporting), it would go a long way to 
combating apathy.73  
B. Codifying the Model 
1. Model Legislation 
The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act already provides a mechanism to 
develop a centralized, mandatory, non-punitive reporting system that can collect and disseminate 
adverse event information to a national audience.  Given the existing infrastructure, Congress is 
in a unique position to more easily fix this problem by amending an existing Act.  This is a major 
benefit.  It already took Congress five years to pass The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement 
Act, and another four for it to become effective in 2009.  It would be imprudent to discard those 
years of progress and start with a new statute.  Instead, Congress should commit to a bi-partisan 
effort to amend and improve upon the existing legislation.  
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2. Roadblocks to Achieving Regulation 
 Each congressional session since the 105th Congress has produced some variation of 
patient safety legislation; however, passage is often thwarted.  Unfortunately, healthcare 
lobbying plays a vital role in the development and passage of healthcare legislation.  These 
powerful interest groups will represent one of the most powerful barriers in the push towards 
amending the existing nationwide regulation.  Fearing retribution, the healthcare industry has 
been aggressively lobbing against mandatory error reporting for decades.  Though legislation can 
be drafted to attempt to allay some of these concerns, and proponents can push the business case, 
the voice of the American public will be the most influential force in passing this sort of reform. 
Voters will need consider this issue when heading to the ballots and continue to stress the 
importance of this issue when their representatives are considering relevant bills.   
This will require cohesive messaging and a major public campaign.  Indeed, Americans 
notoriously struggle to understand their own interests—especially within the healthcare field—
because polarized politics make it difficult to comprehend the reforms clearly and with historical 
perspective.  Given the peculiar moral judgments that Americans have developed—although it is 
only one factor in an incredibly complex trap—the social consequences of human behavior 
might be the most powerful obstacle.  Indeed, as Paul Starr explains, American values are not 
naturally opposed to healthcare reform (in any capacity).  Starr notes, for example, that 
Americans do not demonize government involvement in the public school system as “socialized 
education.”74 Starr reconciles this contradiction by explaining that institutional legacies influence 
how people apply their values to social spheres.  In this way, moral values are inexplicably 
complicated.  Rather than engage in self-reflection, the public beliefs and ideologies develop in 
reaction to interest group’s efforts to mobilize shared values on behalf of their positions.   
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The extent of this public ignorance and misinformation proves to be a formidable foe for 
advancing public policy.  Especially given the broader pattern of increased polarization in 
American politics, it is easy to appreciate how greater social cohesion would contribute to better 
public policies.  To participate in constructive dialogue, therefore, it is critical to understand how 
health care became such treacherous terrain in American politics.  It is perhaps more crucial to 
monitor the interplay between the mass media and the political market.  Without this 
understanding and influence, advisors will struggle to implement effective policies for social 
change.   
C. Conclusion 
This chapter unequivocally posits that unrestrained blame will not create a safer 
healthcare system.  The United States must mandate participation in a national, nonpunitive 
reporting system, while simultaneously ensuring participation through thoughtful and effective 
system design. While organizational ethics offers an avenue and normative foundation to hold 
institutions morally accountable, the success or failure of error reporting will ultimately depend 
on how well the structure for centralized reporting functions.   
From an ethical perspective, the most important issue is protecting patients.  This will 
always be more pressing and take priority over enforcing moral absolutism.  Further, this 
dissertation has evidenced that genuine reform will require a unified and collaborative 
approach—one that must include hospital leadership. To accomplish this goal, this dissertation 
has identified five main criteria for a successful system: (1) incentivize safety efforts, (2) protect 
providers and institutions from unfair punitive measures, (3) integrate the reporting mechanism 
within existing systems to streamline reporting, (4) ensure reporting mandates are clear and easy 
to interpret, and (5) provide meaningful feedback to encourage continued reporting. 
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Incentivizing safety will require providing a compelling business case for participation.  
The greatest tool at the federal government’s disposal is its allocation of federal monies through 
Medicare and Medicaid—accounting for nearly half of hospitals’ revenue.75  The most promising 
approach for implementing this would mandate reporting as a condition of participation, while 
coordinating with The Joint Commission to enforce this mandate.  Ideally, this might have the 
added benefit of encouraging hospital and healthcare institutions to consider patient safety 
metrics when determining CEO and senior leadership compensation.   
As a necessary step in protecting those incentives, the government must reform the 
Patient Safety Quality Improvement Act to needs to clearly recognize the PSWP privilege.76  To 
protect against judicial intrusion, the amended statute must make clear that patient safety work 
product is unambiguously protected, regardless of whether state mandated reporting requires its 
own duplicitous reports.  Congress is more than capable of vigorously protecting all patient 
safety data submitted pursuant to the PSQIA without depriving plaintiffs’ access to that 
information through other means.  
With those barriers removed, the system itself must also be improved to better integrate 
within the normal workflow.  Evidence points to electronic databases—particularly ones that 
directly integrate with the hospital’s electronic medical record system—as being influential in 
increasing both the number and accuracy of reports.  This approach easily meets the two primary 
criteria for overcoming these barriers: quick and easy access to reporting that is incredibly easy 
to use with little training.  
To both ensure that reporting stays simple, while also safeguarding the ability of 
reviewers to aggregate and compare incoming data, it is imperative that reporting requirements 
are clear, and the reporting forms are standardized.  The goal of reporting systems should be to 
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improve safety, not to simply collect as much data as possible.  Recall the wisdom of the orange 
wire test—the reporting system must not be allowed to exemplify the filing cabinet instead of the 
orange wire.  
Lastly, to that point, the reporting system must close the feedback loop.  This is, after all, 
the entire purpose for the reporting mechanism—to utilize the incident data to create a safer 
healthcare system.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
Patients are dying—as many as 400,000 every year.  Guilt-stricken providers are 
persecuted for these mistakes—accidents that they are powerless to stop.  Hospitals are not being 
held accountable.  Despite ongoing awareness of the epidemic, the country is stuck in a cycle of 
inaction.   
While there are already countless efforts and programs in place (at state, institutional, and 
quasi-regulatory levels) to collect information about patient safety incidents, these efforts have 
been falling flat.  Too often, the patient safety efforts that are being implemented do not build 
from basic cause and effect.  To be fair, it usually is not possible—the United States does not 
have a comprehensive database with information on adverse events in order for organizations to 
learn from experience.1  As a result, even though the IOM report generated widespread 
awareness that medical errors continue to occur throughout health care, there is still an 
overwhelming ignorance as to the nature of the problem.2  Even when one program or system is 
able to collect enough data to reveal a defect or factor that contributes to harm, the lack of 
coordination between the various programs is inhibiting and stunting our learning.  
Complicating efforts is our innate human desire to want to find someone to blame when 
errors arise.  Psychologically, blaming individuals is emotionally more satisfying than targeting 
institutions because society believes that individuals are able to choose between right and wrong 
in ways that organizations cannot.3  Although the study of human error and accident theory 
demonstrates that errors (by definition) are unintentional, society continues to hold the belief that 
individuals can choose to be error-free.  Not only does this belief encourage unnecessary guilt 
and shame, it also disregards contemporary knowledge about what actually causes harm (i.e., 
system defects).  
 271 
Not surprisingly, according to the IOM, the biggest challenge to building a safer health 
system is shifting from a culture of blame to a culture that treats errors as opportunities to 
improve the system.4  This oversimplifies the problem.  Rather than focus entirely on how we 
treat individuals (including, how we can structure systems to adjust for human fallibility), as a 
society, we must reform notions of accountability to include organizational duty.  Social science 
reveals the prominence of amoral thinking among organizations, wherein organizations act self-
interestedly—not because of intentional wrongdoing, but as a consequence of simply not 
considering their ethical responsibilities.5  By attributing collective moral agency to the 
organization, society can impose a moral obligation to consider normative responsibilities and 
translate those decisions into appropriate behavior.  There is a tremendous opportunity to apply 
the concept of organizational ethics to impose those normative standards. 
To successfully improve patient safety, it is critical to shift to a more comprehensive and 
integrated approach to ethics and quality improvement, which is captured in the transition to 
organizational ethics.  The purpose of this analysis is to approach the problem of medical error 
from the perspective of organizational ethics in healthcare.  In this respect, this dissertation 
explored the ethical justification for developing a centralized, mandatory, non-punitive reporting 
system that can collect and disseminate adverse event information to a national audience.  This 
argument relies on two foundational concepts:  
1.   that a systems-based approach to patient safety recognizes that healthcare 
organizations are best suited to intervene to improve patient safety, and  
2.   that organizational ethics provides a normative foundation to force government 
actors to hold healthcare organizations morally accountable for defects and 
failures within the system design that allow for these mistakes to occur.  
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Together, these concepts have provided an ethical framework to call for greater transparency and 
a nationwide implementation of a mandatory reporting system for preventable harm.  The 
argument builds by first acknowledging the widely accepted understanding of error management 
(i.e., that poorly designed complex systems are the primary, or root, cause for accidents).  This 
foundation provides a mechanism to adopt a similar organizational approach to call for a 
nationally mandated reporting system to address the problem of medical errors.  This is the first 
dissertation to use a bioethics analysis, grounded in organizational ethics to argue that healthcare 
organizations are ethically required to invest in patient safety.  
 The dissertation first explored the extent of the problem within healthcare. Chapter two 
critically examined the complex arena of medical error, exploring how the history of medicine 
and rise of technology harm helped to create a system that facilities error.  After describing the 
magnitude of the current crisis, this chapter further analyzed the current taxonomies and 
definitions that laypersons and researchers employ when discussing medical error.  
Consequently, this dissertation defines medical error as an act or omission during planning or 
execution that contributes (or could contribute) to an unintentional and unreasonable deviation.   
To provide a context for understanding the responsibility that healthcare organizations 
owe, chapter three considers the history and evolution of the patient safety movement.  This 
analysis studied the terminology and methods that guide modern approach to patient safety and 
reviewed how the application of a systems-based approach to error will develop a safer 
healthcare system. The key teaching in this sense is that, given the complexity of organizational 
systems, the prevailing culture of blame is primarily responsible for the current rates of error.  
Indeed, because of the unavoidability of errors within complex systems, safety depends on the 
ability to resolve systemic flaws.  As such, errors are system accidents—not human weaknesses.   
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Chapter four, then, sought to understand why hospitals and healthcare organizations have 
not traditionally been held accountable for this harm.  After first examining the historical 
application of government regulation—particularly as applied to hospitals—this chapter 
unpacked the legal precedent for regulating businesses to protect the public interest.  As it 
explained the historical origins of the American hospital system contributed to a patchwork of 
regulations within the healthcare industry.  Though many scholars have argued that Nebbia 
discarded the concept of a business affected with the public interest, this chapter makes clear that 
the Nebbia court ultimately freed the scope of legislative power from the confines of businesses 
“affected with a public interest.”  Ultimately, this case expanded the state police power—leaving 
it up to individual state legislatures to determine whether a business or industry is should be 
regulated as being affected with the public interest.  
Of particular significance to this dissertation’s central argument, this legal history paved 
the way for hospitals to be regulated as public utilities.  As demonstrated, regulation is warranted 
when the magnitude of harm is too great for the general public to influence through normal 
market forces—accordingly, the U.S. government is justified in regulating healthcare 
organizations to improve patient safety. 
Lastly, this chapter critically examined the ethical obligation within the industry to 
develop patient safety systems.  Through this analysis, it is clear that healthcare organizations 
need to assume greater responsibility in the patient safety movement.  Specifically, as moral 
agents, organizations have a robust moral and ethical obligation to develop patient safety systems 
and reduce public harm.  In this way, this dissertation uses organizational ethics as a mechanism 
to advance normative methods to improve the quality and safety of healthcare.  
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Armed with the legal authority to regulate, chapter five reviewed the ethical and legal 
debate surrounding voluntary and mandatory reporting systems.  The prevailing argument is that 
mandatory reporting systems are unnecessary at best, and harmful at worst.  There are a number 
of co-factors, but ultimately, there are two reasons why doctors and medical associations 
strongly oppose mandatory reporting, and have, historically, blocked all attempts at 
implementing a mandatory reporting system.  Opponents argue that: 
(1)  empirical evidence demonstrates that even mandatory reporting does not solve the 
problem of underreporting,6 and  
(2)  mandatory systems discourage participation.  
Chapter five effortlessly countered these arguments.  Indeed, it is misleading to suggest that 
because the current punitive-focused mandatory reporting systems are failing, all mandatory 
systems will fail.  The critics have admittedly raised important flaws that plague many systems, 
however, these are merely issues that need to be addressed when designing the system—not 
reasons why a well-designed system cannot succeed.  
However, given the lack of regulation and societal pressures, it is also painfully evident 
that, in order to realize progress, it is important to provide organizations with a compelling 
business case for patient safety.  This challenge moving forward will be providing a better basis 
for such a case.  While legal reforms are not likely to be the only solution, regulation can be an 
integral part of the resolution—should the public succeed in applying political pressure within 
their local or federal government.   
People are dying, and we have the power (and responsibility) to intervene.  This epidemic 
will persist until we, as a nation, demand change.  We must demand greater accountability within 
the healthcare system.  To facilitate this change, this dissertation provides the framework to 
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develop a centralized, mandatory non-punitive reporting system to collect and disseminate 
feedback to improve patient safety.  While confidentiality is a central component, it is also 
critical that negligent or reckless patient safety failings (that identify organizations, not 
providers) are appropriately reported to the public.  In this sense, the model depends on a two-
prong approach relying on both positive incentives and public scrutiny to hold the healthcare 
system accountable.  Accordingly, chapter 6 offers recommendations for how to codify and 
implement this approach.  To accomplish this goal, this dissertation has identified five main 
criteria for a successful system: (1) incentivize safety efforts, (2) protect providers and 
institutions from unfair punitive measures, (3) integrate the reporting mechanism within existing 
systems to streamline reporting, (4) ensure reporting mandates are clear and easy to interpret, and 
(5) provide meaningful feedback to encourage continued reporting. 
                                               
1 Lucian Leape, “Reporting of Adverse Events,” 1633-1638. 
2 Vincent, Patient Safety, 3-25. 
3 Reason, Human Error, 768-770. 
4 Institute of Medicine, Crossing the Quality Chasm. 
5 Gary Weaver, “Virtue in Organizations,” 350.   
6 Kohn et al., To Err is Human, 48. 
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APPENDIX. NATIONAL SURVEY OF LAWS  
Alabama Ala. Admin. Code §§ 540-X-10-.11(1) (requires outpatient surgery physicians 
to report adverse events to board of medical examiners) 
Alaska No error reporting laws. 
Arizona No error reporting laws. 
Arkansas No error reporting laws.  
California Cal. Health & Safety Code §1279-1280 (2008) 
Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-1-124 (2008), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-3-601 to -607 (2008). 
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-127n (2007), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-494 (2007), Conn. 
Agencies Regs. § 19a-127n-2 (2008). 
Delaware No error reporting laws. 
DC D.C. Code § 7-161 (2008), 17-40 D.C. Code Mun. Regs § 4017.40 (Weil 2008). 
Florida Fla. Stat. § 381.0271 (2006), §381.028 (2006), 395.0197 (2006), 458.351 
(2006), 459.026 (2006) 
Georgia  Mandatory reporting of patient incidents, O.C.G.A. §§. 31-2-4, 31-2-6, 31-5-5, 
31-7-2.1, 31-7-15, 31-7-133, 31-7-140, and 50-18-70. 
Hawaii No error reporting laws. 
Idaho No error reporting laws. 
Illinois Adverse Health Care Reporting Act of 2005, 410 Ill. Comp. Stat 522/10-5 to 
522/10-50 (2005), Hospital Report Care Act, 86/25(a)(2) (2008), Ill. Admin. 
Code §255, §§250, 280 (2008). 
Indiana  Ind. Code § 16-40-5-4 to § 16-40-5-6 (Supp. 2008), 410 Ind. Admin Code 15-
1.2-1 (2008), " 15.1-4-2 (2008), and " 2.2. 
Iowa No error reporting laws. 
Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-4921 to -4929 (2007), Kan. Admin Regs. § 28-52-1 to -4 
(2008). 
Kentucky No error reporting laws. 
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Louisiana No error reporting laws. 
Maine Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22 §§ 8751-8756 (2008), 10-144-112 ME. Code R. § VI 
(Weil 2008), 10-144-118 ME. Code R. § 5.C.7 (Weil 2008), 10-144-125 ME. 
Code R. § 4.B. (Weil 2008), 10-144-126 ME. Code R. § 4.F. (Weil 2008). 
Maryland MD. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 19-304 (2005), MD. Code Regs. 10.07.06.01-16 
(2008) (Hospital Patient Safety Program) 
Massachusetts Mass Gen. Laws ch. 111, §§ 203-205 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 112, § 5 (Supp. 2008); 243 Mass. Code. Regs. 3.07-3.08 (2008). 
Michigan No error reporting laws.  
Minnesota Minnesota Adverse Health Care Events Reporting Act of 2003, Minn Stat. §§ 
144.7063-144.7069 (Supp. 2008), Minn. Stat. § 145.64 (Supp. 2008) 
Mississippi No error reporting laws. 
Missouri No error reporting laws. 
Montana No error reporting laws. 
Nebraska Patient Safety Improvement Act, which allows for voluntary reporting. 
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 71-8701-02 (Supp. 2007). 
Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 439.800-890 (2005 & Supp. 2008), Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 
630.293.96, 630.505.07 (LEXIS 2008), Nev. Admin. Code §§ 439.900-915 
(2008) 
New 
Hampshire 
No error reporting laws. 
New Jersey Patient Safety Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 26:2H-12.23 to -12.25a (West 2007), N.J. 
Admin. Code §§ 8:43E-10.1 to 10.11 (2008) 
New Mexico No error reporting laws. 
New York N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2819 (HAI reporting), N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 
tit. 10, § 405.11 (2008) (HAI reporting), N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-1 (2008) 
(incident reporting), N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 405.8 (2008) 
(incident reporting), N.Y. Pub. Health law §§ 2995-2998 (initiative to create 
statewide health information system) 
North 
Carolina 
No error reporting laws.  Only exception was a law governing reporting of 
medication-related errors in nursing homes, which was repealed in 2013. 
North Dakota No error reporting laws. 
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3727.33 (LexisNexis 2008) 
Oklahoma No error reporting laws. 
Oregon Only mandatory for HAI, Admin. Rules 409-023-0000 et seq. (2008) 
Pennsylvania § 1303.407 (quality improvement payment to facilities that achieve a 10% 
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reduction in HAI) 
40 Pa. Con. Stat §§ 1303.103 to .407 (2008 & Supp. 2008). 
Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-17-40 (2001) 
South 
Carolina 
S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-16 (2008) 
South Dakota No error reporting laws. 
Tennessee Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1200-8-1.11 (2007), Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1200-8-
6.11 (2007) 
Texas Annual report, 25 Tex. Admin Code §133.48 (2008) 
Utah Sentinel event, Utah Code Ann. §26-33-103 (2007) 
Vermont NQF events, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 1912-1919 (Supp. 2007) 
Virginia No error reporting laws. 
Washington NFQ events, Wash. Rev. Code § 43.70.056 (Supp. 2008) 
West Virginia No error reporting laws. 
Wisconsin No error reporting laws. 
Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-2-912 (2007), 35-2-912 Wyo. Code R. §§ 1 to 14 (Supp. 
2008) 
 
